Decolonizing Psychic Space: Remembering the Indigenous Psychology Movement in Taiwan by Peng, Rong-Bang
Duquesne University
Duquesne Scholarship Collection
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Fall 2012
Decolonizing Psychic Space: Remembering the
Indigenous Psychology Movement in Taiwan
Rong-Bang Peng
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/etd
This Immediate Access is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. For more information, please contact
phillipsg@duq.edu.
Recommended Citation
Peng, R. (2012). Decolonizing Psychic Space: Remembering the Indigenous Psychology Movement in Taiwan (Doctoral dissertation,
Duquesne University). Retrieved from https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/1036
  
 
DECOLONIZING PSYCHIC SPACE: 
REMEMBERING THE INDIGENOUS PSYCHOLOGY MOVEMENT IN TAIWAN 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Submitted to the McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts 
 
 
 
 
Duquesne University 
 
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
By 
Rong-Bang Peng, M.A. 
 
December 2012 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by 
Rong-Bang Peng 
 
2012 
 
 iii 
 
 
 
 
DECOLONIZING PSYCHIC SPACE: 
REMEMBERING THE INDIDENOUS PSYCHOLOGY MOVEMENT IN TAIWAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
Rong-Bang Peng 
 
Approved November 15, 2012 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
Leswin Laubscher, PhD 
Professor of Psychology 
(Committee Chair) 
 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
Michael Sipiora, PhD 
Professor of Psychology 
(Committee Member) 
________________________________ 
Bruce Fink 
Professor of Psychology 
(Committee Member) 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
James C. Swindal, PhD 
McAnulty College and Graduate School 
of Liberal Arts  
Professor of Philosophy 
 
________________________________ 
Leswin Laubscher 
Chair, Department of Psychology 
Professor of Psychology 
 
 
 iv 
ABSTRACT 
 
DECOLONIZING PSYCHIC SPACE: 
REMEMBERING THE INDIGENOUS PSYCHOLOGY MOVEMENT IN TAIWAN 
 
 
 
By 
Rong-Bang Peng 
December 2012 
 
Dissertation supervised by Michael Sipiora, Ph.D. 
 This project is part of the historical struggle of the indigenous psychology 
movement in Taiwan.  It turns a critical gaze back upon the movement itself in order to 
decolonize it from colonial cultural imaginary. The contribution of this project is 
two-fold.  First, on the theoretical level, it introduces a critical perspective into the 
growing body of indigenous psychological research.  The indigenous psychology 
movement risks repeating the vicious cycle of colonization and re-colonization without 
critically looking back at its own historical trajectory.   Second, on the level of 
intervention, writing the history of the indigenous psychology movement will make this 
project a crucial first step toward relieving Taiwanese psychologists from the cultural 
aphasia resulting from the traumatic encounter between two worlds. 
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Chapter 1 
Indigenous Psychology: The Conjunction of Two Wor(l)ds 
 
In more ingenuous times, when the tyrant razed cities for his own greater 
glory, when the slave chained to the conqueror's chariot was dragged 
through the rejoicing streets, when enemies were thrown to the wild beasts 
in front of the assembled people, the mind did not reel before such 
unabashed crimes, and the judgment remained unclouded. But slave 
camps under the flag of freedom, massacres justified by philanthropy or 
by a taste for the superhuman, in one sense cripple judgment. On the day 
when crime dons the apparel of innocence — through a curious 
transposition peculiar to our times — it is innocence that is called upon to 
justify itself. (Camus, 1991, pp. 3-4) 
 
Kuo-Shu Yang, the founder of the indigenous psychology movement in Taiwan, 
begins the story of his profound intellectual and professional transformation from a 
Westernized psychologist to an indigenous psychologist by revealing to readers his dream, 
the dream for a genuinely ―indigenous psychology‖ in Chinese societies: 
I have had a professional dream for about twenty years—to turn the 
unhealthily Westernized psychology in Chinese societies into a genuinely 
indigenous Chinese psychology. (Yang, 1997, p. 63) 
 
The rhetoric of relating one‘s dream to the collective destiny of the people to which one 
belongs easily reminds readers of the historic ―I have a dream‖ speech delivered by Dr. 
Martin Luther King Jr. in 1963 in front of the Lincoln Memorial, in which he called for 
the nation to rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed: ―We hold these truths to 
be self-evident, that all men are created equal.‖  Indeed, Yang‘s story does bear 
resemblance to Dr. King‘s speech.  However, the resemblance is more than in rhetoric; 
it is in the humbleness of their dreams as well as in the great agony involved to realize 
them. 
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What started as one man‘s dream eventually culminated in an academic 
movement.  Over the past 30 years, the indigenous psychology movement advocated by 
Yang has become an undeniable phenomenon in Taiwan.  More than half a dozen 
conferences directly related to or inspired by the movement have been organized since 
the inception of the movement in the mid-1970s.  Advocates and interested scholars 
have published more than 200 papers, most of them written in Chinese; nevertheless, 
English-written papers seem to be growing in numbers in recent years (Hwang, 2004).  
A Chinese semiannual journal entitled Indigenous Psychological Research in Chinese 
Societies was created to provide a forum for indigenous psychological research in 1993; 
in the same year, the Laboratory of Research for Indigenous Psychology was established 
in the Department of Psychology at the National Taiwan University (NTU) to hold 
seminars for researchers to share their thoughts and works (Hwang, 2005a).  In 1997, 
the Foundation for the Advancement of Indigenous Psychology in Chinese Societies was 
established to provide organizational support for indigenous psychological research.  In 
2000, a four-year, nationally funded project of Chinese indigenous psychological 
research was launched as a part of a multi-million dollar governmental program, and 
some of the results became a special issue (volume 22) of the journal of Indigenous 
Psychological Research in Chinese Societies in 2004.  All told, more than two 
generations of Taiwanese psychologists have been either mobilized to participate in the 
movement or at least influenced or troubled by it (Gabrenya, Kung, & Chen, 2006).  In 
his article about the historical development of social psychology in Taiwan, Hei-Yuan 
Chiu (2004), a prominent Taiwanese sociologist with a background in psychology, 
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comments that indigenous psychological research has, since the 1990s, become ―the most 
important trend‖ within social psychological research in Taiwan (p. 210). 
The call for an indigenous psychology is not a phenomenon peculiar to Taiwan; in 
fact, starting from the mid-1970s psychologists in other parts of the world such as India 
(Nandy, 1974), Mexico (Díaz-Guerrero, 1977), the Philippines (Enriquez, 1977), Japan 
(Azuma, 1984), and Korea (Kim, 1990) also advocate their own versions of indigenous 
psychologies.  Indian psychologist Durganand Sinha nicely summarizes that indigenous 
psychology ―has developed as a reaction to or rejection of dominance of Western 
psychology…and has assumed almost the shape of a ‗movement‘ in many erstwhile 
colonial and developing countries‖ (Sinha, 1997, p. 135).  Despite the fact that 
indigenous psychologies were gaining ground in various Asian societies and the Muslim 
world, the marginal voices of indigenous psychologies flew mostly under the radar of 
mainstream American psychology in the 1970s and the 1980s (Turtle, 1989).  The year 
1993 was a landmark for indigenous psychologies—under the editorship of Uichol Kim 
and John W. Berry, the first anthology of indigenous psychologies, entitled Indigenous 
psychologies: Research and experience in cultural context, was published.  Toward the 
end of the 1990s, as the related discussions became more heated, several special issues 
were organized by interested scholars and published in peer-reviewed journals such as 
Asian Journal of Social Psychology (1998/2000/2005), Applied Psychology: An 
International Review (1999), and the International Journal of Psychology (2006).  In 
2006, under the editorship of Uichol Kim, Kuo-Shu Yang, and Kwang-Kuo Hwang, 
another anthology of indigenous psychologies, entitled Indigenous and cultural 
psychology: Understanding people in context, was published.  The emergence of 
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indigenous psychologies has become, as Carl Martin Allwood and John W. Berry 
comment, an ―interesting new phenomenon‖ in psychology (Allwood & Berry, 2006b). 
It has taken nearly three decades for indigenous psychologies to be finally 
recognized as an ―interesting new phenomenon,‖ as something worthy of attention.  I 
will argue, however, that this recent recognition—a seemingly victorious moment for the 
indigenous psychology movement—is at the same time misrecognition.  And, as I will 
strive to demonstrate, this (mis)recognition of indigenous psychologies, if properly 
analyzed, can serve as the entry point to really unpack the phenomenon of indigenous 
psychologies in its complexity. 
 
The Recognition/Misrecognition of Indigenous Psychology1 
 
The Negro is a slave who has been allowed to assume the attitude of a 
master.  The white man is a master who has allowed his slaves to eat at 
his table. (Fanon, 1952/1967, p. 219) 
 
The emergence of indigenous psychologies is often misrecognized as the 
emergence of a new approach in psychology.  As a so-called ―culture-related‖ approach, 
it is often compared to the other two culture-related approaches, namely, cross-cultural 
psychology and cultural psychology.  Since most psychologists are more or less familiar 
with the two established culture-related psychologies, it is quite intuitive to compare this 
new phenomenon with the old ones.  ―Culture,‖ however it is defined, seems to be the 
main concern for the three of them.  When Harry C. Triandis, an American psychologist 
                                               
1 As I have alluded to in the following quote, the notion of ―recognition/misrecognition‖ is inspired by 
Frantz Fanon‘s classical work on colonial subjectivity Black Skin, White Masks (1952/1967); however, as 
Fanon pointed out in the lengthy footnote (fn. 25, pp. 161-164), the theoretical formulation of the role of 
the imago in the formation of the subject should be credited to Lacan‘s (2006) conception of the mirror 
stage.  
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and the chief editor of the first edition of the Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology 
(1980), was invited to be a keynote speaker, representing the cross-cultural perspective at 
the Third Conference of the Asian Association of Social Psychology (AASP) in 1999, he 
as well as the other five keynote speakers
2
 were asked by the conference organizer ―to 
focus and to share their views on how these three different perspectives can be 
consolidated‖ (Hwang & Yang, 2000, p. 183).  This request makes the conference 
papers an interesting and representative anthology with which to begin a discussion of the 
recognition/misrecognition of the indigenous psychology movement. 
Is indigenous psychology a new approach to psychology?  If so, how is it 
different from the other two existing culture-related approaches?  And finally, is there a 
way to synthesize the three approaches?  These are questions Triandis tries to address in 
his keynote speech, which was published a year later in the special issue of the Asian 
Journal of Social Psychology.   
To begin with, indigenous psychology, cultural psychology, and cross-cultural 
psychology are taken by Triandis to be ―sub-disciplines‖ or ―approaches‖ of the broad 
area that deal with culture and psychology (Triandis, 2000, p. 185).  The major 
difference among them is that each has its own kind of sampling bias.  As Triandis puts 
it,  
Indigenous psychologists sample especially the meaning of keywords in 
the culture.  Cultural psychologists are more likely to sample 
ethnographic information and ignore information that comes from 
laboratory experiments.  They are likely to look for relationships within 
the culture.  Cross-cultural psychologists are more likely to sample 
information across cultures.  They are methodologically in-between 
                                               
2 Six distinguished scholars from three culture-related psychologies were invited as keynote speakers: the 
cross-cultural perspective was represented by Harry Triandis and John Berry; the cultural psychological by 
Richard Shweder and Patricia Greenfield, and the indigenous psychological by Kuo-Shu Yang and Uichol 
Kim (Hwang & Yang, 2000).   
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experimental (rigorous control of situations, manipulation of dependent 
[sic] variables) and cultural psychologists. (p. 185) 
 
According to Triandis, the methodological difference among the three can be best 
illustrated by using the emic-etic distinction.
3
  Triandis explains the distinction as 
follows: 
The emic view emphasizes that psychological processes take unique 
culture-specific forms; the etic view emphasizes that psychological 
processes are basically the same and have different manifestations…. In 
short, universals create the basis, and cultural differences are 
superimposed. (Triandis, 2000, p. 186) 
 
By adopting the framework of the emic-etic distinction, Triandis perceives ―indigenous 
psychology as emphasizing emics, experimental psychology as emphasizing etics, and 
cultural and cross-cultural as located in-between, with cultural closer to indigenous, and 
cross-cultural closer to experimental psychology‖ (p. 186).  The main advantage of 
indigenous psychology is that: 
This approach allows a researcher to get to the heart of a culture, by 
analyzing the central concepts used very frequently by its members, and 
the relationships among these central concepts.  One can discover 
phenomena that only exist in one culture, and are entirely unknown and 
unexpected by researchers from other cultures. (p. 190) 
 
Because Triandis articulates the difference between cultural psychology and indigenous 
psychology only in terms of how emic each one is, it is not surprising when he concludes 
that ―[to] a large extent the advantages of indigenous psychology are shared by cultural 
psychology‖ (p. 191).   Therefore, one can say that there is nothing new about 
indigenous psychology except that it tends to be more emic than cultural psychology; it 
does not really create any new niche since the advantages are already demonstrated by an 
                                               
3 The emic-etic distinction is commonly used in anthropology and cross-cultural psychology.  The two 
terms were first coined by linguistic anthropologist Kenneth Pike (1967) to refer to the distinction between 
an insider‘s view (the emic view) and an outsider‘s view (the etic view) of a cultural system. 
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existing approach.  In fact, indigenous psychology‘s emic orientation actually becomes 
its main disadvantage.  As Triandis says, 
It is very difficult to convince mainstream psychologists that they should 
pay attention to the findings of this approach.  They say: I am interested 
in universal psychological phenomena, not in anthropology.  Furthermore, 
there are potentially too many findings that can be generated by this 
approach.  It is difficult to convince mainstream psychologists to pay 
attention to that many findings.  In addition, the richness of findings 
raises the question: Which findings are ―really‖ important?  One needs 
some criterion that can rank-order the importance of the findings.  For 
example, do the findings predict behavior? (p. 191) 
 
There are quite a few things to unpack in the above quote.  First, according to Triandis‘s 
understanding, the emic-etic spectrum is not categorical, but hierarchical.  Second, the 
―mainstream psychologists‖ are those who see themselves on the etic/universal side of 
the spectrum; they are privileged to be acultural, to be convinced, to recognize or 
disregard findings, and to prescribe standards for the importance of research.  Last but 
not least, indigenous psychologies are disadvantaged the moment they are placed in the 
hierarchical emic-etic spectrum since they fall under the approach named ―Indigenous 
Psychology,‖ which is inevitably less than cultural psychology and all other psychologies 
on the spectrum. Indigenous psychologies, then, are doomed to be inferior.  Triandis 
therefore suggests two ways for indigenous psychologists to correct their methodological 
inadequacy so that they may be ―visible‖ to the mainstream.  The first one, as quoted 
above, is to conform to the standards prescribed by the mainstream—for example, 
―predictive validity‖—to rank their findings.   Second, in order to get the attention of 
mainstream psychologists, the best strategy for indigenous psychologists is to become the 
examiners of cross-cultural theories rather than to become theorists in their own right. As 
Tiandis says, 
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Mainstream psychologists pay attention only when they are shown that 
their favorite theories are only valid in their own culture, and cannot be 
generalized to other cultures.  A demonstration of that point is best done 
by using the methods of mainstream psychology, in different cultures, and 
by showing, for instance, that one obtains the usual findings in the West, 
but not in the East.  In short, mainstream psychologists are more likely to 
pay attention to the findings of cross-cultural than of indigenous or 
cultural psychologists. (p. 191)   
 
In the following discussion, I will focus on two aspects of Triandis‘s comparison 
of the three psychologies: (a) how indigenous psychology is conceptualized in relation to 
the other two psychologies, and (b) how indigenous psychology is situated in the ―culture 
vs. universality‖ issue. 
John W. Berry, a well-respected Canadian psychologist, was another keynote 
speaker representing the cross-cultural perspective at the AASP conference.  Curiously, 
being the chief editor of the second edition of the Handbook of Cross-Cultural 
Psychology (1997), Berry‘s take on the three psychologies seems to have reflected a 
generational difference between the first and the second generation of cross-cultural 
psychologists.  Compared to Triandis‘s adamant positivistic and ethnocentric stance, 
Berry (2000) attempts to offer a more inclusive position which takes into account the 
changes in the field within the past two decades. 
For Berry, the emic-etic spectrum on which Triandis relies to compare the three 
psychologies appears to be too simple to adequately address the complexity of the affair.  
He divides the etic approach into the imposed etic approach
4
 and the derived etic 
                                               
4 The usage of the term ―imposed‖ here refers to the ethnocentric nature of the cross-cultural comparisons 
done in the early years of cross-cultural psychology. 
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approach
5
 in order to avoid the methodological pitfall of equating the etic with the 
universal. 
The other noticeable difference from Triandis‘s view is the historical nature of 
Berry‘s comparison:  He does not merely compare the three psychologies on the basis of 
categorical differences as if they are things to be compared; instead, he tries to more or 
less restore the historicity of the approaches—to see them as a historically evolving 
―sequence of activities‖ as he compares them (p. 198).  What results from historicizing 
the comparison is a framework that integrates the revised emic-etic methodological 
distinction with a reinterpretation of the three goals of cross-cultural psychology that 
Berry and Dasen proposed in 1974. 
From Berry‘s viewpoint, Triandis‘s take on cross-cultural psychology, that is, ―to 
transport current hypotheses and conclusions about human behavior to other cultural 
contexts in order to test their validity‖ (p. 198), does not cover the full spectrum of the 
tasks of cross-cultural psychology.  He refers to Triandis‘s narrowly defined 
cross-cultural psychology as the ―imposed etic methodological approach‖ and he argues 
that it is only the first goal of cross-cultural psychology (p. 198). 
The second goal of cross-cultural psychology, ―to explore new cultural systems to 
discover psychological phenomena not available in the first culture,‖ is associated with 
the ―emic methodological approach‖ (p. 198).   Berry identifies the emic approach with 
the emergence of ―cultural,‖ ―indigenous,‖ and ―ethnic‖ psychologies (p. 198).  As he 
argues in an earlier text, this move toward the emic approach has to do with the 
―diversification in the notion of culture and how it may be related to psychology‖ (Berry, 
                                               
5 The usage of the term ―derived‖ here refers to the derivative nature of the cross-cultural comparative 
approach proposed by Berry. 
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1997, p. xi).  Some of this change came from the influence of cultural anthropology, 
especially from one of the most influential interpretive anthropologists Clifford Geertz: 
In the 1970s, a move was afoot to emphasize more the symbolic view, in 
which culture was to be found within and between individuals in their 
shared meanings and practices….This emergent view (in anthropology) of 
culture as ‗an historically transmitted pattern of meaning embodied in 
symbols‘ (Geertz, 1973, p. 89) and as ‗a conceptual structure or system of 
ideas‘ (Geertz, 1984, p. 8) has given rise to a more cognitive emphasis in 
psychology on the intersubjective, interpretive conception of culture, now 
broadly adopted by those who identify with ‗cultural psychology‘ (Cole, 
1996; Shweder, 1990). (Berry, 2000, p. 199) 
 
The other change came from the cultural ―Others‖ who had previously been studied by 
cross-cultural psychologists as objects.  As Berry points out,  
There can be no doubt that for many years cross-cultural psychology was 
done mostly by those in the Western, economically and politically 
powerful nations; the objects of their attention were usually ‗others.‘  
When these others lived elsewhere, they were ‗tribes,‘ and when they were 
closer at hand they were ‗subcultures‘ or ‗minorities.‘ (Berry, 1997, p. xi) 
 
These cultural Others tend to use the emic approach because methodologically it can help 
them to ―[understand] themselves in their own terms‖ and ―[draw] upon their own 
culturally-rooted concepts and intellectual traditions‖ (p. xi).  As Berry points out, these 
cultural Others brought about the emergence of ―acculturation psychology,‖ ―ethnic 
psychology,‖ ―indigenous psychology,‖ and ―ethnopsychology‖ (Berry, 1997, pp. xi-xii). 
The third goal of cross-cultural psychology is associated with the ―derived etic 
methodological approach‖ which seeks to ―integrate psychological knowledge gained 
from these first two activities, and to generate a more pan-human psychology that would 
be valid for all people‖ (p. 198).  Berry does not believe that one can simply rely on the 
imposed etic approach to create a psychology that is universal to all humankind; he 
emphasizes that a universal psychology can only come from the derived etic approach 
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that is grounded in a solid foundation of a diversity of cultural or indigenous 
psychologies.  So, unlike Triandis, Berry does not prioritize the etic approach over the 
emic approach; on the contrary, he seems to have reversed the priority so that the emic 
approach becomes the foundation of the etic approach.  This is what he calls the ―culture 
first, comparison second‖ rule (p. 202).  Nevertheless, Berry has not given up the pursuit 
of a universal psychology, of which the etic approach is an indispensible part.  As he 
says,  
I consider that the cultural and the comparative perspectives are both 
necessary; neither is sufficient (Berry, 1999a).  This view was well 
argued by Pike (1967) who considered that the emic and etic perspectives 
are like the double view one gets from a stereoscope; the object is the 
same, but the two optics are slightly different, providing depth, relief and 
perspective on what is being observed (see also Berry, 1999b) (p. 201). 
 
This stereoscopic ―double view‖ that integrates the cultural/emic perspective with the 
comparative/etic perspective is at the core of Berry‘s argument; he argues that the two 
perspectives do not form a dichotomy but a symbiosis in which both are ―necessary‖ and 
neither is ―sufficient.‖  However, if one carefully examines the ―symbiosis‖ proposed by 
Berry, one finds neither a symbiotic relation (in which each one contributes to the other‘s 
existence) nor a stereographic relationship (in which each alone is flat, so to speak), but a 
dialectic relation
6
 in which the cultural/emic approach is needed by the comparative/etic 
approach to create a universal psychology.   
By carefully reviewing two leading cross-cultural psychologists‘ comparisons of 
the three psychologies, we have come a step closer to what I am trying to convey by the 
                                               
6 Young in his book White Mythologies (1990) has argued that even though the system of Hegelian 
dialectic is often used as a conceptual resource to formulate oppression and resistance to it, the system itself 
is a product of ethnocentrism (p. 33).  As he explains, ―This [dialectic] structure is not, as might at first be 
imagined, derived from a fantasy of power relations modeled on a medieval joust but from the 
phenomenological account of a subject perceiving an object, a same/other dialectic in which the other is 
first constituted by the same through its negation as other before being incorporated within it‖ (p. 37). 
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composite term ―recognition/misrecognition.‖  Let me briefly summarize the two 
viewpoints to point out the recognition/misrecognition therein.  In Triandis‘s article, 
indigenous psychology is indeed recognized as an approach.  However, as an approach, 
it is first characterized as an approach doomed to be inferior because it is placed on the 
furthest emic end of the emic-etic spectrum, in which the etic end represents the universal 
and the ideal, and the emic end represents the cultural and the trivial.  Second, 
indigenous psychology is characterized as an inadequate approach: indigenous 
psychology is too ―trivially rich‖ to be considered as anything other than subordinate to 
the etic/universal approach.  From the above characterization (or image) of indigenous 
psychology, this recognition is, in fact, a misrecognition because indigenous psychology 
is not seen as a psychology in its own right.  As Oliver (2001) keenly points out, this 
form of recognition/misrecognition belongs to ―the particular pathology of colonial and 
oppressive cultures‖ (p. 23).  In the context of psychology, this pathology of recognition 
has its roots in the colonial relation between mainstream American psychology and 
psychologies in other parts of the world, and this relation according to Sinha (1997) is 
characterized by domination and neglect. 
On the other hand, Berry‘s attempt to create a more inclusive cross-cultural 
psychology (rather than in opposition to cultural psychology and indigenous psychology, 
as Triandis does) is admirable but still problematic.  With regard to the 
conceptualization of the three psychologies, we have learned from Berry as well as 
Triandis that if one tries to conceptualize them within an ahistorical framework as 
methodological categories, one simply loses sight of the uniqueness of indigenous 
psychology because, as a methodological approach, it is not that different from cultural 
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psychology.  One has to adopt a historical framework in order to tell the difference 
between indigenous and cultural psychology.  Berry has clearly demonstrated that 
culture psychology and indigenous psychology are two distinctive events in the history of 
cross-cultural psychology.  The emergence of cultural psychology is the result of a 
paradigm shift in which the notion of ―culture‖ dramatically changed.  The emergence 
of indigenous psychologies is part of a greater event in which the previously objectified 
cultural Others began to speak for themselves, to act like subjects.  As Berry describes 
it, 
Cross-cultural psychology, while still dominated by Western views and 
psychologists, is no longer their exclusive preserve.  What started as a 
Western-based attempt to understand the ―others‖ is now a field 
well-populated by these ―others.‖  In part, this has come about by many 
developing world psychologists having experienced Western psychology 
(as graduate students, as research collaborators, or as ―consumers‖), and 
being attached to, and wary of it. (Berry, 1997, p. xiii) 
 
However, the uniqueness of the indigenous psychology movement as an event in which 
cultural Others voice their subjectivity is soon covered up by Berry‘s schematization of 
the symbiotic integration of three methodological approaches which, as I have pointed 
out, is a methodological variation of the Hegelian dialectic.  In Berry‘s grand 
schematization of the historical development toward a universal psychology—from the 
imposed etic to the emic to the derived etic approach, the function of the emic approach 
is to create a diverse knowledge base of indigenous psychologies which can again be 
integrated into the etic approach that really generates universal knowledge.  Universal 
knowledge for whom?  One must wonder.  Is the integration really a symbiosis in 
which the integrated knowledge benefits both sides, as Berry has claimed, or is it a 
dialectic in which the Others are needed and integrated into the same, as I have argued? 
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Allwood and Berry (2006a) have recently published an international analysis of 
the origins and development of indigenous psychologies which might give us some clues 
as to this issue.  In their worldwide survey, indigenous psychologists were asked to 
briefly address four questions related to the history and characteristics of indigenous 
psychology as they understand it in their local context as well as in the global context.  
After analyzing their answers, Allwood and Berry found several common themes.  One 
theme they found among all indigenous psychologists‘ responses was that ―IP 
[indigenous psychology] is a reaction by scholars and practitioners to the dominance of 
WP [Western psychology]‖ (2006a, p. 263).  This reaction, characterized by Allwood 
and Berry as ―post-colonial reactions to mainstream psychology‖ (p. 243), consists of two 
parts: first, indigenous psychology is ―viewed as a response that rejects the validity and 
usefulness of WP in their societies,‖ and second, it ―also seeks to provide an alternative 
psychology to the massive presence of WP in their own society, and internationally‖ (p. 
263).  The emergence of indigenous psychologies is therefore, as Sinha (1997) has 
observed, a ―crisis‖ reaction in non-Western societies in which ―de-colonization‖ of the 
psyche and ―cultural empowerment‖ are desperately needed (p. 137).  Berry‘s (2000) 
recognition of indigenous psychology as an event in which cultural Others voice their 
subjectivity apparently corresponds to this theme. 
On the other hand, Berry‘s (2000) project of a symbiotic universal psychology 
does not seem to be well supported among indigenous psychologists.  Indeed, Allwood 
and Berry (2006a) did find that more than half of the contributors discussed the 
possibility of creating a universal psychology.  However, if one carefully examines the 
responses, those who considered that possibility did not emphasize how a universal 
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psychology can benefit all humankind; instead, they emphasized that it can ―serve as a 
challenge to the presumed universal status of WP‖ (p. 265).  In other words, it was the 
de-colonizing aspect rather than the symbiotic aspect that was the emphasis of indigenous 
psychologists when they considered a universal psychology.  Besides, Berry himself 
seems to be aware of the ethnocentric nature of a so-called ―universal psychology‖ in his 
2006 article.  As Allwood and Berry (2006a) note, ―while the ‗derived etic psychology‘ 
may be more informed by many other cultures, it would still remain anchored in one 
specific cultural understanding‖ (p. 265).  Moreover, there is another theme that almost 
all indigenous psychologists endorsed besides the postcolonial reaction theme: they all 
agreed with Sinha (1997) that indigenous psychology is ―a facet of worldwide concern 
for making knowledge culturally appropriate‖ (p. 131).  As Allwood and Berry (2006a) 
have observed, 
IP was seen as an attempt to produce a local psychology within a specific 
cultural context….The local culture is unanimously identified both as a 
source of inspiration for developing an IP, and as a concrete goal in 
achieving an IP….Their unanimous concern with this theme means that it 
is widely accepted both as a local characteristic and as a global one. (p. 
263) 
 
Thus according to Allwood and Berry‘s analysis, the main concern of indigenous 
psychologists is in the local rather than in the universal.  Since a universal psychology is 
less an interest of indigenous psychologists, who really needs it?  One can reasonably 
argue that the project of a universal psychology is a dialectic rather than a symbiotic 
process which involves, as Young (1990) has pointed out, ―the creation, subjection and 
final appropriation‖ of cultural Others for the sake of Euro-American subjects (p. 33). 
Will cultural psychologists, who are often presumed to be more appreciative of 
the otherness of other cultures, be able to offer an alternative to the ones already 
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examined?  Richard A. Shweder, a prominent psychologist whose notion of cultural 
psychology is heavily influenced by Geertz‘s Interpretation of Cultures (1973), was also 
invited to give a keynote speech at the AASP conference representing cultural 
psychology.  In his comparison of the three psychologies, Shweder (2000) argues that 
there is hardly any difference between indigenous psychology and cultural psychology, 
yet both of them are quite different from cross-cultural psychology which seeks the 
uniformity of human behaviors (p. 212).  He argues that cultural psychology is the study 
of diverse ―mentalities‖ rather than the study of ―mind,‖ in which the term ―mind‖ refers 
to ―the totality of actual and potential conceptual contents of human cognitive processes‖ 
and the term ―mentality‖ refers to ―the actual cognitive functioning of a particular person 
or people‖ (p. 210).  From Shweder‘s perspective, the above characterization of cultural 
psychology does not deny the universals of common humanity; nevertheless, he claims 
that ―the search for and privileging of things that are uniform across all people and 
cultures‖ is not the proper project of cultural psychology (p. 210).  This position is 
summarized in his slogan, ―Universalism without the uniformity‖ (p. 210).  Therefore, 
the kind of universality, if the term still applies, that Shweder seeks in cultural 
psychology is neither a blunt ethnocentric universal, nor a dialectic universal which is 
elaborated but nonetheless ethnocentric, but the freedom to get beyond the limitations of 
any particular cultural perspective by ―staying on the move between different ways of 
seeing and valuing things in the world‖ (p. 219). 
At the core of Shweder‘s idea of cultural psychology is this freedom to think 
otherwise, to think outside of the limitations given in one‘s own culture. What he does 
not quite stress in his keynote speech, however, is the role that cultural Others play in the 
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exercise of such freedom.  This freedom that Shweder espouses actually depends on 
cultural Others.  As Shweder explains in his major work Thinking through cultures: 
Expeditions in cultural psychology (1991): 
Cultural psychology is an interpretative enterprise in Geertz‘s sense.  Yet 
just what is it one actually does in the interpretation of (intentional) worlds 
and (intentional) lives?  The answer to that question has much to do with 
the process of ―thinking through others‖…in at least the four senses…: (1) 
thinking by means of the other; (2) getting the other straight; (3) 
deconstructing and going beyond the other; and (4) witnessing in the 
context of engagement with the other. (p. 108) 
 
In the first sense, as Shweder explains, the other is used to ―reveal hidden dimensions of 
our selves‖ (p. 108); in the second sense, the other is rationally reconstructed as having 
an internal world or system consisting of ―indigenous belief, desire, and practice‖ in 
order to justify the existence of an alternative worldview (p. 109); in the third sense, the 
other is ―passed through‖ or ―intellectually transformed‖ into something else by exposing 
his or her hidden life or incompleteness (p. 109); and in the fourth sense, the other is 
represented or depicted as an ―alien other in an alien land‖ encountered by the 
―self-reflexive‖ cultural psychologist whose job is to depict the encounter (p. 110).  One 
should have no doubt by now that this ―interpretative enterprise,‖ upon which cultural 
psychologists pride themselves, is still another way of using cultural Others for the sake 
of Euro-American subjects.  However, this does not mean that there is no improvement 
in Shweder‘s formulation.  In his fourth sense of cultural psychology as ―thinking 
through others,‖ Shweder does something quite significant (whether he is fully aware of 
it or not): he reveals the conditions under which so-called ―cultural knowledge‖ is 
produced.  It is through the awareness of cultural differences created by the 
inter-cultural encounter that a cultural psychologist is able to understand the Others in 
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relation to him or herself or to understand him or herself in relation to the Others.  
Therefore, the one who is depicting the other should not be left out of the picture because 
the representation or knowledge of the other is eventually for oneself; cultural knowledge 
is perspectival rather than objective. 
Through analyzing the perspectives of psychologists whose works are at the 
interface of cultures, I have argued that the recent recognition of indigenous psychology 
as a new approach in psychology is a misrecognition of the indigenous psychology 
movement. The recognition/misrecognition either adopts the view that indigenous 
psychology is a subordinate methodological approach, that it is a dialectic complement 
of a futuristic universal psychology which is inevitably ethnocentric, or that it is not 
different from cultural psychology, which is a perspectival representation of cultural 
Others not yet challenged by the Others themselves.  Despite their efforts to grapple 
with the unfamiliar phenomenon called ―indigenous psychology,‖ there remains an 
unintended referential framework that determines how the indigenous psychology 
movement appears to these psychologists.   
On the theoretical level, this unintended yet powerful framework is not different 
from what Said (1979) refers to as the discourse of Orientalism or what Hall (1995) refers 
to as the discourse of ―The West and the Rest.‖  This powerful discourse not only 
determines the form in which the indigenous psychology movement is to be understood 
by psychologists, but in many ways also determines how anything ―cultural‖ appears on 
the intellectual horizon of psychologists. 
The recognition/misrecognition I have identified is not just a one-sided pathology; 
it is a two-sided phenomenon.  Not only must Euro-American psychology recognize 
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indigenous psychology in a way that does not threaten but enhances or enriches its core 
values, its history, and its identity; indigenous psychology also needs Euro-American 
psychology to recognize it, to grant it a place in history despite the fact that 
Euro-American psychology is the very thing it is fighting against.  It is not difficult to 
find this paradoxical desire—a desire to be rid of the influence of the West but at the 
same time to be recognized by it—in the works of indigenous psychologists.  For 
example, in the introduction of their co-edited book The Sinicization of Social and 
Behavioral Science Research in China (1982), Kuo-Shu Yang and Chung-I Wen write: 
The subjects whom we studied are Chinese people in Chinese society, but 
the theories and methods we used are mostly imported from the West or of 
the Western style. In our daily life, we are Chinese; when we are doing 
research, we become Western people. We repress our Chinese thoughts or 
philosophy intentionally or unintentionally, and make them unable to be 
expressed in our procedure of research....Under such a situation, we can 
only follow the West step by step with an expectation to catch up their 
academic trend….Eventually, our existence in the world community of 
social and behavioral science becomes invisible at all. (as cited in Hwang, 
2005a, p. 230, italics added) 
 
This paradoxical desire to be recognized by the colonizer or oppressor has been identified 
by Fanon in Black Skin, White Masks (1952/1967): 
As long as he [the slave] has not been effectively recognized by the other 
[the master], that other will remain the theme of his actions.  It is on that 
other being, on recognition by that being, that his own human worth and 
reality depend.  It is that other being in whom the meaning of his life is 
condensed. (p. 217) 
 
If the dynamics of recognition identified by Fanon hold true, it means that without 
unpacking how this recognition/misrecognition works on the subjectivity of the 
indigenous psychologists, the indigenous psychology movement will likely go astray—it 
will be trapped in the vicious cycle of the pathological searching for recognition rather 
than become the driving force of decolonization.
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Chapter 2 
At the Center: Psychology and its Imaginary Relation with Others 
 
From 1492 to the 1990s we are dealing not with change, rupture and 
difference but rather with suppression, amnesia and deliberate avoidance 
of realities, cultural as well as psychological.  We are dealing with the 
deformed sight of a blinded eye. (Sardar, Nandy, & Davies, 1993, p. 88) 
 
It has been said that there are two kinds of white people: those who have 
never found themselves in a situation where the majority of people around 
them are not white, and those who have been the only white person in the 
room.  At that moment, for the first time perhaps, they discover what it is 
really like for the other people in their society, and, metaphorically, for the 
rest of the world outside the west: to be from a minority, to live as the 
person who is always in the margins, to be the person who never qualifies 
as the norm, the person who is not authorized to speak. (R. Young, 2003, 
p. 1) 
 
Others and the Eye of the World 
 
In 1993, five hundred years after Christopher Columbus‘s historic voyage across 
the Atlantic, Indian political psychologist Ashis Nandy and two well-known public 
intellectuals of the Muslim world Ziauddin Sardar and Merryl Wyn Davies audaciously 
revisit the historic voyage and its global aftermath in the short and yet powerful book 
Barbaric Others: A Manifesto on Western Racism.  Arguing against the widely held 
view that the significance of Columbus‘s journey was that he accidentally discovered the 
New World in his first voyage westward, the three authors claim that, except for that it 
was an ―unprecedented encounter‖ (p. 1) between the two worlds across the Atlantic, 
nothing ―new‖ was ―discovered‖; in fact, the Old World of Europe that Columbus 
represented actually ―missed,‖ rather than ―discovered,‖ the novelty of the newness of the 
New World. 
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The authors point out that, for centuries before Columbus ever landed on the New 
World, Europe had already nurtured an ―anxiety-ridden perception‖ (p. 1) about Other 
People and about the natural world.  Since those Other People (or Others) were beyond 
Europe‘s actual reach and touch, the perception (or imagination) was based primarily on 
―fears, fantasies and demons inhabiting the Western mind‖ (p. 1) rather than on the 
experiences of actual encounter with the Others.  They further point out that this 
perception of Other People was so deeply ingrained that it had become ―an integral part 
of Europe‘s self-identity‖ (p. 1).  Under such premises, the ―historic events of 1492‖ 
actually stood for an unprecedented opportunity for Europe to renew itself: not only to rid 
itself of the long-standing anxieties about the unknown Others, but also to redefine 
Europe in relation to non-European Others. 
Historically, Europe eventually missed the unprecedented opportunity to really 
encounter the Others in their newness, in their novelty.  However, what is more 
important than missing the opportunity is that, it was not a pure accident that the real 
encounter did not happen; there was a constitutive factor that prevented it from 
happening.  As the authors keenly point out, the ―blinded gaze‖ of Europe‘s eye of the 
world, its oculus mundi, was what was preventing the real encounter with the Others from 
happening: 
The eye of the West….was blind when it turned to observe what was not 
European or Western.  When it observed the Other, oculus mundi was 
blinded, paradoxically, by its own perceptions and previsions.  It not 
merely helped falsify the Other, but in fact invented it out of Europe‘s own 
inner demons—Europe‘s fears, anxieties, and disowned self. (p. 88) 
 
 22 
Europe‘s own ―perceptions and previsions,‖ that is to say, its own imagination and 
anticipation, became the main visual function
7
 when it gazed upon the Others.  As a 
result, when the two worlds across the Atlantic eventually met in 1492, Europe‘s 
longstanding imagination of Others was not shattered by the newness of the experience; 
on the contrary, it ―acquired flesh‖ (p. 88): what was originally inside the European 
psyche was fleshed out and became something observable, something eventually 
manageable out in the world.  The subjectivity of Others in the actual world—that is to 
say, as real people having their own concerns in their various ways of being in the 
world—was denied; they were subjected to the blinded eye.  Europe thus 
proceeded to administer and interact with the Others as if they were 
nothing other than what it perceived.  The vast diversity of peoples 
around the world were lumped together for all practical purposes in one, 
gigantic category of Otherness.  The distinctness of a particular Other 
was lost in the generality shared with all Others, that of being different and 
sundered from the West. This distinctiveness was left for the experts or 
professionals to debate. (p. 89) 
 
Therefore, the real significance of the historic events of 1492 was that it 
―established not only what it is to be modern, but what it is to be Other, not European, 
distinct from the West‖ (p. 91); in other words, it marked a critical moment in history in 
which a ―perversion of reality‖ (p. 91) not only occurred but in the years to come, layer 
by layer, gradually structured the core of how Europe relates to the Others.  As a 
compiled world atlas, Dutch geographer and map maker Gerhardus Mercator‘s Atlas 
(1570) was the most potent legacy of Columbus‘s historic voyage because historically it 
was the first embodied display of the world as seen by Europe‘s blinded eye. 
                                               
7 In his article, ―Allegories of Atlas,‖ Rabasa Jose (1995) brilliantly analyzed the ―visual function‖ of 
history.  His main argument is that, in the process of creating a map, European history serves as the 
inseparable visual function in the personification of geographic space in terms of a Eurocentric perspective. 
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The reason why I started out this chapter by reviewing Sardar and the other two 
authors‘ explication of Europe‘s problematic relation with Others in Barbaric Others, is 
very much the same as theirs when they revisited Christopher Columbus‘s historic 
voyage: we are still living out the history of 1492.  History moves rather slowly when 
something fundamental has to be changed, especially when it comes to what constitutes 
our way of seeing the world. 
With the innovations in navigation technique and the breakthrough in navigation 
route made by Christopher Columbus, European expansion in the world took off with 
unprecedented speed.  By the time of World War I, the imperial powers of Europe had 
taken control over ninety percent of the surface territory of the globe (R. J. C. Young, 
2001).  In the following years, the traditional imperial powers of Europe suffered a rapid 
demise after two World Wars and were replaced by two new powers, the United States 
and the Soviet Union in competition for world domination.  And decades later, to the 
surprise of many, the seemingly indestructible power of the Soviet Union suddenly 
collapsed, with the United States becoming the single dominant power in the world from 
the 1990s until now.  However, even though there were changes of players as well as 
changes in the form of their world domination (that is, from the direct and more violent 
form of control over land and people, to the indirect and more subtle form of control over 
the economy in the name of ―world trade‖), Europe‘s oculus mundi, its eye of the world, 
did not change much in this competition for world dominance.  On the contrary, as 
Rabasa (1995) beautifully said, it resembles ―Caesar‘s laurel crown‖ which has a 
transhistorical and transnational dimension.  ―Caesar functions as an empty slot where 
different leaders may inscribe themselves,‖ said Rabasa. ―Like the symbol of Caesar, the 
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world revealed by Mercator‘s Atlas is a transhistorical and transnational theatre where 
imperialist configurations take form by means of particular national appropriations‖ (p. 
363).  Therefore, as long as taking control is still the main intention in the interaction 
with Others, the eye of the world actually does not change.  Just like Caeser‘s laurel 
crown, it can be given a different name and then inherited by different world powers.  
One way or another, Others are still subjected to the blinded eye, whether of another 
world power or, most likely, of a different form of domination. 
In comparison to the long history of European expansion, the establishment of 
modern universities as the professional site of production for specialized knowledge 
came rather late; in fact, it was not until the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries that the idea of 
―freedom of scientific research, teaching and study‖ and its institutional foundation had 
gradually become the standard in universities (Ru  egg, 2004).  Therefore, the eye of the 
world endorsed and legitimized by European expansion, was inherited by universities as 
a part of the European tradition and inevitably shaped the eye of the world of the modern 
sciences.  As Haller (1995) points out, 
The sciences…became the means through which both scientists and social 
scientists sought to determine the relative value of the races of man, 
delineate social categories, and even justify the rationale of race 
legislation. (p. xii) 
 
Others and the Power-Knowledge-Desire Relations 
 
There is an old Chinese old saying which can be roughly translated as, ―one who 
was frightened by a snake sees it everywhere‖; similarly, for a very long time the eye of 
the world inherited by the modern sciences could only see Others in the ―perversion of 
reality‖ invented by its own blinded gaze, rather than Others in the actual world.  
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Historically, the critique of the problematic relation between Europe (or the West) and 
Others, and of the perversion innate to its eye of the world almost always came from 
Others who were dehumanized by the blinded eye, or from those who have witnessed the 
violence resulting from the dehumanizing power of the blinded eye.  It was first voiced 
in the analysis of the traumatic effects of the colonial situation written by Western-trained 
intellectuals in or from the colonies, such as Mannoni (1950/1990), Fanon (1952/1967), 
Césaire (1955/2000), and Memmi (1957/1991).  And later on, with the flow of post-war 
immigration from ex-colonies to the West, some migrants, or their children, who 
subsequently held positions in universities and still felt strongly about the marginalization 
of their places of origin, started to offer profound critiques of the Eurocentric nature of 
western history and on the implicit assumptions about Others in western knowledge (R. J. 
C. Young, 2001).  Among them the more renowned are: Homi Bhabha, Stuart Hall, 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Dipesh Charkarbarty, and Edward Said, whose eloquent 
critique in Orientalism (1978) of the cultural politics in academic knowledge helped 
founded the academic field of postcolonial studies. 
Mercator‘s Atlas was historically the first embodied display of the world as seen 
by Europe‘s blinded eye.  In a similar sense, Said‘s Orientalism was the first systematic 
exposure and analysis of the existence of Europe‘s eye of the World.  On the first page 
of Orientalism, Said brings out one of his main arguments by introducing an anecdote of 
a French journalist‘s regretful comment on the ruined city of Beirut.8  Through a careful 
analysis of the rather short comment, he points out that the so-called ―Orient‖ is a 
―European invention‖ (p. 1), a ―European representation of the Orient‖ (p. 1, italics 
                                               
8 The French journalist regretfully wrote, ―it had once seemed to belong to…the Orient of Chateaubriand 
and Navel.‖ 
 26 
added).  He further elaborates by saying that, among all the relations Europe has with 
the Orient, the Orient is ―one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other…. 
The Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, 
personality, experience‖ (pp. 1-2).  He then emphasizes that, even though this Orient is a 
representation invented or imagined by the West, it is not merely imaginative but ―an 
integral part of European material civilization and culture‖ (p. 2).  Using Foucault‘s 
notion of discourse developed in The Archaeology of Knowledge (1971), that is, as a 
systematic dispersion of discursive events, Said first delineates the contour of what he 
means by the term ―Orientalism‖: 
The Orient is an integral part of European material civilization and 
culture. Orientalism expresses and represents that part culturally and even 
ideologically as a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, 
vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies 
and colonial styles. (Said, 1978/2003, p. 2, italics added) 
 
And a few paragraphs later, Said further employs the notion of ―power-knowledge 
relations‖ developed by Foucault in Discipline and Punish (1975)—which, in Foucault‘s 
own words refers to the fact that ―there is no power relation without the correlative 
constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does  not presuppose and 
constitute at the same time power relations‖ (p. 27)—to propose a meaning of 
Orientalism based on the power-knowledge relations of institutionalized disciplinary 
power:   
Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for 
dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, 
authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over 
it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, 
and having authority over the Orient. (p. 3, italics added) 
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With the deployment of this authoritative systematic discipline, Said argues that 
European culture ―gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as 
a sort of surrogate and even underground self‖ (p. 3). 
In order to clearly position Said‘s contribution to this project—that is, what 
conceptual tools his Orientalism has to offer in the analysis of the problematic relation 
between psychology and its Others—I will have to first contextualize Orientalism in the 
dialectical history of critical intellectuals‘ struggle to theorize and fight against 
colonialism.  Historically, it was not until very recently that we have become aware that 
colonialism is a multi-layered form of domination, which involves almost all layers of the 
Other‘s daily life—political, economic, cultural, and psychological.  Before the rapid 
decolonization of European colonies in the 1940s, most critical intellectuals and 
revolutionists in these colonies placed their focus on the political and economic aspects 
of colonialism or imperialism.  They argued that the only way for the colonies to be 
―self-determined,‖ to be really free from imperial domination, was to become 
independent nations.  However, not long after the ex-colonies became independent 
nations, they were soon confronted with a harsh reality: independence was not the 
antidote to colonialism; on the contrary, it was the beginning of a new form of 
colonization in which the newly founded nations were still subservient to, not the old 
imperial powers, but the economic system of capitalist power.  Thus, the analysis of 
neocolonialism‘s capitalist system on the global scale became the task for many critical 
intellectuals. 
Compared to the critiques devoted to the political and economic aspects of 
colonialism, critical intellectuals‘ identification and analysis of the cultural and 
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psychological aspects of colonialism came later in the dialectical process of 
understanding aspects of colonialism.  It was not until the disillusionment of those 
dreams of political or economic autonomy of the newly founded states that critical 
intellectuals turned to those prophet-like sensitive minds (such as Fanon) who, in the 
elated atmosphere of independence, had already voiced their concerns about the 
psychological and cultural impacts of colonization; they also turned to western critical 
traditions other than Marxism for conceptual resources that could be employed in the 
identification and analysis of the previously ignored aspects of colonialism.  It was at 
this critical juncture in which the reflections on colonial experience and the conceptual 
resources from western critical traditions became hybridized, that we were able to 
appreciate the theoretical contributions made by Said‘s Orientalism, and thereby to distill 
the conceptual tools required in the analysis of the problematic relation between 
psychology and its Others. 
Generally speaking, critical intellectuals mainly draw upon two western critical 
traditions for conceptual resources to deal with the problematics with regard to cultural 
and psychological aspects of colonialism: from the tradition of post-structuralism, such as 
Derrida‘s (1967/1997) deconstructive methods and Foucault‘s (1971/1972) methods of 
discourse analysis; or from another equally important tradition—psychoanalysis, 
especially from Lacanian psychoanalysis.  Despite the fact that, as R. J. C. Young (2001) 
points out, Said relies more on Derrida‘s deconstructive methods than on Foucauldian 
discourse analysis in his actual analyses in Orientalism (p. 388), in terms of the 
productivity brought about by Orientalism, Said‘s main theoretical contributions are 
along two lines.  His first theoretical contribution is more obvious and frequently 
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identified.  It was Said who introduced Foucauldian discourse analysis and the 
discussion of power-knowledge relations to the theoretical field of colonial discourse 
analysis.  And it is here that the introduction of the notion of discourse is key.  Why?  
This has to do with how Foucault constructs the notion of ―discourse.‖  In Foucault‘s 
understanding of it, the notion of discourse involves events, discursive events; and 
whether or not a discursive event would emerge depends on the contingencies of 
historical, material, and institutional conditions (Foucault, 1971/1972).  When 
understood as a mode of discourse, Orientalism‘s historical, material, and institutional 
aspects become theoretically discernable as constitutive parts of a system of 
representation.  With this theoretical foundation, Foucault‘s discussion of 
power-knowledge relations can thus be translated to the colonial context as a conceptual 
tool utilized in the identification and analysis of how Orientalism—or broadly speaking, 
colonial discourse—becomes a discourse of domination, an epistemic violence toward 
Others, and eventually a form of cultural and psychological colonization.   Foucault and 
Said‘s concerns with the ―discursive regime of knowledge‖ (R. J. C. Young, 2001, p. 385) 
will also be one of the main concerns of this part of the project, and the conceptual tools 
of Foucauldian discourse analysis will be employed in the analysis of the problematic 
relation between psychology and its Others. 
Compared to the first contribution, Said‘s second theoretical contribution is not 
that obvious because it involves not what he proposes but what he hints at but left 
undeveloped.  This undeveloped problematic in Orientalism, briefly said, involves 
whether or not the resources of psychoanalysis can be further translated into effective 
conceptual tools in the analysis of colonialism. 
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The employment of the conceptual resources of psychoanalysis in the analysis of 
colonialism first appeared in the works of Mannoni and Fanon, in which the latter is not 
only in itself a painful self-analysis of the colonized psyche but also at the same time a 
profound critique of the misuse of psychoanalysis in the defense of colonization.  
Mannoni  (1950) was the first to employ the conceptual tools of psychoanalysis in the 
analysis of the so-called ―colonial situation,‖ in the psychological sense of the term (p. 
18).  He argues that, if understood at the psychological level, the colonial situation can 
be discerned as ―a case of the meeting of two entirely different types of personality and 
their reaction to each other― (p. 17), and in such a meeting of the two parties the 
European becomes the colonizer and the native become the colonized. The results of this 
meeting may be tragic, but it is definitely not accidental.  As Mannoni explains, the 
formulation of a colonial situation requires a ―coupling‖ of the two parties involved: it is 
a co-creation of the European who behaves like a superior and dominant being due to his 
own inferiority complex, and the native who is anxious about being abandoned due to his 
or her uncivilized dependency complex.  Therefore, the colonial situation is, as Mannoni 
puts it, ―primarily the results of misunderstanding, of mutual incomprehension‖ (p. 31) . 
Fanon (1952) recognizes that Mannoni ―has managed to achieve a grasp… of the 
psychological phenomena that govern the relations between the colonized and the 
colonizer‖ (p. 83), and he also agrees with Mannoni‘s analysis of the colonizer‘s Adlerian 
overcompensation-driven behaviors; however, Fanon firmly protests against Mannoni‘s 
attribution of the colonized‘s inferiority complex to an ontogenetic origin, that is, as 
stemming from his childhood.  Fanon argues that the colonized‘s inferiority complex is 
neither ontogenetic nor phylogenic, but sociogenically created in the process of 
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colonization; it is primarily an economic inferiority that is subsequently epidermalized
9
 
as an internal complex (p. 11). If the colonizer‘s psychology is also taken into 
consideration, Fanon‘s point is that the colonial situation is a black-white relation based 
on ―dual narcissism‖ in which ―[t]he white man is sealed in his whiteness, the black man 
in his blackness‖ (pp. 9-10).  Fanon‘s formulation of the colonial situation as an 
antithetical relation based on narcissism is clearly influenced by Lacan‘s notion of the 
mirror stage (p. 161).  Together with his emphasis on the sociogeny of such an 
imaginary relation, Fanon translates the conceptual resources of psychoanalysis into the 
analysis of colonialism in a powerful and inspiring way:  the traumatizing moment in 
which one‘s subject position is configured operates not merely ontogenetically, but also 
sociogenetically.  We are thus able to discern the psychological traumas of colonization 
as psychoanalytic moments which configure different subject positions in the colonial 
situation.  It is therefore theoretically justified, or at least justifiable, when we translate 
psychoanalytic concepts in dealing with the problematic of subjectivity in the colonial 
situation. 
There is no doubt that Said thinks along the lines of Mannoni  (1950) and Fanon 
(1952), especially the latter, when he discerns the Orient as the Other, as a ―contrasting 
image, idea, personality, experience‖ (Said, 1978/2003, p. 2) the West uses to define 
itself.  By delineating the Orient as the imaginary representation of the West,  Said is 
referring to the colonizer‘s subject position in relation to his narcissistic invention of the 
image of the Other, which is clearly a Fanonian proposition.  However, this 
psychoanalytic proposition was not further developed in Orientalism.  Therefore, the 
                                               
9 Epidermalization is a term created by Fanon, which refers to the internalization of inferiority along the 
differentiation of skin color. 
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insights and the psychoanalytic conceptual tools developed in the previously mentioned 
works of Fanon and others were not used to their potential by Said.  In Bhabha‘s (1994) 
words, Said pays ―inadequate attention to representation as a concept that articulates the 
historical and fantasy (as the scene of desire) in the production of the ‗political‘ effects of 
discourse‖ (p. 103, italics added).  In addition, what is more important is that the notion 
of discourse and power, translated by Said to colonial discourse analysis, is a notion 
Foucault developed during the time of his two major works, The Archaeology of 
Knowledge and Discipline and Punish.  This notion of discourse and power, as 
evidenced by Foucault‘s modifications of his own theoretical framework in his later 
works, does face some theoretical difficulties when dealing with the historical strategic 
changes of discursive power and the problematic with regard to subjectivity (Foucault, 
1980a).  These theoretical difficulties, naturally, are also reflected in Orientalism: 
Orientalism as proposed by Said, is a mode of discourse which continuously dominates, 
restructures, and has authority over the Orient by way of producing knowledge; it is an 
authoritative power with a somewhat Foucautian will-to-know and will-to-dominate.  
Without making some theoretical modifications, it is difficult to conceive of ―the 
historical enunciations of colonial discourse,‖ and of ―the process of subjectification as a 
placing within…colonial discourse‖ in such a theoretical construct, as Bhabha says (p. 
103). 
It is on this crucial point that Bhabha (1994) makes an admirable theoretical 
intervention.  He creatively rereads Said‘s Orientalism so as to theoretically revamp the 
notion of colonial discourse.  Bhabha brings in two new elements to reconstruct Said‘s 
more disciplinarily-defined notion of colonial discourse: first, he introduces the notion of 
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―apparatus‖ developed in Foucault‘s later work, and redefines colonial discourse as an 
apparatus of discriminatory power in which power-knowledge relations are just one of its 
many heterogeneous power strategies (p. 100).  Colonial discourse as an apparatus is a 
notion which emphasized the strategic function of the use of power.  It does not exclude 
or replace Said‘s original insight that colonial discourse is a discursive power but 
repositions it as one of many deployable power strategies in a given historical time, that 
is, as a ―discursive strategy‖ (p. 95) of the colonial discourse.  And more importantly, 
desire is also part of the apparatus of discriminatory power; it is defined as a power 
strategy which operates relationally with other deployable power relations, that is, as a 
―psychic strategy‖ (p. 95) of colonial discourse. 
Second, by giving desire a theoretical place in the apparatus of discriminatory 
power, Bhabha further translates psychoanalytical concepts such as fixity, disavowal, 
narcissism, fetishism, and identification as conceptual tools in discerning the operation of 
desire in relation to other power relations in the colonial situation.  Armed with these 
conceptual tools, Bhabha discerns a ―process of ambivalence‖ (p. 95) when colonial 
discourse is confronted with the difference of the Other: the Other is always beyond 
representation but nevertheless has to be repeatedly represented so as to mask the 
irrepresentable difference.  The result of this process of ambivalence is a form of fixity 
of colonial subjects to the Other as representation which from Bhabha‘s perspective can 
be read in terms of ―fetishism‖ (p. 106).  Bhabha further indicates that this fetish object 
or stereotype is at the same time an object of ―surveillance power‖ and an ―object of 
desire‖ (p. 109); it is therefore not only a field of the exercise of discursive regime, but 
also a field of identification.  Bhabha argues that, it is in the psychoanalytic moments of 
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narcissistic identification or disavowal of the Other as representation that the different 
colonial subject positions are configured (pp. 109-111). 
Without a doubt, Bhabah‘s creative reading of Said‘s Orientalism is a significant 
theoretical move in the analysis of colonialism. In his psychoanalytic reconstruction of 
the notion of colonial discourse, Bhabha ―upgrades‖ the Foucauldian notion of power 
therein and adds the psychoanalytic dimension of desire to the power-knowledge 
analytical paradigm, which was originally proposed by Said to merely discern the 
discursive regime of colonial discourse.  As a result of his theoretical construction, the 
original paradigm has become a power-knowledge-desire analytical paradigm which can 
be utilized to discern the apparatus of discriminatory power of colonial discourse.  It is a 
significant hybridization for the theoretical field of colonial discourse analysis in which 
reflections on colonial experiences and conceptual resources from the tradition of 
psychoanalysis and post-structuralism become hybridized in a more comprehensive 
theoretical framework to discern the psychological and cultural aspects of colonialism.  
In this sense, it is a critical theoretical intervention in the dialectical history of critical 
intellectuals‘ struggle to theorize and fight against colonialism.  This 
power-knowledge-desire analytical paradigm and its related conceptual tools will be 
guiding this project in discerning the problematic relation between psychology and its 
Others. 
 
Psychology and Its Others 
 
The problematic imaginary relation between psychology and its Others is rarely 
discussed in the literature of mainstream psychology.  One might defend this negligence 
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on the part of mainstream psychology by blaming the philosophical connotations of the 
term ―the Other‖ and demand that the problem be formulated in a different manner, since 
psychology has long since broken away from philosophy and successfully established 
itself as an empirical science.  Besides, one might further complain about the title of this 
chapter, ―Psychology has an imaginary relation with its Others?  What a bizarre way of 
talking about psychology!‖  Indeed, most psychologists tend to see what they do as 
empirical science and nothing other than that.  For example, they conduct experiments 
to study conformity, dissect lab rats‘ brains to explore biological mechanisms involved in 
obesity, design computer models to simulate decision making, and use psychological 
tests to assess the pathology of their clients. Thus, some of them might argue, 
―Psychology is based on the results gained from empirical observations in rigorous 
methodological procedures.  It is not based on imagination, not to mention the 
imaginary relation with others or whatever that means.‖ 
It is actually quite understandable why psychologists like to pride themselves on 
doing empirical science because historically that depiction has been a hard-earned 
recognition from the scientific community at least according to the authoritative story 
told repeatedly in most psychology textbooks.  And it is also understandable why most 
contemporary psychologists identify psychology as an empirical science since for them it 
is the tradition in which they have been trained, and after years of being ―conditioned‖ to 
think empirically it is difficult to think otherwise.  In many ways, empiricism has 
become one of the fundamental assumptions adopted by psychology which functions 
more like a disciplinary ideology rather than a theoretical orientation open for discussion, 
as is also pointed out by Packer and Addison (1989, p. 31).  The problem is, in spite of 
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the common belief, psychology may not be as empirical as most psychologists would like 
it to be. 
To begin with, as psychologist and well-respected historian of psychology Kurt 
Danziger (1990) points out, psychology does not deal with natural objects, it deals with 
―test scores, rating scales, response distributions, serial lists, and innumerable other items 
that the investigator does not just find but constructs with great care‖  (p. 2, italics 
added).  Which means that, even when a psychologist claims that she or he is doing 
―observation,‖ she or he is not just observing but already doing some kind of ―translating‖ 
which translates things and events in the actual world into, in Danziger‘s (2003) term, 
―psychological objects.‖  As he comments in this article in which he proposes to study 
the ―biography of psychological objects,‖ there is ―no empirical observation that does not 
require some discursive interpretation to give it a communicable form, and the data are 
not raw ‗findings‘ but careful constructions in accordance with explicit and implicit rules‖ 
(p. 21).  Therefore, the naturalistic, mutually-independent subject-object relation 
assumed in so-called ―empirical observation‖ is more myth than fact in the actual practice 
of psychology. 
Apart from the fact that empiricism may not to be the best fit for psychology, it 
has become an impediment to the development of psychology.  Danziger (1997) points 
out that despite the seemingly flourishing appearance created by the constant revamping 
of theories, the empiricist tradition of psychology actually fails to render visible, not to 
mention corrigible ―the presuppositions about our subject matter that are implied in the 
[psychological] categories we use to define the objects of our research and to express our 
empirical findings‖ (pp. 7-8).  Consequentially, psychologists act like ―naïve naturalists‖ 
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while in fact they are ―conventionalists‖ with regard to the categorical presuppositions 
they use to accumulate empirical knowledge.  As Danziger comments, psychologists 
―tend to proceed as though everyday psychological categories represented natural kinds, 
[and] as though the distinctions expressed in their basic [psychological] categories 
accurately reflected the natural divisions among psychological phenomena‖ (p. 8).  That 
is to say, psychologists trained in the empirical tradition presuppose that there is a sort of 
―correspondence‖ between theory and reality, and historically psychologists try to 
guarantee this correspondence by being rigorous in methodology.  Nonetheless, no 
matter hard they have tried, what they try to fix is something based on, in Packer and 
Addison‘s words, ―the impossible ‗correspondence theory‘ of truth‖ which can never be 
fixed by methodological modifications (Packer & Addison, 1989, p. 28).  
Once the empiricist pretension is unveiled, psychologists will find themselves 
awakening to a new scene of psychology that is unfamiliar and challenging, if not 
threatening.  They will find that new problems start to emerge although many of them 
are really not that ―new‖ but were rendered invisible in the empiricist tradition.  The 
problem of ―Others‖ is one of those new yet old challenges to psychology, especially 
after the end of the Second World War when psychology gradually became less a 
privileged field for White psychologists than a common asset for all (Pickren, 2007).  
However, it has not been easy for psychology to realize that its eye of the world has been 
blinded; it was when psychology traveled to the edge of the Euro-American world and 
suddenly met the firm gazes of Others, or when it was confronted by Others from within, 
that psychology awoke to the existence of Others.  At the beginning of his phenomenal 
book Naming the Mind: How Psychology Found its Language (1997), Danziger told a 
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personal story about how he woke up to the problem of Others.  I will give a shortened 
version of it here. 
Probably in the late 1950s or early 1960s Danziger went to a university in 
Indonesia as a visiting scholar for two years, and one of the requirements was for him to 
teach a course on psychology.  When he got there, he found that there was already an 
Indonesian professor teaching psychology but of a different kind.  Danziger was excited 
to learn that there was an indigenous psychology being taught, so he persuaded the 
Indonesia professor to offer joint seminars with him.  That is where the problems started.  
In their preparatory discussions about what topics should be taken as important and what 
should be left out, they failed to come to an agreement.  The seminar never happened.  
Reflecting on the event Danziger thought that he was confronted with psychology‘s 
―exotic Dopplegänger‖ and he admitted that it was for him an unsettling experience (p. 2).  
Though unsettling, the experience turned out to be a positive one for him. Because of this 
experience, Danziger became keenly aware of the categorical presuppositions of 
psychology and eventually wrote an insightful book about the history of psychological 
categories.  He summarized his experience as follows: ―It is difficult to escape such 
reflections when confronted with alternative frameworks for organizing psychological 
knowledge and experience.  Certainly, while teaching in Indonesia, I could never forget 
that mine was only one possible psychology‖ (pp. 3-4). 
On the one hand, it was lucky for Danziger to get involved in a dialogical 
situation with the Indonesian professor who was able to confront him with a system of 
psychological thinking that is alien to but as valid as western psychology.  On the other 
hand, it was also lucky for the Indonesia professor and even the students of psychology to 
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have Danziger as an interlocutor who was humble enough to be confronted by 
irreconcilable difference and eventually admit that western psychology is only one 
possible psychology.  For the most part, especially under the dominance of the empirical 
tradition, psychology has not been so merciful to Others or their traditions, as history 
shows.  As Holliday and Holmes (2003) point out, historically psychology has been an 
accomplice of scientific racism, and the history of ethnic minorities in psychology in the 
United States is ―the tale of people who were objects of a concept and 
ideology—scientific racism—that was integral to the justification of their oppression and 
exclusion‖ (p. 47).  And in his review of the relation between ethnic minorities and 
American psychology from 1966 to 1980, Pickren (2004) also shows that it was through 
continuous advocacy and activism that ethnic minorities forced mainstream American 
psychology to ―yield a place at the table to non-White, non-European individuals‖ (p. 45).  
Furthermore, psychology did not have an honorable record when it expanded outside of 
the Euro-American world.  As Staeuble (2006) says, ―the distortion and destruction of 
the knowledge systems of the colonized have been both a precondition for the 
establishment of the positional superiority of Western knowledge and a lasting obstacle to 
postcolonial attempts at establishing alternative cultures of knowledge,‖ and psychology 
is ―part of the disciplinary order of Western knowledge‖ (p. 185).  Therefore, in terms of 
psychology‘s relation with Others, it is fair to postulate that psychology functions like an 
apparatus of discriminatory power.  
 
Psychology as an Apparatus of Discriminatory Power 
 
At the time of imposing his domination, in order to justify slavery, the 
oppressor had invoked scientific argument. (Fanon, 1964/1967, p. 43) 
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The problem is, therefore, in what ways are Others—as real people having their 
own concerns in their various ways of being in the world—represented or constructed as 
speculatable, and even controllable, ―psychological objects‖ when psychology is 
discerned as an apparatus of discriminatory power? 
To begin with, how do we define ―psychological objects‖?  And in what ways 
are they constructed?  Danziger (2003) points out that psychological objects, like any 
other scientific objects, are not just manipulanda, things to be manipulated; they exist 
historically and change over time.  Therefore, to study psychological objects in a way 
proper to their way of existence is to study their historicity, that is, how they come to be 
as such; or in Danziger‘s metaphor, to study their ―biography.‖  Danziger defines the 
―biography‖ of scientific objects (which includes psychological objects) as 
the historical study of how domains of phenomena come to be constituted 
as such, and how they are transformed into objects of scientific scrutiny 
and manipulation, how they grow and gain in saliency, and how they 
change with age and are eventually supplanted or given a new identity. (p. 
20) 
 
Because Danziger (1990) is well aware that historically scientific psychology is a social 
practice which in essence is an empirical investigative practice based paradigmatically on 
the notion of experiment, he argues that psychological objects should not be identified 
merely as ―discursive objects‖ but as ―epistemic objects‖ which in their making involve 
both discursive and nondiscursive practices.  The term ―discursive‖ as used by Danziger 
in this article is rather different from that used by Foucault in The Archaeology of 
Knowledge, in which he, for the most part, reserves the usage of the term ―discourse‖ and 
its adjectival form ―discursive‖ for the archaeological study of knowledge, that is, the 
study of discourse as event.  On the other hand, Danziger uses ―discursive practice‖ to 
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refer to either the practice which involves theoretical construction or some kind of 
interpretative activities, or the practice which is potentially theorizable or interpretive for 
those who are involved in the practice at a given historical time.  Danziger further 
explicates that, in the making of psychological objects, discursive practice involves the 
―theoretical construction‖ that goes into the making of such objects; and nondiscursive 
practice involves the ―procedures‖ which instantiate the theoretical construction in 
―empirical exemplars‖ (p. 21).  He emphasizes that even though the procedures, tools, 
and instruments used in nondiscursive practice are closely related to discursive practice, 
they cannot be treated as part of discursive practice; they have their own history which 
should not be seen as identical to that of discursive practice.  In sum, due to the 
empirical nature of psychology,  psychological objects, argues Danziger, ―represent a 
fusion of the theoretical and the empirical‖ (p. 21) and changes in any of the two 
constitutive practices will be reflected in the configuration of psychological objects. 
To a great extent, Danziger has crafted a systematic approach to psychological 
objects as epistemic objects.  But this is not quite enough.  As we have learned from 
the dialectical history of critical intellectuals‘ struggle to theorize and fight against 
colonialism, as an ambivalent object, the representation of Others is more than an 
epistemic object but also an object of desire; desire is an indispensible dimension in the 
exercise of the discriminatory power.  To further our discussion regarding how in the 
process of representing Others the representation itself is at the same time an epistemic 
object and an object of desire, an explication of Foucault‘s notion of an apparatus will be 
necessary here. 
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I would like to first point out that Danziger‘s explication of psychological objects 
can easily be integrated into Foucault‘s notion of an apparatus, even though Danziger 
seems to disagree with Foucault‘s overemphasis on the discursive, which is, as I have 
pointed out above, a disagreement in terminology than anything else.  An apparatus is, 
as Foucault says, 
A thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourse, 
institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative 
measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic 
propositions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid.  Such are the 
elements of the apparatus.  The apparatus itself is the system of relations 
that can be established between these elements. (p. 194, italics added) 
 
If representing Others is considered to be part of psychology‘s strategic deployment of its 
discriminatory power over Others, Foucault‘s notion of an apparatus as a ―heterogeneous 
ensemble‖ which includes the said and the unsaid to a great degree echoes Danziger‘s 
emphasis on both the discursive and nondiscursive practices in the making of 
psychological objects.  I would also like to further point out that, in Foucault‘s dialogue 
with psychoanalyst Jacques-Alain Miller, his modification of the notion of episteme not 
only echoes Danziger‘s notion of psychological objects as epistemic objects, but also 
clarifies for us how episteme functions in the making of psychological objects. Foucault 
redefines the episteme as 
the strategic apparatus which permits of separating out from among all the 
statements which are possible those that will be acceptable within….a 
field of scientificity, and which it is possible to say are true or false.  The 
episteme is the ‗apparatus‘ which makes possible the separation, not of the 
true from the false, but of what may from what may not be characterized 
as scientific. (p. 197) 
 
That is to say, the two practices that Danziger points out function as the episteme of 
psychology‘s strategic deployment of its discriminatory power over Others; their working 
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together determines what can be accepted as ―scientific‖ statements in representing 
Others as psychological objects. 
However, as I pointed out earlier, the representation of Others is more than an 
object of the discursive regime but also an object of desire.  Therefore, while Danziger‘s 
notion of psychological objects as epistemic objects provides us with an approach to the 
necessary conditions for Others to be represented as psychological objects—that is, 
Others have to be ―scientifically‖ represented—is itself insufficient to account for either 
the strategic choice of what (e.g., why ―intelligence‖? ) in Others is to be represented, or 
for the historical changes of the representation of Others (e.g., from the Others as a 
statistical variation to the Other as an agent of a culture system).  Both of them—the 
strategic choice of the signifier of difference and the psychic investment/withdrawal of 
such a signifier—point to the dimension of desire in an apparatus of discriminatory 
power.  Foucault in his later works proposes the notion of an apparatus as a modification 
of his notion of discourse, which put too much emphasis on synchronic analysis and 
ignored the diachronic aspect of the exercise of power.  His emphasis on the strategic 
nature of the apparatus provides us with a theoretical foundation to discern the role 
played by desire in psychology‘s exercise of its discriminatory power over Others 
regarding the strategic choice and the historical changes of psychological objects as the 
representation of Others.  Regarding the strategic nature of the apparatus, Foucault says,  
the apparatus is essentially of a strategic nature, which means assuming 
that it is a matter of a certain manipulation of relations of forces, either 
developing them in a particular direction, blocking them, stabilizing them, 
utilizing them, etc.  The apparatus is thus always inscribed in a play of 
power, but it is also always linked to certain coordinates of knowledge 
which issue from it but, to an equal degree, condition it.  This is what the 
apparatus consists in: strategies of relations of forces supporting, and 
supported by, types of knowledge. (Foucault, 1980a, p. 196) 
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Foucault points out that, the major function of the apparatus at a given historical moment 
is to respond to an ―urgent need‖ (p. 195).  And as Bhabha (1994) points out, this urgent 
need for the colonial discourse is the ambivalence caused by encountering the difference 
of Others:  Others must be represented and represented repeatedly so that their 
essentially irrepresentable difference can be masked by the representation of Others.  
This is how desire plays a role in the apparatus of discriminatory power: as a psychic 
strategy in reaction to a potentially traumatizing encounter, a play of identification in 
relation to the representation of Others.  And in the case of psychology, this dance 
between power, knowledge, and desire substantializes itself in the history of Others as 
psychological objects, in the fixity and repetition of the representation of Others as an 
―impossible‖ object of desire. 
 
From Racial Other to Cultural Other 
 
The issue is not whether human beings are biological organisms with 
intrinsic characteristics.  Man can‘t fly and pigeons can‘t talk.  Nor is it 
whether they show commonalities in mental functioning wherever we find 
them.  Papuans envy, Aborigines dream.  The issue is, what are we to 
make of these undisputed facts as we go about explicating rituals, 
analyzing ecosystems, interpreting fossil sequences, or comparing 
languages. (Geertz, 1984, p. 268, italics added) 
 
When one looks back on the history of psychology with a sensitivity to how 
Others are represented in psychology, one cannot but notice how insistent psychology has 
been in finding ways to represent Others.  It is an imperative to psychology: Others must 
be represented, one way or another.  Historically, psychology‘s earliest representation 
of Others is the racial Other.  However, the concept of ―race‖ and its related theories 
were not psychology‘s invention, but were inherited as a legacy of the European world‘s 
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complicated history of interacting with Others.  Etymologically speaking, the concept of 
―race‖ can be traced back to the end of the 15th century (Oxford English Dictionary), 
when Europeans started sailing south and then eventually west to bypass the 
Muslim-dominated East in order to find new paths of trading unrestricted by the Muslims.  
The concept of ―race‖ is mainly used to differentiate the ―Us race‖ and the ―Other race‖ 
which, in a more Bhabharian term, is essentially a signifier of difference.  As a signifier, 
―race‖ originally came from the traditional cultural-linguistic matrix of the European 
world, but as the matrix was changed by the European world‘s further experience with 
Others (for example, slavery or colonization), or itself changed by having a new element 
introduced (for example, evolutionary thought), ―race‖ as a signifier of difference 
changed accordingly. 
For example, Richards (1997) points out that, in the traditional Christian 
cosmology, ―‗Mankind‘s‘ basic unity was an article of faith: we are all descendants of 
Noah‘s sons and daughters-in-law‖ (p. 1).  This is why at the beginning of the European 
expansion, dark-skinned Africans were considered to be the descendants of Ham, Noah‘s 
cursed son.  For Europeans at the time, ―blackness‖ registered the difference between 
the ―Us race‖ and the ―Other race‖; we are all the descendents of Noah, but they are from 
the cursed Ham, therefore they  are ―eternally ordained to be inferior ‗hewers of wood 
and drawers of water‘‖ (p. 1).  
However, as Western history proceeded, differences in the experience of Others 
also contributed to how difference was registered in ―race.‖  For example, in Richards‘ 
“Race”, Racism, and Psychology: Towards a Reflexive History (1997), the history of the 
concept of ―race‖ in the United States and in Europe cannot really be seen as one but has 
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to be treated separately as two genealogies.  In the United States, the Native Americans 
who survived massive genocides were mostly ―cornered‖ in the reservations and 
therefore posed no threat; therefore, for white Americans, the major Others were the 
dark-skinned African slaves who lived among them.  Thus ―race‖ in the United States 
mainly registered the ―negro vs. white‖ binary and it was not until much later, when the 
United Stated became populated with people with different skin colors, that the 
differential registry of ―race‖ became the ―colored vs. white‖ binary.  On the other hand, 
because historically Europe dominated non-European Others through colonization, 
Others were those who lived outside the European world in ―primitive‖ and 
―non-civilized‖ areas; the concept of ―race‖ in Europe therefore registered the ―primitive 
vs. civilized‖ binary which reflected the colonial experience of the European world. 
However, after the Second World War, Europe and the United States seemed to 
have changed seats regarding their relations to Others: Others from ex-colonies flooded 
to the European world and therefore Europe is forced to face Others from within; on the 
other hand, the United States had become the dominant world power, and started to 
interact more frequently with Others outside of the American world.  These new 
experiences of interacting with Others in many ways changed the fate of ―race‖ as an 
effective signifier of difference, whether it continued to be psychically invested to 
represent Others, to rationalize the domination over Others, or at the same time 
effectively mask the anxiety cause by the difference of Others. 
While ―race‖ as the signifier of difference was not psychology‘s own invention, 
psychology did play a critical role in making the racial Other a scientific object.  In fact, 
as Richards (1997) points out, psychology from its very beginning was deeply involved 
 47 
in the enterprise of scientific racism—the repeated attempts to make the racial Other a 
scientific object.  In another major work, Richards (2002) identified two major trends of 
thought which helped found psychology: first, the experimental methodology which 
consists of two wings, the experimental/empirical wing pioneered by scholars like Gustav 
Fechner and William Wundt, and the statistical wing represented by Francis Galton and 
Karl Pearson; and second, evolutionary thought associated with Charles Darwin and 
Herbert Spencer (p. 32).  If we review the influences these two trends had on the 
establishment of psychology as a empirical science, with a focus on how they helped to 
formulate the discursive and nondiscursive practices of the discipline, we will find that 
these two trends of thought also profoundly influenced how the racial Other was 
constructed as a psychological object. 
Evolutionary thought had a profound influence on many of the so-called ―modern 
sciences,‖ psychology included.  The major contribution of evolutionary thought was 
that it provided Europeans with a new self-image which liberated them from the Christian 
cosmology and thus allowed them to no longer define themselves in terms of the articles 
of faith.  However, this new self-image not only implied that Europeans gradually saw 
themselves as ―Homo sapiens,‖ as one among many species evolved in the long history 
of evolution, it also implied that the world in which the Europeans dwelled was gradually 
separating itself from the Biblical world.  Therefore, the relation between Europeans and 
the other species, and the relation between Europeans and the natural world had to be 
reconsidered and redefined.  The amazing productivity of evolutionary thought lay in 
the passion as well as the anxiety evoked by these yet-to-be-answered questions.  In the 
case of psychology, evolutionary thought supplied an ―overarching integrating 
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framework‖ for different psychological inquires such as ―animal behavior, child 
development, individual differences, physiological psychology, social psychology, 
psychopathology, emotion and the very nature of ‗Mind‘ itself‖ (Richards, 1997, p. 1).  
With the emergence of these new domains of psychological inquiry, we find that 
evolutionary thought provided psychology with a kind of ―comparative homology,‖10 so 
that various differences such as developmental difference, individual difference, species 
difference, racial difference, or psychological difference could become visible through 
comparison using a certain hypothesis of sameness.  Since evolution is essentially a 
biological process, all these comparisons are fundamentally biological in nature. 
The discursive practice involved in the making of the racial Other as a 
psychological object started along the lines of biological comparison.  For example, 
early in the history of psychology the ―Spencer hypothesis‖11 was repeatedly used to 
measure the difference between the ―white race‖ and the other ―lower races,‖ but most of 
the results did not confirm the Spencer hypothesis (Richards, 1997).  These failed 
attempts did not discourage psychologists from finding other possible differences 
between the ―white race‖ and other ―races.‖  When American psychology gradually 
formulated its own brand of psychological categories, such as ―behavior‖ and 
―intelligence,‖ as is explored historically by Danziger (1997), ―behavioral performance‖ 
and ―intelligence test scores‖ became other sites of possible difference.  For example, 
American psychologists attempted to measure difference in school performance between 
                                               
10 R. J. C. Young (2001) comes up with this term in his chapter on Foucault.  Foucault thinks that 
ethnology consists of a structural science predicated on a hypothesis of sameness which enables it to 
theoretically approach other cultures; and in Yang‘s term, this is a kind of ―comparative homology‖ 
exercised by ethnology (pp. 396-397). 
11 The ―Spencer hypothesis‖ hypothesizes that the amount of energy allocated to higher functions of reason 
and will is greater in whites than in ―primitives‖; therefore, ―primitives‖ should outperform whites in 
simple tasks such as reaction time (RT).  As Richards (1997) points out, proving/disproving the 
hypothesis creates an obvious ―no-win situation‖ for non-whites. 
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―Negro‖ children and ―white‖ children as a scientific proof to justify the continued 
segregation of education in the American South; and Army tests were used to justify the 
hostile immigration policy toward southern European immigrants (Richards, 1997).  
These attempts failed eventually; they were proven to be either scientifically dubious or 
else the difference in performance could be better accounted for as originating from 
socio-economic difference than from ―racial‖ difference. 
The racial Other, as a psychological object based on evolutionary thought, 
gradually became socially undefendable in discursive practice.  Racial difference had 
been repeatedly used to provide scientific justification for injustices toward non-whites, 
which gradually evoked opposition and criticism not only from within the psychology 
community but also from the public, especially from the popular liberal press and black 
magazines.  By 1930, race psychology as a specialized subfield in psychology was 
under a lot of social pressure (Richards, 1997).  But more importantly for psychology as 
an empirical science, the racial Other as a psychological object was also scientifically 
undefendable in nondiscursive practice. In the case of making the racial Other a 
psychological object, discursive practice provides the theoretical construction to account 
for how the racial Other is different from us through comparison, or in other words, the 
necessary signifier of difference; and the nondiscursive practice provides empirical 
procedures to instantiate the signifier of difference in concrete experimental setting.  
And historically ―race‖ as an essentially biological signifier of difference had proven to 
be difficult to instantiate in concrete experimental settings by empirical procedures as a 
scientific object in nondiscursive practice. 
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The nondiscursive practice discussed by Danziger mainly involves the 
problematic of measuring: how does one properly translate the theory or hypothesis 
constructed in the discursive practice into a measurable variable in order to instantiate 
the theoretical construction or hypothesis in the concrete experimental setting by 
empirical procedures?  In the history of scientific racism, measuring had always been 
problematic, especially for those who attempted to empirically validate racial difference.  
As Richards (1997) points out, early in the history of scientific racism, physical 
anthropologists were obsessed with ―fleshing out‖ evidence of racial difference by 
measuring skulls.  Their research results were not influential in psychology as a whole, 
but their obsession to measure was definitely inherited by psychologists. 
Historically for psychology, statistical method is at least as important as 
experimental method, if not more important. This is especially true with regard to the 
history of making the racial Other a psychological object.  Compared to those obsessive 
physical anthropologists, psychology had better theoretical architects in the constructing 
of racial difference.  In fact, Francis Galton, the major architect of scientific racism, was 
also one of the main founders of the statistical method in psychology.  With the efforts 
of Galton and other British statisticians, the statistical method became psychology‘s most 
powerful tool in discerning and constructing difference.  It eventually constituted a 
relatively independent subdiscipline of psychology, namely psychometrics, which 
specialized in the theory and technique of measuring psychological properties.  In the 
early years of psychology, the more statistically-minded psychologists‘ main concern was 
how to theorize and measure the individual or racial difference in heredities due to the 
influence of evolutionary thought.  However, as more psychological categories such as 
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―intelligence,‖ ―behavior,‖ and ―personality‖ started to emerge, the theory and technique 
of psychometrics were modified or revamped accordingly to measure individual and 
group difference in those categories, racial difference included. 
Through our brief review of the history of psychology‘s experimental 
methodology, it is fair to say that this experimental methodology gradually evolved to be 
psychology‘s most powerful weapon: a quantifying tool which consists of the empirical 
procedures to instantiate theoretical constructions in the experimental setting, and of the 
statistical methods to processes the experimental results; it became psychology‘s ―proof‖ 
of its credibility to the scientific community.   However, in its actual operation, 
especially with regard to how the difference of Others is constructed and measured, it is a 
rather unique and powerful mode of representing difference: it quantitatively constructs 
the difference of Others through theoretical comparison based on the hypothesis of 
sameness, and instantiates such a difference in concrete experimental settings by 
empirical procedures.  And as we have seen in our brief historical review, this mode of 
representing difference as a nondiscursive practice has a relatively independent existence 
from the discursive practice of ―race,‖ the signifier of difference.  As a result, even if 
―race‖ had gone through some modifications in its differential registry, or could no longer 
be defended as the signifier of difference in discursive practice, this mode of representing 
difference was rather unaffected and continued to evolve by modifying itself accordingly 
to the change of differential registry.  Therefore, the demise of the signifier ―race‖ is not 
the critical issue; as long as there is another signifier of difference to replace ―race,‖ 
psychology can still effectively construct another psychological object to represent 
Others by this powerful quantifying tool.  In this sense, the Other is always measureable 
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and representable; as E.L. Thorndike says, ―everything which exists must exist in some 
quantity and can therefore be measured‖ (as quoted in Richards, 2002, p. 252).   
Around the mid-1930s, because of the social pressure and criticism from within 
the scientific community, ―race‖ was less psychically invested and was no longer able to 
function effectively as the signifier of difference in the discursive practice of psychology. 
Some psychologists started to wonder why there was a need to see differences in ―race‖ 
which later became a blooming interest in racial prejudice and attitudes (Richards, 1997).  
It was not until the rise of Nazi anti-Semitism in Germany that American psychologists 
started to view, from the outside, how ―race‖ as the signifier of difference could be 
utilized politically and ideologically as a way of justifying oppression.  The Holocaust 
was the straw that broke the camel‘s back, so to speak.  After the Second World War, 
―race‖ as the signifier of difference became almost psychically withdrawn; ―race‖ 
became a taboo, a forbidden signifier which, if named, had the capacity to bring on the 
most unimaginable disasters. 
However, for psychology as a whole, most psychologists did not really see the 
problem in representing Others by way of quantified difference, which always refers to a 
norm set in ―white‖ terms, so to speak; therefore, it was not that Others should not be 
represented, but that ―race‖ itself was a ―bad‖ signifier of difference.  On the other hand, 
this powerful quantifying tool could also be used in ways other than justifying racism.  
In fact, liberal psychologists, black psychologists, or so-called ―ethnic minority‖ 
psychologists theoretically constructed difference based on economic and social factors 
and used this quantifying tool to argue that the difference of Others was actually not 
racial but economic and social (Holliday & Holmes, 2003).  
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After the mid-1930s, the attempt to make the racial Other into a psychological 
object was temporarily dead.  Some psychologists started to wonder, ―Why is there a 
need to see the difference in race?‖  This wonder evoked a great deal of interest in the 
study of racial prejudice and attitudes; ―racism‖ rather than ―race‖ became the focus of 
psychologists‘ theoretical interest (Richards, 1997; Samelson, 1978).  However, 
reflection on the Nazi experience turned psychologists to the study of how personality 
and social group affect human behavior (Richards, 2002).  This research not only 
reminded American psychologists to be more aware of the fact that human are social 
beings, but also inspired them to be more actively involved in social issues.  Due to both 
the theoretical and the activist involvement of psychologists in social issues, social 
psychology became a salient field in psychology, and psychology as a whole became 
more receptive to the idea that social context is crucial in the understanding of human 
behavior.  In a sense, this emphasis on contextual significance was a prelude to the 
emergence of the cultural Other.  Social psychology to a great extent paved the way for 
the cultural Other to emerge since ―culture‖ was considered to be one of the social 
dimensions of human existence.   
More importantly, psychology itself went through dramatic changes after the 
Second World War, both internationally and domestically.  Domestically, besides the 
post-war immigrations from Europe, the change of immigration policy in 1965 drastically 
changed the ―color component‖ of the American population, and psychology in no way 
could resist this change.  More and more ―colored people‖ or ―ethnic minorities‖ 
became or fought to become members of the psychology community.  Once they 
entered the system, they became dissatisfied by or disillusioned with psychology‘s 
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explicit and implicit ways of excluding their representation in psychology, in both senses 
of the term.  Therefore, they not only wanted to be the Others in psychology (for 
example, they asked for more institutional representation), they also objected to how they, 
as Others of psychology, were represented (or the lack thereof) by psychology (Holliday 
& Holmes, 2003).  Historically, this was how psychology in the United States became 
more diversified. 
Internationally, the United States had become one of the two dominating world 
powers, and in order to contain communism from spreading, the United States tried 
aggressively to make friends in the world by economic and political supports, as well as 
sharing its higher educational resources with the rest of the world by funding 
international students.  As a result, American psychology spread from its traditional 
Euro-American centers to places where psychology as a discipline was never present or 
only vaguely present.  In the 1970s, when these non-traditional centers of psychology 
became more established, psychologists from these centers became aware that the 
psychology they had learned was not ―relevant‖ to the concerns in their own societies 
(Azuma, 1984; Sinha, 1993).  Thus, they initially argued that the concerns in their 
societies should be properly represented by psychology, but later more of them started to 
advocate for a psychology of their own that better addresses these concerns (Enriquez, 
1993; Kim, 1990; Mataragnon, 1979; Yang, 1997).  Historically, this was how 
psychology became more internationalized. 
―Culture‖ as the signifier of difference for psychology emerged in this post-war 
condition in which psychology became more diversified in the United States (I would 
argue in Canada as well) and became more internationalized around the globe.  In this 
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gradually diverse and international condition, there is a lacuna in psychology‘s discursive 
practice with regard to Others: it did not have a proper term to replace ―race‖ as the 
signifier of difference.  Therefore, when psychologists took from anthropology the 
concept of ―culture,‖ which itself is a rather disputed concept among anthropologists 
(Kuper, 1999), to account for the difference of Others, it quickly became the preferred 
signifier of difference in place of ―race.‖  The boom in culture-related 
psychologies—such as ethnopsychology, cross-culture psychology, cultural psychology, 
and indigenous psychologies—starting in the 1970s is historical evidence of this 
metonymy of the signifier of difference in psychology. 
From the perspective of power, ―culture‖ as the signifier of difference is not just a 
replacement of ―race,‖ but a strategically ―better‖ signifier of difference—not only for the 
psychology establishment, but also for psychology‘s Others.  It is a signifier that is 
abstract enough; as Radcliffe-Brown (1940) says, ―we do not observe a ‗culture,‘ since 
that word denotes, not any concrete reality, but an abstraction, and as it is commonly used 
a vague abstraction‖ (p. 2).  But at the same time, it can refer to almost anything, as this 
most quoted definition of culture in culture-related psychology says: 
Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior 
acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive 
achievements of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; 
the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived 
and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; cultural systems 
may on the one hand be considered as products of action, on the other as 
conditioning elements of further action. (Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952, p. 
181) 
  
As a result, we can see that mainstream psychology and culture-related psychologies all 
work around the concept of ―culture‖ each in their own way.  Representing the cultural 
Other has become a battle on many fronts: domestically in the United States, and globally 
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in non-traditional centers of psychology; and a battle in many forms: institutionally in the 
establishment of psychology, discursively in the form of and right to representation, and 
―desirously‖ in the struggle with one‘s identity beyond identification with the idealized 
mainstream American psychology.
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Chapter 3 
At the Margins: A History Misrecognized and Misappropriated 
 
History, like science, is controversy, not story-telling. (R. M. Young, 
1966) 
 
In September 2009, the Taiwanese Psychological Association (TPA) held its 48
th
 
annual meeting at the Psychology Department of the National Taiwan University (NTU).  
That year was also the Department‘s 60th year since its establishment in 1949.  Since it 
was the first, and for almost 20 years the only, psychology department in Taiwan, many 
Taiwanese psychologists tend to think that psychology in Taiwan began with the 
establishment of the Department.  Therefore, the fact that this annual meeting was 
hosted by the Psychology Department of NTU in its 60
th
 year made it a historically 
significant event. 
In traditional Taiwanese/Chinese chronology, sixty years of time is marked as one 
jia zi, and the end of that implies that something has almost gone through a full cycle of 
its life, and is about to enter a new one.  The year 2009, therefore, symbolically stood 
for psychology in Taiwan having almost gone through its first developmental stage, and 
was about to enter a new one.  Traditionally people would devote some time to reflect 
on the past if they realized that something, if it mattered to them, had been in existence 
for one jia zi.  They would take that brief but precious moment to reflect on how things 
had come to be the way they were, both good and bad, so as to celebrate what they had 
achieved and to learn from their past mistakes.  It was only at these brief moments of 
historical reflection that people are able to temporarily detach themselves from the daily 
routine and have a clearer view of their own life trajectories. 
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There is no doubt that TPA was aware of the historical significance of holding the 
annual meeting at the Psychology Department of NTU in 2009.  As Li-Jen Weng, then 
president of the TPA and the chair of the Psychology Department at NTU said, TPA 
decided to take this opportunity to invite Taiwanese psychologists to ―review the one Jia 
zi of the development of psychology in Taiwan, so as to preview the future‖ (Weng, 
2009).  Three venerable professors—Dr. Ying-Mao Liu (experimental and cognitive 
psychologist), Dr. Yung-Ho Ko (clinical psychologist), and Dr. Kuo-Shu Yang (social 
and personality psychologist)—were invited as keynotes to address the audience about 
the historical development of their respective fields in Taiwan; other participating 
psychologists were also invited to speak on subjects related to the history or the future of 
the development of psychology in Taiwan. 
Indeed, the 48
th
 annual meeting of the TPA could have been an extraordinary 
event, given that it took place at a historically significant time at a historically significant 
site.  Disappointingly, the meeting turned out to be no more than an ordinary annual 
meeting.  The keynote addresses were almost the only section of the meeting that 
responded to the main theme designated by the TPA, most presenters did not bother to 
contextualize their own work in a historical manner, not to mention providing either a 
―review‖ or ―preview‖ of the development of their respective field.  What most 
participating psychologists presented at the meeting was research reflecting their current 
interests, and the historical dimension of such research was limited to the form of 
―literature review,‖ which could only afford a rather limited history of the subject in 
question.  On the other hand, the keynote addresses of the three venerable professors, 
which constituted almost the only historical section of the meeting, were presented 
 59 
mostly in the form of exhibiting past achievements, a privileged honor belonging to 
veterans. 
Nevertheless, in their brief previews of the future development of psychology in 
Taiwan, one cannot but notice a sense of urgency in their tone, especially in Ko and 
Yang‘s speeches.  Both of them showed a great deal of eagerness in conveying to the 
audience that the development of psychology in Taiwan is indeed at a historical crossroad.  
Ko (2009), as a seasoned clinical psychologist, appeals to the new generations that ―the 
most important thing right now for the development of clinical psychology in Taiwan is 
to construct our own clinical psychological theories‖ (p. 55); and Yang (2009) 
encourages the new generations to continue the revolution of hua ren
12
 indigenous 
psychology he and others started more than 30 years ago (p. 86).  In his keynote address, 
Ko emphasizes that ―theory is the soul of a discipline‖ (p. 57) and he expects seasoned 
clinical psychologists to take the initiative to theorize on the basis of their years of 
clinical experience, rather than relying indolently on Western theories.  Ko emphasizes 
that, without the will and capacity to indigenously theorize clinical experience, the 
practice of clinical psychology in Taiwan would always be ―clinical psychology in 
Taiwan‖ rather than ―Taiwanese clinical psychology,‖ and in that case it would be 
nothing but a ―soulless‖ psychology (p. 57). 
                                               
12 The two terms ―hua ren‖ and ‖zhong guo ren‖ are not distinguishable in English; they are both 
translated as ―Chinese.‖  The term ―zhong guo ren‖ is considered, especially by Taiwanese, to be a term 
with too many political implications (for example, Taiwanese and Chinese are both zhong guo ren and 
therefore the future of Taiwan is to return to the welcoming arms of China), and therefore has gradually lost 
its currency in the daily language use of Taiwanese as a term to refer to themselves; Taiwanese now prefer 
to identify themselves as ―tai wan ren‖ rather than ―zhong guo ren.‖  However, it is also undeniable that 
Taiwanese and Chinese do share the same cultural-linguistic matrix to a great extent.  The term ―hua ren‖ 
is therefore being used more frequently in recent years to replace the term ―zhong guo ren‖ because of its 
emphasis on the shared cultural-linguistic aspect rather than the divided political aspect between the 
Taiwanese people and the Chinese people. 
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Ironically, Yang and Wen (1982) use the same expression ―soulless‖ to describe 
the condition of psychology in the mid-1980s, and one could even say that this very 
awareness of the soulless condition of psychology was what led to the indigenous 
psychology movement nearly 30 years ago.  Hearing the same ―diagnosis‖ being given 
again to describe the condition of psychology in Taiwan after three decades of the 
indigenous psychology movement is bewildering.  What is more troubling is the 
indifference shown by most participating psychologists to the invitation to historically 
reflect.  It is almost like history does not matter, be it the historical reflection of their 
predecessors in psychology, or the historical significance of their own work. 
 
 
Lessons from the History of Psychology 
 
History of psychology is not a salient field in Taiwan. Most Taiwanese 
psychologists are not particularly interested in looking back into the past of psychology.  
The history of psychology in their view is, metaphorically speaking, like a long and 
winding river which has a clear directional flow.  The outline of the story of psychology 
can probably be best summarized in the following banal expression: ―psychology has a 
long past but a short history.‖13  The long past of psychology is usually mentioned rather 
briefly in this story; for example, in an introduction to psychology textbook by Wade and 
Tavris (2003), this long past of psychology is presented in the section of ―Psychology‘s 
Past: From the Armchair to the Laboratory ‖ and it traces the history of psychology back 
to Greek thinkers because they ―raised questions that today would be call psychological‖ 
                                               
13 Hermann Ebbinghaus began his introductory psychology text Outline of Psychology (1902) with this 
famous statement (Hergenhahn, 2005). 
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(p. 15).  Then the story goes through the changes in psychological thought in past 
centuries with some comments here and there about the mistakes past thinkers made 
without ―empirical methods,‖ and quickly fast forwards to the end of the 19th century 
when psychology started to emerge as a modern discipline. 
From this point on, the previous fast-paced story-telling seems to enter a slow 
motion mode, even to the degree of gazing.  In this linearly progressing history of 
psychology, the end of the 19
th
 century and the beginning of the 20
th
 century was the 
crucial moment for psychology to enter its ―present‖ from its ―long past.‖  And the most 
crucial of all was the establishment of the experimental method.  The experimental 
method was psychology‘s announcement that it had evolved from a brand of ―armchair‖ 
philosophy to a new discipline of empirical science based on ―laboratory‖ findings.  
Wilhem Wundt‘s establishment of the first psychology laboratory in Leipzig, Germany 
becomes the object of the historical gaze and the focus of the story because it is seen as 
the event which stood for the birth of ―modern psychology.‖  As a consequence of this 
landmark event in 1879, the history of psychology, this long and winding river which had 
its origins in the Greek philosophers, started to change its directional flow.  After early 
phases of structuralism, functionalism, and psychoanalysis, it gradually incorporated 
streams from modern medicine and other natural sciences; and with the continuous 
devotions of great minds, it eventually became the splendid scene of scientific 
psychology in the United States. 
This river-like, linear history of psychology was learned by most Taiwanese 
psychologists in their training; maybe the emphasis or the details were slightly different, 
but the core structure of the story stayed very much the same.  Therefore, the historical 
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narrative that psychology ―originated in Europe but became great in the United States‖ 
becomes the history of psychology as identified by Taiwanese psychologists; most will 
not cast a doubt on the truth value of the story, not to mention not knowing its 
particularity and the problems thus involved.  The problem is that this biographical 
history of modern psychology may not be as trustworthy as it is believed to be. 
Early in 1966, when the history of psychology started to become a recognized 
field in psychology,
14
 Cambridge scholar Robert M. Young wrote a long article 
criticizing the low level of scholarly works in the field.  After reviewing a long list of 
representative works in the field, he points out that most of them had not yet reached the 
―useful but limited stage of amateurism‖ (p. 13) and therefore could not be qualified as 
scholarly historical works.  He points out that it was ―unfortunately symptomatic‖ for 
the history of psychology that it suffers from three limitations: ―great men,‖ ― great 
insights,‖ and ―great dates‖ (p. 29), which as a result created historical works in the form 
of an ―expository history.‖  Since most of the works in the history of psychology were 
written by working psychologists for their colleagues or students, they naturally stress the 
history of problems which reflect their current interest, and as Young points out, ―history 
is thus written backwards from the viewpoint of a modern textbook‖ (p. 15).  Young 
argues that these pragmatic considerations generated significant problems.  He points 
out that this presentist approach had produced ―shockingly bad history,‖ and that it 
―denies the student one of the most valuable helps to be gained from historical reading: 
                                               
14 Institutionally, the American Psychological Association (APA) formally recognized the Division of the 
History of Psychology in 1966, and many of the Division members were actively involved in the Journal of 
the History of the Behavioral Sciences founded in 1965.  Funding wise, not only the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) establish a History of the Life Sciences Study Section which made grants for research in the 
study of the biological and related (including psychological) sciences, there were also funds for establishing 
departments or institutes of the history of medicine and science and fellowships for potential teachers (R. 
M. Young, 1966). 
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perspectives‖ (p. 15).  Young also points out that, even though some works in the 
history of psychology had started to refer to Thomas Kuhn‘s new historiography, there 
was only ―scant evidence‖ that Kuhn‘s idea of ―understanding the past in its own term‖ 
was actually grasped by these works.  Young‘s article began the critique of the historical 
narrative in the history of psychology.  However, it was not until the 1980s, when more 
dialogue started to take place between the history of psychology and the history of 
science,
15
 that historians of psychology reconnected to the critique made by Young. 
In his article ―Of What Is History of Psychology a History?‖ (1987) British 
historian of psychology Graham Richards argues that the development of the history of 
psychology needs to be critically examined.  He first points out that the early works in 
the history of psychology were written by psychologists with a clear aim to provide a 
―respectable genealogy‖ for the nascent discipline: they defended the legitimacy of 
psychology by presenting psychology as ―the legitimate heir to the main western 
philosophical tradition‖ (p. 201).  The widely-accepted story that psychology 
―originated in Europe but became great in the United States‖ was the historical product of 
such a defense.  It provided a simple storyline which not only genealogically connected 
the nascent discipline of psychology to the glorified European tradition but also stressed 
the scientificity of psychology by emphasizing its experimental methods, which at the 
time seemed to be a good enough defense for the legitimate status of psychology as a 
young but respectable science.  He further argues that the efforts of the history of 
psychology to emulate the history of science since the 1960s was nothing but a ―repeat 
                                               
15 History of psychology became a salient field in the 1980s, especially toward the end of it.  The 
publication of several major works (Buss, 1979; Danziger, 1990; Leary, 1990; Rose, 1985) and the 
establishment of a new journal named History of the Human Sciences (HHS) in 1988 contributed greatly 
to active dialogues between the history of psychology and the history of other sciences. 
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performance‖ of psychology‘s earlier striving to become a respected science (p. 203).  
But this emulation is quite problematic because it assumes that psychology is not 
different from the natural sciences and therefore the history of psychology should be 
interpreted in the orthodox terms of the history of science.  And such an approach, 
according to Richards, ―begs some central questions and prevents some genuinely 
interesting and very important issues from being confronted‖ (p. 203). 
Richards then points out one of the begged questions: there is a crucial difference 
between psychology and the natural sciences, which is, that the widely used distinction 
between ―internalist‖ and ―externalist‖ approaches to historiography does not really apply 
to psychology because ―Psychology, the discipline, directly emerges out of ‗psychology‘ 
the subject matter‖ (p. 205); in other words, there is a reflexive relation between 
psychology, the discipline, and psychology, the subject matter.  Richards suggests that 
historians of psychology should admit that the scientific status of psychology is 
problematic and this should be explored rather than defended by the history of 
psychology. 
In his article ―Does the History of Psychology Have a Subject?‖ (1988) historian 
Roger Smith directly probes the core issue of the history of psychology: does the history 
of psychology have a continuous subject as its subject matter?  Smith‘s main points can 
be summarized as follows: first, most works in the history of psychology accept highly 
questionable notions of ―psychology,‖ their subject matter; and second, the history of 
psychology as a disciplinary domain does not have a historically invariable ―psychology‖ 
as its corresponding subject.  Smith begins his arguments by first criticizing the 
―textbook history‖ of psychology.  He argues that the linear history of psychology 
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presented by most textbooks contributes to the ―normative framework‖ of the psychology 
community and that such texts embody and transmit values important to psychologists‘ 
sense of worth and identity.  However, Smith also points out that this simplified version 
of psychology‘s history is eventually dangerous to psychology itself.  First, this 
simplified version of psychology‘s history is selective in nature, it ―privileges one body 
of knowledge and practice as ‗truth‘, reducing the imagination‘s power to conceptualize 
alternative truths‖ (p. 148).  Second, the linear history modern psychology presents is 
essentially an oversimplified view of history: it ―distorts and simplifies what have been 
far from inevitable events and circumstances‖ (p. 148).  And third, this historical 
narrative presupposes that ―psychology‖ is a continuous subject but this presupposition is 
exactly what should be explored by the practice of historical inquiry. 
Using Foucault‘s general critique of the human sciences, Smith argues that 
psychology‘s disciplinary existence consists of ―relations among bodies of knowledge 
and forms of power‖ that can be traced to ―institutional, occupational, and personal 
enactments,‖ and psychology as such is historically configured by these 
power-knowledge relations, rather than by any pre-existing reality (p. 150).  Therefore, 
instead of a presentist linear history, Smith proposes a ―present-centered‖ critical history 
of psychology.  The present of psychology is still the main concern of this critical 
history, but the present is neither a natural result of progress, nor is it a peak of 
development; rather, it is a present made possible by historical contingencies. 
From this critical stance, Smith points out that ―psychology‖ as a seemingly 
continuous subject is in fact a narrative construction of textbook histories formed 
selectively choosing to emphasize some part of psychological knowledge (for example, 
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experimental psychology) and linking it with a particular historical tradition (for example, 
the western philosophical tradition); however, what actually made ―psychology‖ 
historically recognizable was its ―social presence‖ since the generation of Wundt or 
James (p. 154).  Therefore, the real subject of the history of psychology should be the 
historical contingencies which made possible the emergence of psychology as such, and 
the power-knowledge relations which sustain it.  The different ―faces‖ of psychology in 
different societies is a result of those historical contingencies.  As Smith provocatively 
points out, psychology was not ―one discipline‖ formed in ―one set of historical 
circumstances‖; it is ―the ‗generic sign‘ of a cluster of competing would-be disciplines‖ 
(p. 156). 
In the introduction to the special issue of History of the Human Sciences 
published in 1991, the executive editor Kurt Danzier, who just published his major work 
Constructing the Subject: Historical Origins of Psychological Research (1990), 
responded, for the most part, positively to Smith‘s article.  He agreed with Smith that we 
should by all means ―bury the ghost of the history of psychology,‖ but he nevertheless 
argued that it does not mean the end of the disciplinary domain of the history of 
psychology.  It means that a reappraisal is needed of psychology‘s appropriate subject 
matter (p. 327).  Danziger concurs with Smith that psychology only recently became 
historically identifiable as a ―social activity‖ and thus he proposed that ―the appearance 
of psychology as a discipline‖ should be one anchoring point for historical studies.  
Danziger argues that if the history of psychology is not to become the story about the 
pursuit of timeless ―human nature,‖ it has to be grounded in ―the specific social activities‖ 
that constitute psychology as such.  He then points out that modern psychology since its 
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inception has an inescapable feature of erecting universalistic knowledge-claims on a 
rather localized social basis despite the fact that the discipline has multiple origins and 
that its development has not been one of linear convergence.  Danziger argues that it is 
only by ―privileging certain local developments over others‖ that psychology is able to 
make such universal claims and speak of the history of psychology (pp. 327-328).  He 
points out three factors which have contributed to the univocalization/universalization of 
locally developed American psychology.  First, the internal politics of the discipline: 
History has been used by psychologists such as Boring (1950) to place their particular 
version of the disciplinary project at the central position.  Second, psychology as a 
discipline has been unequally developed in different nations, and American psychology 
has surpassed that of other nations both in quality and quantity.  Third, the uneven 
development of psychology made it easier to structure the history of the discipline in 
terms of a continuous and progressively developing subject.  As a result, this linear 
history marginalized trends, both local and international, that did not fit the perspective of 
mainstream American psychology and played down the pervasiveness and significance of 
fundamental disagreements.  However, as psychology in other places grew rapidly in 
recent years, the American-centered history of psychology has become less convincing as 
representing the history of psychology.  Danziger therefore proposes a ―polycentric 
historiography‖ to replace the old historiography which not only positions American 
psychology at the geographical center, but also positions a particular brand of it 
(empirical, experimental mainstream psychology) at the conceptual core of the discipline. 
Besides the proposal of a new polycentric historiography, in ―Does the History of 
Psychology Have a Future‖ (1994), Danziger further proposes that psychology is in need 
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of a critical history.  He first examines two opposite models of institutionalizing 
disciplinary history: one represented by physics which institutionally separates the study 
of its history from the disciplinary practice, and the other represented by economics in 
which the study of its own history is an integral part of the disciplinary practice.  By 
comparing these two opposite models, Danziger argues that the natural sciences and the 
human sciences have very different ways of ―mobilizing tradition,‖ and therefore they 
have different kinds of historical ―sensibilities‖ (pp. 468-472).  The natural sciences are 
largely consensus enterprises, they usually mobilize tradition by a brief account of the 
recent relevant research literature to demarcate a sphere of uncertainty and ignorance 
within predefined research areas, and this small piece of recent relevant historical past is 
presented in the ―literature review‖ section of a study.  On the other hand, the human 
sciences are often divided by alternative schools of thought which tend not to agree with 
each other, and therefore, their way of mobilizing tradition usually involves ―critical 
historiography‖ (p. 471) with considerable chronological depth so that the differences 
among schools can be seen with maximum visibility.  The ―shallow history‖ (p. 471) of 
research papers does help the natural sciences maximize consensus around the formation 
of what is already known and what is still uncertain.  However, the efficiency of 
problem solving comes at a price: the natural sciences institutionalize a ―lack of reflective 
historical consciousness‖ (p. 471); they ―progress‖ in a way as if science were beyond 
history. 
Danziger points out that in terms of their research practice, most experimental 
psychologists mobilize tradition in a way similar to that of physicists; therefore, there is 
hardly any room in their world for a reflective or critical history (p. 472).  One could 
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even argue that there was perhaps no need for a critical history, since after World War II 
the American model was the one to be emulated rather than criticized.  The historical 
narrative that psychology ―originated in Europe but became great in the United States‖ 
provided the necessary sense of identity and pride for American psychologists, and they 
just had to focus on what they were doing and the ―shallow history‖ that could help them 
clarify their research questions was all they needed.  However, things started to change 
in the mid-1970s.  With the recovery of European psychology, the American model of 
―behavioral science‖ was no longer the only game in town, and the American-centered 
historical narrative was also contested.  And externally, as the scientific advance started 
to show its negative impacts, the general public became skeptical about the supposedly 
transcendental claims made by science.  There was even the glimmer of a suspicion that 
science is not beyond history; science is a social activity and, like other social activities, 
it is historical in nature.  Critical histories of science started to emerge as a response to 
the fall of scientism, which in many ways inspired critical historical studies of 
psychology to question its natural science model.  In addition, the ―human geography‖ 
of psychology also started to change; psychology‘s Others started to enter the field and 
they were not satisfied with the status quo.  And along with the end of American 
hegemony in psychology, both the old discipline hierarchy of placing the ―hard-core 
experimentalists‖ at the top and the old historiography of placing the Euro-Americans at 
the center were challenged from within and without American psychology.  The old 
historiography has lost its appeal and the shallow history was never a genuine history; 
Danziger therefore proposed that psychology was in need of a different kind of historical 
consciousness in order to deal with the complexity of its current affairs. As Danziger says, 
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it is ―when the authority becomes questionable, when the professional community is 
divided in some profound way, that a critical disciplinary history has a significant 
contribution to make‖ (p. 478). 
Danziger argues that there are at least three ways a critical historiography might 
have an effect on psychology.  First, the discipline of psychology has traditionally 
defined its subject matter in ahistorical terms, that is to say, as human ―nature.‖  But as 
we already know, human subjectivity is not a thing-like object; it is historically and 
locally configured.  Critical studies‘ interest in the historicity of human subjectivity and 
its conceptions therefore should have a legitimate place in the discipline of psychology.  
Second, the historicization of human subjectivity forces the discipline to reexamine, and 
eventually historicize, its ahistorical investigative practices.  And as Danziger comments, 
this might help the discipline of psychology to finally realize that ―psychology‘s 
investigative practices are historically contingent products reflecting a limited set of 
knowledge interests‖ (p. 480) and break up its ―methodological gridlock,‖ its obsession 
with quantifying methodology.  Third, the discipline of psychology was given high 
hopes at its birth, but has failed to participate in the major currents of intellectual 
discourse in the 20
th
 century.  By gathering historical depth in theoretical discussions, 
Danziger expects a change in the social contribution of psychology. 
On the basis of the arguments reviewed above, we can assert that the history of 
psychology that has been taken for granted by the majority of Taiwanese psychologists is 
itself quite problematic.  This historical narrative, that psychology ―originated in Europe 
but became great in the United States,‖ presupposes that history progresses in a linear 
fashion as if history is a homogeneous temporal-spatial duration.  Instead we can 
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propose that it was actually an oversimplified historical narrative constructed by elite 
psychologists not only to defend the problematic scientific status of psychology, but also 
to place their specific disciplinary agenda at the center of psychology.  While this 
historical narrative did provide American psychologists with a sense of identity and 
worth, it also came at a price; it privileged a certain trend of psychology (the 
experimental tradition) and its practice as the ―hardcore‖ of psychology, and 
marginalized or ignored other trends of psychology and other systems of psychology.  
For example, in almost all psychology textbooks, psychoanalysis is dealt with in the ―past 
tense‖ as if it were irrelevant in the contemporary context, which we know is far from an 
accurate depiction.  Other trends which do not share the same perspective or 
philosophical ground with the mainstream, such as phenomenological psychology, are 
hardly mentioned in this grand narrative. 
As for psychology in other places in the world, Brock (2006) summarizes the 
rules of inclusion/exclusion rather nicely: 
Rule #1: If your work did not have a major impact on American psychology, 
however influential it might have been elsewhere, it does not count.  
 
Rule #2: If your work had a major impact on American psychology, even though its 
influence was limited or nonexistent elsewhere, it is an important part of the history 
of psychology. 
 
Rule #3: Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Oceania do not exist. (pp. 3-4) 
 
That is to say, whether psychology from other places in the world will show up in this 
grand narrative really depends on its impact on mainstream American psychology.  This 
grand narrative cannot ignore Europe, because it is considered to be the birthplace of 
psychology; but other systems of psychology which did not play a role in the formation 
of American psychology can simply be ignored and considered as nonexistent. 
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What is ironic is that most Taiwanese psychologists consider this historical 
narrative, which in principle excludes their contributions, as the history of psychology.  
But what is more bewildering is that, even those who advocate for an indigenous 
psychology also embrace this historical narrative almost without a doubt.  It seems that 
the abovementioned lessons from the history of psychology have not been learned by 
Taiwanese psychologists; they identify with a history without knowing that they are the 
Others of this history, and still strive to be recognized by this very history that ignores 
their legitimate existence. 
 
From a History of Psychology to the History of Psychology 
 
Do you feel that your own people and country are somehow always 
positioned outside the mainstream?  Have you ever felt that the moment 
you said the word ‗I‘, that ‗I‘ was someone else, not you?  That in some 
obscure way, you were not the subject of your own sentence?  Do you 
ever feel that whenever you speak, you have already in some sense been 
spoken for?  Or that when you hear others speaking, that you are only 
ever going to be the object of their speech?  Do you sense that those 
speaking would never think of trying to find out how things seem to you, 
from where you are?  That you live in a world of others, a world that 
exists for others? (R. Young, 2003, p. 1) 
 
This misrecognition of the historical narrative constructed by mainstream 
American psychologists as the history of psychology has to be first explicated historically 
in a global context.  If we look back to the early phase of the discipline of psychology at 
the end of the 19
th
 century and the beginning of the 20
th
 century, not only was psychology 
practiced in many nations (for example, Wundt‘s lab experiments in Leipzig, Charcot‘s 
psychopathology research in Paris, Galton‘s psychometric studies in London), it was also 
heading toward divergence rather than convergence.  There were frequent international 
exchanges but at the same time the discipline exhibited a ―profound localism‖ (Danziger, 
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2006).  In other words, in its early phase the discipline of psychology in the 
Euro-American world was a polycentric practice in which psychology showed a different 
―flavor‖ in different localities and none of these ―flavors‖ was easily transplantable. 
As for the development of the discipline of psychology in Asia, according to 
Turtle (1989), modern psychology appeared in Asia very early on in history,
16
 and its 
advent and development coincided with the decline of the old colonial regime in Asia.  
However, due to linguistic barriers, economic poverty, and mostly, the difference 
between modern psychology and the local social-cultural matrices, the development of 
the discipline in Asian countries had been rather difficult and stayed in a kind of 
apprenticeship to European and American psychology for decades.  According to 
Turtle‘s (1989) observation, it was not until the 1970s that psychology in Asia overall 
showed more signs of maturity. 
The eruption of World War II changed everything.  Since Europe was one of the 
main battlegrounds, many European cities and academic institutions were either wrecked 
or threatened by ground battles or airstrikes.  Financing the war put a heavy burden on 
governmental budgets.  Most war-unrelated academic activities, including that of 
psychology, were either forced to stop completely or survive in a rather resourceless 
condition.  Thing were not better in Asia.  Those countries which had psychological 
institutions established before World War II such as China, India, and Japan all took part 
in the Pacific War, either voluntarily or involuntarily.  The development of psychology 
in these countries was seriously hindered by the war, if not completely stopped by it 
(Blowers, 2006; Turtle, 1989).  On the other hand, the United States was barely touched 
                                               
16 India established its first psychological institution in 1916, China in 1920, and Japan established its first 
psychology lab in 1903. 
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by the war and it benefited greatly from being the supplier of war necessities.  Therefore, 
neither the institutions nor the academic activities of American psychology were 
threatened by the war; on the contrary, American psychologists‘ active participation in 
wartime affairs and especially the psychology community‘s affiliation with the military 
establishment actually broadened the base of psychology‘s social support and helped 
change psychologists‘ role in American society from a more academic role to a more 
socially involved role (Evans, Sexton, & Cadwallader, 1992).  Overall, American 
psychology became more active and powerful than ever during and after World War II. 
In comparison to its pre-war condition, postwar psychology was a completely 
different scene.  American psychologists had demonstrated to the government and to the 
general public that their expertise could be of great use during the war, and they were 
determined to market their expertise more widely with the help of the newly reformed 
and more activist-oriented American Psychological Association (Evans et al., 1992).  As 
Pickren and others (Buchanan, 2003; Pickren, 2005, 2007) point out, World War II and 
the changed conditions of postwar American life resulted in rapid expansion in every area 
of psychology, and created the need for a great number of professional psychologists.  
American psychology was no longer the dubious science that had to defend itself, but had 
become a rapidly expanding industry. 
As American psychology became stronger than ever, the once active European 
psychology went into postwar depression and Asian psychology‘s way toward maturity 
was still seriously hindered by postwar regional unrest.  Overall, there was no 
psychology in any other nation that had the scale, funding, and social support comparable 
to that of American psychology.  Under such conditions of uneven development, 
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European psychology soon became the importer of, or ―colonized‖ by American 
psychology despite the rich local traditions that developed in various nations before the 
war (van Strien, 1997).  In the case of Asia, psychology began to show a much stronger 
presence in Asian countries as part of American influence.  With American support, 
many countries started to establish psychology departments or institutions, and those 
which already had psychological institutions shifted their allegiance from European 
psychology to American psychology (Turtle, 1989).  The United States became the 
major exporter of psychology and psychological education after World War II.  
Therefore, in its postwar development, psychology also became profoundly 
Americanized.  As a result, these postwar changes created ―a pattern of international 
exchange of psychological knowledge‖ in which the exchange of knowledge was 
essentially asymmetrical: from the center (the United States) to peripheries (non-US 
nations), and rarely the other way around (Danziger, 2006).  In this center-periphery 
scheme, American psychology could basically ignore other psychologies and make 
universal knowledge-claims without hesitation while other psychologies could not afford 
to ignore American psychology without the status of their knowledge-claims being 
questioned.  The center-periphery scheme profoundly shaped the global landscape of 
psychology after World War II, and in many ways it is still the dominating structure 
within psychology, probably less effectively so in Europe or other places where they have 
found ways to enrich psychology with their own traditions. 
In the Taiwanese context, the history is even more complicated than the global 
context just described.  Although it is commonly believed that the establishment of the 
Psychology Department of NTU in 1949 marked the beginning of modern psychology in 
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Taiwan, this story of origin actually covered up the historical fact that modern 
psychology made its first appearance in Taiwan during the period of Japanese colonial 
rule.  The Institute of Psychology specializing in the study of Taiwanese aborigines was 
established at Taihoku Imperial University in 1928 as one of the Japanese Empire‘s 
Southeast Asian research bases.
17
  However, after World War II, all the faculty members 
and students of the Institute of Psychology left Taiwan and went back to Japan.  It is not 
clear whether they were forced to leave or left voluntarily.  But in terms of the nature of 
the Institute‘s psychological practice, there seemed to be no reason for them to stay after 
the war since most of the Institute‘s activities involved the assistance of the Japanese 
colonial government‘s administration of the Taiwanese aborigines, which was hardly one 
of the urgent administrative concerns of the new government. 
The reemergence of psychology in Taiwan after World War II was actually based 
on the legacy left by psychological practice during colonial rule.  The legacy was not in 
the form of teaching or training, but in the form of material resources (research papers, 
books, and experimental instruments) left by the Institute of Psychology.  These 
material resources were accidentally discovered by Thome H. Fang, then chair of the 
Department of Philosophy, and he assigned Xiang-Yu Su, a faculty member of the 
Department of Philosophy who had three years of psychological training at Tokyo 
Imperial University, to take charge of establishing a new psychology department.  The 
Department of Psychology was eventually established in 1949, and the department‘s 
                                               
17 Taihoku Imperial University was founded in 1928 by the Japanese colonial government in Taiwan, and 
it was the second Imperial University founded overseas in Japanese colonies (the first one being Keijo 
Imperial University founded in 1924 in Korea).  The founding of these two overseas Imperial Universities 
was part of the strategic deployment in the Japanese Empire‘s expansion plan: Keijo Imperial University 
served as the academic base for the Northern Advancement Policy in which China was targeted, and 
Taihoku Imperial University served as the academic base for the Southern Advancement Policy in which 
Southeast Asia was targeted.  After World War II, Taihoku Imperial University was reformed and 
renamed National Taiwan University by the government of the Republic of China in 1945. 
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mission was to develop psychology as a theoretical and practical science which could 
help facilitate the well-being of people and make positive contributions to society 
(Chuang et al., 1999).  Therefore, if the establishment of the Department of Psychology 
at NTU in 1949 is to be considered a significant event, the real significance was that it 
marked the transition of the disciplinary practice of psychology in Taiwan; the nature of 
the psychological practice in Taiwan had changed from a colonial science in the service 
of the Japanese Empire‘s Southern Advancement Policy (Yeh, 2010), to a normative 
science expected to contribute to the welfare of a troubled nation (Chuang et al., 1999). 
The above history shows that the history of Taiwanese psychology actually 
consists of two earlier histories.  One belongs to Japanese psychology in the colonial 
context in which studies of folk psychology were conducted with Taiwanese aborigines 
so that they could be properly managed (Wu, 2007).  The other one belongs to Chinese 
psychology which adopted the discipline of psychology as part of the ―package deal‖ of 
Western modernity, and whose development in mainland China had been seriously 
interrupted by seemingly endless wars (Blowers, 2006). These two histories briefly 
overlapped in Taiwan after World War II and were the forces that gave birth to a new 
history of psychology impregnated in a different geopolitical context.  At this new 
historical stage, the main factor that shaped Taiwanese psychology‘s development was 
the ―American factor‖: by ways of financial support, book donations to university 
libraries, and scholarships/fellowships offered, the United States quickly changed the 
postwar landscape of psychology in Taiwan. 
The faculty members in the Department of Psychology at NTU were first 
generation Chinese psychologists who were mostly educated in Japan in the tradition of 
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German psychology.  One of them, Fa-Yu Chen, continued the study of Taiwanese 
aborigines for a short while in the direction of the research done by the Institute of 
Psychology in the colonial period (F.-Y. Chen, 1952a, 1952b; Cheng, Chen, Rin, & 
Chang, 1958).  When they started their teaching careers in Taiwan, these first generation 
Chinese psychologists were confronted with a different landscape of psychology in which 
Germany psychology had declined and American psychology had become 
overwhelmingly hegemonic.  They were forced to teach and research in the unfamiliar 
tradition of American psychology which seemed at the time to be the only model for 
psychology.  Even though some of them might have expected to go back to China, the 
Chinese civil War between the Kuomintang (KMT; also referred to as the Chinese 
Nationalist Party) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) prevented such a return.  
Instead the KMT and more than a million Chinese people retreated to Taiwan and 
reestablished the government of the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan, while the CPC 
took control of mainland China, formed a new government, and declared the founding of 
the People‘s Republic of China (PROC) in 1949.  These Chinese psychologists 
eventually stayed and continued their professional careers in Taiwan.  The turbulent 
China in which their profession began was a world away
18
 and they no longer belonged 
to the history of Chinese psychology after 1949.  Instead, in a geopolitically 
anti-communist and pro-American Taiwan, they became pioneering figures in the 
postwar history of Taiwanese psychology. 
                                               
18 After the retreat in 1949, the KMT government strictly prohibited any form of communication between 
Taiwan and China out of fear of communist infiltration.  Any communication between Taiwan and China 
had to be done cautiously and indirectly (mostly through Hong-Kong) otherwise one was at risk of 
breaking the martial law declared in 1949.  The Taiwanese government eventually lifted martial law in 
1987 and allowed the Taiwanese to visit China in 1988; however, nearly forty years of separation and the 
never ending negative propaganda against each other during this time had created an overall sense of deep 
mistrust between the Taiwanese people and the people of China. 
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In terms of professional development, the next generation of Taiwanese 
psychologists was luckier than the first generation Chinese psychologists whose 
professional careers were seriously hindered by war.  This next generation was able to 
pursue their professional careers in a relatively stable environment sustained by the 
coercion of the KMT government.  Most of early students who graduated from the 
Department of Psychology at NTU pursued diverse career paths, but some outstanding 
alumni were hired by the department as lecturers to share the teaching load of faculty 
members.  These young lecturers were teaching newly published American textbooks 
that they themselves were learning at the same time (Chuang et al., 1999).  After several 
years of teaching, these eager young lecturers were encouraged by the department to go 
overseas to the United States for graduate studies with scholarships offered by the United 
States or the Taiwanese government, and they later became the first generation of 
postwar American-trained Taiwanese psychologists.  The three venerable professors 
invited to be the keynote speakers of TPA‘s 48th annual meeting were the first among 
them.  Because their years of self-learning and graduate education were all in the 
tradition of American psychology, when they returned to teach in the department, they 
passionately pushed for curriculum reform based on the American model.  The reform 
of the curriculum further Americanized the disciplinary training and practice of 
Taiwanese psychology.  With the extensive use of American textbooks, the historical 
narrative constructed by mainstream American psychologists became the first historical 
perspective of the students of psychology in Taiwan. 
Due to the relatively small academic publishing market, both Taiwanese 
psychologists and publishers were discouraged to publish textbooks authored by 
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Taiwanese psychologists.  Even if they did publish such work, it was soon replaced by 
American textbooks which updated relevant materials with amazing speed.  In such a 
difficult publishing environment, one could hardly expect Taiwanese psychologists to 
formulate their own historical perspectives through the gradual process of authoring 
psychology textbooks.  Therefore, psychology students in Taiwan mainly acquired their 
perspective on the history of psychology through textbooks authored by mainstream 
American psychologists, translated or not.  Furthermore, since the textbooks used in 
many different courses were not that different in terms of their historical perspectives, the 
same historical narrative was repeated in different courses and thus essentially acquired 
the status of common knowledge among Taiwanese psychology students.  And lastly, 
since the historical narrative constructed by mainstream American psychologists 
presupposed a presentist stance that history progresses in a linear fashion, the historical 
past was summoned to justify the status quo and to guarantee the future of that status quo. 
Therefore, Taiwanese psychologists and their students who were ―brainwashed‖ 
by this historical narrative did not find it necessary to investigate the historical past.  
They were more inclined to spent time catching up with ―current developments‖ or 
―groundbreaking discoveries‖ in American psychology.  Consequentially, they remained 
quite ignorant of other non-mainstream historical perspectives, and the debates over the 
historiography of psychology never seemed to enter their intellectual horizons.  Without 
the challenge from other historical perspectives or from critical reflection on the 
power-knowledge relations involved in the construction of textbook histories, the 
American-centered history eventually became the history of psychology for Taiwanese 
psychologists and their students.  By being exposed to this historical narrative over and 
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over again, they became deeply convinced that mainstream American psychology 
represented the present and future of psychology, and that therefore it was the psychology 
on which Taiwanese psychology should be modeled. 
 
A History Misidentified and Misappropriated 
 
We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters 
between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indians 
in blood and color, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals, and in 
intellect.  To that class we may leave it to refine the vernacular dialects 
of the country, to enrich those dialects with terms of science borrowed 
from the Western nomenclature, and to render them by degrees fit vehicles 
for conveying knowledge to the great mass of the population. (By Thomas 
Babington Macaulay in "Minutes on Indian Education," as cited in Spivak, 
1999, p. 268) 
 
When people tell personal stories about themselves, they are not simply 
describing a past that is fixed and gone but re-membering their past in the narrative they 
tell.  Some events in their lives are emphasized, and some are ignored; they can tell 
upbeat stories about themselves, or they can tell depressing ones.  Therefore, the stories 
they tell about themselves are not simply about their past; these stories also reflect how 
they conceive of their present and imagine their futures.  Analogously, the historical 
narrative constructed by mainstream American psychologists is not simply a description 
of the historical facts, but a selective re-membering of the past which reflects how the 
present of psychology is conceived of, how the future is imagined, how changes are 
evaluated, and so on.  That is to say, this particular historical narrative reflects 
mainstream American psychologists‘ historical conception of the discipline of 
psychology; it is essentially a temporal framework employed to determine the relative 
positioning of different trends of psychological knowledge, and evaluations of these 
 82 
different trends are already implied in the act of determining their relative positioning 
(which trends should be placed at the core?  Which trends should be seen as belonging 
to the past?  Which trends should be seen as belonging to the future?). 
For example, the thinking and practice of psychoanalysis are very much alive in 
many parts of the world.  Psychoanalysis continues to exist not only as a therapeutic 
practice, but it has already had a great deal of influence in many areas in the human 
sciences such as literature studies and cultural studies.  Even the ―hardcore sciences‖ 
such as neuroscience are reevaluating psychoanalytic theories in light of the new 
discoveries in the field (Mancia, 2006).  However, many Taiwanese psychologists tend 
to talk about psychoanalysis as if it belongs to the unscientific past of psychology, and 
this prejudiced attitude toward psychoanalysis is likely due to the historical narrative they 
have learned which positions psychoanalysis as one of the three now surpassed early 
schools in the history of psychology.  Similarly, the paradigm shifts that occurred in the 
American context (for example, the fall of behaviorism and the rise of cognitive 
psychology) or the rise of certain psychological trends in the United States (for example, 
the recent rise of neuropsychology and the extensive use of functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) in studying psychological functioning in terms of brain 
activities) are often taken out of the context by Taiwanese psychologists as universal 
trends with which Taiwanese psychology should try to keep up. 
Taiwanese psychology‘s misrecognition of the historical narrative constructed by 
mainstream American psychologists as the history of psychology has become 
problematic in many ways.  First, as a discipline locally practiced in Taiwan, Taiwanese 
psychology has overall developed a paradoxical sense of historical consciousness.  
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Taiwanese psychologists care and know about the development of psychology in the 
United States, but are relatively indifferent to, and ignorant of, the historical and present 
development of psychology in Taiwan.  And one can even say that Taiwanese 
psychologists to a great extent identify with the history of mainstream American 
psychology as if it were their own history, and try their best to be part of this glorified 
history.  If their research is recognized by mainstream American psychology and cited 
in textbooks, most Taiwanese psychologists will consider it to be a great honor because 
they are now ―internationally‖ recognized.  In comparison to ―international‖ recognition, 
whether their research is locally relevant or not is a relatively minor concern to them. 
Second, since almost all the significant events and theoretical innovations in the 
history of psychology took place in the United States, rather than locally in Taiwan, the 
local practice of psychology in Taiwan appears to be less significant and less advanced in 
comparison to the practice of psychology in the United States.  For many Taiwanese 
psychologists, the sheer quantity and diversity of psychological publications in the United 
States is convincing enough evidence of the significance and advancement of American 
psychology.  This implicit presupposition of the significance and advancement of 
American psychology automatically places Taiwanese psychology in a marginalized and 
inferior position.  It therefore becomes ―self-evident‖ to Taiwanese psychologists that 
the main task of Taiwanese psychology is to ―catch up‖ with the development of 
American psychology.  As a result, psychological practice in Taiwan has been mostly 
driven by a kind of inferiority complex originating in an implicit reference to mainstream 
American psychology, rather than by the reflexive relation between the disciplinary 
practice of psychology and the psychological life of the local community.   And as 
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Richards (1987) says, this reflexive relation is crucially important to the relevance and 
worth of the disciplinary practice of psychology with regard to the concerns of the local 
community to which it belongs: 
Psychology, the discipline, directly emerges out of ‗psychology‘ the 
subject matter.  The success of a psychological theory might well be 
determined by such factors as whether people ‗see themselves‘ in it, 
whether the view of life contained in it corresponds to everyone else‘s less 
articulated feelings and perceptions, whether, in short, it meets the needs 
which people at the time wish psychological theories to meet. (pp. 
205-206) 
 
However, in the case of Taiwanese psychology, the reflexive relation between the 
disciplinary practice and the psychological life of the local community has been greatly 
disturbed by Taiwanese psychology‘s envious relation with American psychology.  As a 
result, rather than being a reflexive practice integral to the psychological life of its local 
community, the practice of psychology in Taiwan has instead become estranged from its 
local community. 
Taiwanese psychologists‘ misrecognition/misappropriation of the historical 
narrative constructed by mainstream American psychologists is actually part of the local 
consequence of the postwar American hegemony within the discipline of psychology.  
In the American dominated center-periphery scheme, mainstream American psychology 
becomes idealized in peripheral areas like Taiwan; its history becomes the history of 
psychology, its psychological categories become ―natural‖ categories, and its values and 
knowledge criteria become the universal standards that psychology in peripheral areas 
should follow. 
Unlike the human child‘s identification with the gestalt image of the ―ideal-I‖ 
discussed in Lacan‘s (2006) article on the mirror stage in which the child‘s playful 
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experience with his own image in the reflected environment helps to establish a 
relationship between the child and its environment, identification with this idealized 
mainstream American psychology actually becomes a threat to the autonomy of 
psychological practice in peripheral areas such as Taiwan.  It not only offers a fictional 
history which covers up the genuine historical trajectories of peripheral psychologies, but 
it also disturbs the functioning of psychology as a reflexive practice and estranges 
psychological practices in peripheral areas from their local community.  It is only by 
critically historicizing the history of psychology that we are able to see how this history 
has been misrecognized and misappropriated by psychologists at the margins, and how 
the identification with the idealized mainstream American psychology has led 
psychologists at the margins astray from the possibility of having a genuine indigenous 
psychology.  History does matter, and it has to be re-membered. 
Yet, everything considered, the non-Western world cannot disown its 
cultural self entirely, even it wants to do so.  Its version of the oculus 
mundi cannot be other than inauthentic and occasionally comic.  In that 
inauthenticity and comicality there is always another play that is 
possible—there is always the possibility of a failure to live up to the 
expectation of the West.  The play and the failure offer a small way out 
for the non-West from an otherwise totalizing situation. (Sardar et al., 
1993, p. 87) 
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Chapter 4 
Indigenous Psychology: A History Forgotten and Remembered 
 
The most serious blow suffered by the colonized is being removed from 
history and from the community....He is in no way a subject of history any 
more.  Of course, he carries its burden, often more cruelly than others, 
but always as an object. (Memmi, 1957/1991) 
 
As pointed out in chapter 2, the blinded gaze of Europe‘s eye of the world 
involves a ―perversion of reality‖ in which the imaginary dimension of the European 
psyche ―fleshed out‖ and became dominant in Europe‘s relation with Others.  A similar 
―perversion of reality‖ also happened to non-European Others when they encountered the 
overwhelming power of the West.  Non-European Others became narcissistically 
attached to the idealized West and thus alienated from their own traditions and even from 
their own histories.  This identification with the idealized West is often considered to 
constitute progress in the modernization of non-European societies.  As demonstrated in 
chapter 3, Taiwanese psychologists‘ misrecognition and misappropriation of the history 
of psychology is a symptomatic aspect of their identification with the idealized 
mainstream American psychology.  
The emergence of the indigenous psychology movement in Taiwan was initially a 
―wakeup call‖ to Taiwanese psychologists‘ problematic relation to an idealized 
mainstream American psychology.  Or in Kuo-Shu Yang‘s words, it was a wakeup call 
to the fact that he had been thoroughly ―brainwashed‖ by mainstream American 
psychology and became an ―almost 100 percent Westernized psychologist‖ (Yang, 1997, 
p. 63).  However, this moment of clarity was once again covered up by the history of 
psychology and the wakeup call to the problematic relation with idealized mainstream 
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American psychology was misappropriated by Yang as part of the ―cultural revolution‖ 
in the history of psychology (Yang, 2005, p. 3).  What Yang, as well as other indigenous 
psychologists, did not realize was that history was also part of the ―brainwashing‖ and 
therefore should not be accepted as is but critically reexamined.  That is to say, the 
history of psychology has to be critically historicized so as to disrupt its power to idealize 
mainstream American psychology.  This is only the first step.  In order for Taiwanese 
psychology to become a genuine indigenous psychology—that is, a social practice 
grounded in the reflexive relation with its local community rather than driven by 
identification with idealized mainstream American psychology—the marginalized and 
thus forgotten historical trajectory of Taiwanese psychology has to be re-membered by 
way of critical historiography. 
 
Psychology‘s Journey to the East 
 
Psychology was first introduced to Chinese-speaking societies
19
 at the end of the 
19
th
 century.  Sciences and technologies from 19
th
 century Europe had demonstrated 
their practical value or even ―magical‖ power—for example, in the production of the 
mighty weaponry used by Western colonial powers to force the late Qing government 
into trading on unequal terms, or in the scientific experiments performed by Western 
missionaries for the general public in order to coerce them into religious conversion (Luo, 
                                               
19 The term huaren shehui 華人社會 often refers to Taiwan, Hong-Kong, and China in which the majority 
of the population are ethnic Chinese.  Depending on whether the emphasis is on ethnicity or on language, 
it is either translated as ―ethnic-Chinese societies‖ or as ―Chinese-speaking societies.‖  With its emphasis 
on the shared linguistic heritage, ―Chinese-speaking societies,‖ is the preferred translation for the 
following reasons: first, the adaptation of psychology to the Chinese-speaking world is essentially a 
―translingual practice‖ (Liu, 1995) in which language is the very battleground of colonization and as well 
as of decolonization.  Second, the histories of the three societies (including that of psychology) are in 
many ways related, if not entangled; decolonization will therefore be most effective as a joint effort of the 
three.  Acknowledging the shared linguistic heritage is the first step toward such an effort. 
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1996)—as the desirable ―Western technological knowledge‖ (yiji 夷技) that Chinese 
people had to acquire so as to defend themselves against colonial ambitions.  
Psychology, in contrast, had never in any way ―proven‖ itself to be useful or even 
necessary at all when it was first introduced to this part of the world.  In fact, 
psychology was such a foreign form of knowledge that the early translators of 
psychology texts had to choose Chinese characters not previously conjoined just to 
translate the basic terms such as ―mind‖ and ―psychology‖ into Chinese, not to mention 
the difficulties involved in translating other major conceptual building blocks of which 
the edifice of psychology is composed (Blowers, 2006; Kao, 2009). 
Psychology has come a long way in Taiwan and other Chinese societies since its 
introduction to the Chinese-speaking world.  Psychology seems to have successfully 
established itself as a respected science in which the authority of psychological 
knowledge is prescribed, and more recently as a licensed clinical profession in Taiwan to 
which the responsibility for treating mentally-disturbed patients is entrusted.  There is 
no doubt that psychology has already gained a foothold and will continue to flourish in 
Taiwan and other Chinese-speaking societies.  And indeed, most psychologists consider 
psychology‘s current establishment and its continuous development in Chinese-speaking 
societies a story of progress, as psychology‘s successful ―journey to the East,‖ so to 
speak. 
However, the apparent success of psychology in Chinese-speaking societies 
should not prevent us from probing important but often ignored questions.  The most 
puzzling one among them regarding the introduction of psychology to the 
Chinese-speaking world is the question regarding ―why.‖  As evinced by the difficulties 
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encountered by the early translators of psychology texts, there seemed to be a huge 
cultural-linguistic barrier that needed to be overcome.  Furthermore, the early translators, 
such as Yan Yongjing and Wang Guowei, must have been aware that psychology was a 
rather young science compared to the longstanding Chinese intellectual tradition of the 
study of the heart (xin 心) in which traditional Chinese intellectuals (shiren 士人) used 
to take much pride.  Why was psychology introduced in the first place?  This question 
opens up a whole range of other questions regarding the historical conditions of the 
introduction of psychology to the Chinese-speaking world. 
―Psychology‖ in Western sense of the term was introduced to the 
Chinese-speaking world in the context of missionary activities in coastal Chinese cities.  
The neologism ―xinlingxue 心靈學‖ (mind-spirit study) was coined by Yan Yongjing 
(1838-1898) as the corresponding Chinese term for ―psychology‖ in his translation of 
American clergyman Joseph Haven‘s Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, 
Sensibilities, and Will (1859).  Yan was educated in a Christian school at Shanghai and 
later went to the United States for higher education in the 1850s.  Haven‘s Mental 
Philosophy was used extensively as a school textbook during this time, and Yan found 
Haven‘s approach to mental philosophy (or psychology) essential to the understanding of 
human nature (Kao, 2009).  Yan returned to China in 1862, a year after he graduated 
with honors from Kenyon College in Ohio, and went back to Shanghai to help found St. 
John‘s College in 1879 in which he served as the dean and was a lecturer in several 
courses.  Yan decided to translate Haven‘s Mental Philosophy as a textbook for the 
philosophy course he taught.  However, as a translator, Yan found himself in a difficult 
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position and was compelled to invent neologisms so as to introduce the ideas of 
psychology to the Chinese-speaking world. 
The Chinese character xin 心 (heart) was originally a pictographic representation 
of the heart which in the Chinese intellectual tradition refers to the master (zhu 主) of the 
five essential organs (wuzang 五臟) of the human body.  Heart as an ―organ‖ in this 
context should not be taken in the Western anatomical sense.  It is a functional center 
essential to human existence.  The body-mind dichotomy does not really apply here.  
Xin not only refers to the visible organ located in the chest, it also refers to the invisible 
psychological or spiritual functions attributed to it.  The study of xin (heart) is, therefore, 
not only a matter of medicine, but also a matter of moral-spiritual cultivation (xiuyang 修
養) in the Chinese intellectual tradition.  Yan‘s translation did introduce a new science 
of the mind to the Chinese-speaking world, but the introduction of this new science was 
neither to break away from nor to replace the longstanding Chinese intellectual tradition 
of the study of xin (heart).  As Blowers (2006) points out, the introduction of 
psychology, like many other Western texts translated at the time, was seen as ―an aid to 
moral guidance‖ (p. 96) which at the time was part of Chinese intellectuals‘ strategic use 
of Western knowledge (xixue 西學) to enhance ―self-strengthening‖ (ziqiang 自強).  
Yan‘s decision to coin ―psychology‖ as xinlingxue 心靈學 was probably an attempt to 
bridge the Christian religious/spiritual (ling 靈) tradition with the Chinese tradition of the 
study of xin (heart). 
The idea of ―self-strengthening‖ through the strategic use of Western knowledge 
was not merely an individualistic attempt on the part of Chinese intellectuals.  In fact, it 
became a policy of the Qing government after the humiliating defeat of the Second 
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Opium War (1856-1860) by the British Empire and the Second French Empire.  The 
Self-Strengthening Movement (ziqiang yundong 自強運動; 1861-1895) involved a broad 
range of institutional reforms which included modernizing the military, establishing a 
new office in charge of foreign affairs, building schools specialized in the training of 
scientific, technological, and diplomatic personnel, sending out young students overseas 
to learn Western knowledge, and building industrial and communication infrastructures.  
The main goal of the movement was to make China a stronger and wealthier Empire in 
order to defend itself against the ambitions of Western colonial powers.  To a great 
extent, the Self-Strengthening Movement was an institutional reflection of the ti-yong 體
用 principle endorsed by Chinese intellectuals at the time.  The introduction of Western 
knowledge should be based on its utility (yong 用) and should not threaten the essence (ti 
體) of the Chinese intellectual tradition (Luo, 1998). 
The defeat of the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) by the Japanese Empire 
practically ended the Self-Strengthening Movement of the Qing government.  Most 
Chinese intellectuals were shocked and humiliated by the fact that the Qing Empire was 
defeated by its recently modernized tribute state.
20
  For Chinese intellectuals, it was an 
indication that the mild reform of the Qing government was a total failure.  Some of 
them still had hope for a second reform but many were radicalized and yearned for a 
political revolution (Luo, 2007).  Nevertheless, both the conservatives and the would-be 
revolutionists agreed that the Chinese intellectual tradition should no longer be seen as 
                                               
20 The tribute system (chaogong tixi 朝貢體系) was Imperial China‘s major framework for dealing with 
foreign affairs.  Foreign countries affirmed the authority of Imperial China by paying tribute to the 
Emperor, and in return the Emperor granted trading privileges to those tribute-paying countries.  The 
tribute system was an organic part of Imperial China‘s world order.  However, starting from the end of the 
18th century, the Imperial China‘s world order was gradually eroded by the expansion of European power 
into the Asia-Pacific region.  The humiliating defeat of the First Sino-Japanese War marked the historical 
transition of regional power from China to Japan. 
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the essence of Chinese civilization but rather as the representation of the old China that 
needed to be radically revamped. 
It was in this radical sentiment that ―the West‖ became no longer a mere 
geographical term but a psychological category.  Chinese intellectuals started to idealize 
the West (zunxi 尊西) and pushed for a more radical educational reform which prioritized 
the learning and teaching of Western knowledge.  The establishment of the Imperial 
University of Peking in 1898 was the first of such reforms.  The Qing government 
eventually decided to abolish the imperial examination (keju 科舉) in 1905, which put an 
end to the traditional scholar-official (shidaifu 士大夫) system.  And since the imperial 
examination had been the backbone of the traditional Chinese educational system for 
more than a thousand years, the abolishment of it was an official announcement from the 
government that the Chinese intellectual tradition would no longer be prioritized and 
institutionally supported.  Without institutional support, the Chinese intellectual 
tradition was soon marginalized and eventually became the subject of sinology (hanxue 
漢學 or guoxue 國學)—a specialized area of study within the new disciplinary order of 
Western knowledge—rather than a living tradition.  As prominent Chinese historian 
Ying-Shih Yu (1991) points out, in the years between 1905 and 1911, the idea that 
Western knowledge represents the universal truth was already deeply rooted in the mind 
of Chinese intellectuals. 
The second phase of the development of psychology in China started in this 
period when Western knowledge became idealized as universal truth and institutionally 
supported by the Qing government.  Since Japan was then regarded by Chinese 
intellectuals as the successful Asian model of modernization, Japanese texts and systems 
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quickly became the ―shortcut‖ for Chinese intellectuals to acquire Western knowledge 
due to its use of the kanji (Chinese character) system.  In order to quickly train a new 
generation of intellectuals who could serve as seeded teachers of Western knowledge, the 
Qing government decided to set up teacher training institutes based on the Japanese 
model in which psychological courses were offered as part of the curriculum.  As 
Blowers (2006) and Kao (2009) point out, psychology at this time was strongly 
influenced by Japanese psychology (whose major influence at the time was European 
psychology) due to the extensive use of textbooks translated from Japanese.  In 1907, 
Harold Høffding‘s Outline of Psychology was translated into Chinese by Wang Guowei 
(1877-1927), a prominent scholar of both Chinese and Western knowledge in the early 
20
th
 century.  Wang was one of the early overseas students who went to Japan in pursuit 
of modern Western knowledge, and it is likely that his translation of the term 
―psychology‖ as xinlixue (heart-principles-study) was a direct adaptation of the Japanese 
kanji translation.  Xinlixue, instead of the earlier translation xinlingxue (heart-spirit 
study), later became the standard translation of the term ―psychology‖ in the Chinese 
language. 
The change of translation from xinlingxue to xinlixue was therefore a historical 
event which involved more than a change in words: it marked the early 
institutionalization of psychology in Chinese-speaking societies and the historical 
transition of psychology‘s status from a complementary Western knowledge to a science 
taken as universal truth.  In other words, it marked the birth of Western knowledge‘s 
domination in the study of xin (heart).  As Liu (1995) reminds us, translation is a 
translingual practice that is never natural or neutral.  Translation is practical and 
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political.  It happens all the time due to practical purposes or needs, and consequentially 
one always has to ask oneself ―in whose terms, for which linguistic constituency, and in 
the name of what kinds of knowledge or intellectual authority does one perform acts of 
translation between cultures?‖ (p. 1)  In the context of psychology, the hypothetical 
equivalence between ―xin‖ and ―mind‖ was conventionalized, or in Liu‘s term ―thrown 
together‖ (p. 12), under the historical condition in which Western knowledge became the 
authoritative voice in determining the signification of the Chinese character xin.  In 
other words, xin/mind became the super-sign.  As Liu (2004) explains, 
What is a super-sign?  Properly speaking, a super-sign is not a word but a 
hetero-cultural signifying chain that crisscrosses the semantic fields of 
two or more languages simultaneously and makes an impact on the 
meaning of recognizable verbal units, whether they be indigenous words, 
loanwords, or any other discrete verbal phenomena that linguists can 
identify within particular languages or among them.  The super-sign 
emerges out of the interstices of existing languages across the abyss of 
phonetic and ideographic differences.  As a hetero-cultural signifying 
chain, it always requires more than one linguistic system to complete the 
process of signification for any given verbal phenomenon.  The 
super-sign can thus be figured as a manner of metonymical thinking that 
induces, compels, and orders the migration and dispersion of prior signs 
across different languages and different semiotic media. For that reason, it 
offers ample insight into the workings of intellectual catachresis. (p. 13, 
italics added) 
 
Since xinlixue/psychology spoke the universal truth about xin/mind, the traditional study 
of xin (heart) became, in Foucault‘s words, a form of ―naïve knowledge‖ which is 
―located low down the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity‖ 
(Foucault, 1980b, p. 82).  And as a result, the introduction/translation of psychology 
created a Chinese-speaking psychology that knows much about the mind but is quite 
ignorant of xin (heart). 
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The third phase of the development of psychology in China happened after the 
establishment of the Republic of China in 1912.  First, the Japanese influence on 
Chinese psychology almost ceased to exist.  As Blowers (2006) points out, Japanese 
influence on Chinese psychology started to wane at the beginning of the 20
th
 century, and 
instead the United States became more influential in Chinese education through 
establishing new universities (by Protestant missionaries) and providing financial aid to 
encourage Chinese students to study in American.  However, the eventual cessation of 
Japanese influence was a result of the Japanese Empire‘s growing ambition to occupy 
Chinese territory.  The Western powers‘ decision to transfer the concessions of the 
Shandong province from Germany to Japan in the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 
sparked widespread student protests in China and anti-Japanese sentiment among the 
general public.  Japan was no longer invested psychically by Chinese intellectuals as a 
role model of modernization, but as an aggressive and ambitious enemy of the nation. 
Second, the discipline of psychology became further institutionalized.  Starting 
in the 1920s, more psychology departments were established in prestigious universities 
such as Nanking Higher Normal College (1920), Peking Normal University (1920), the 
National Peking University (1926), Qinghua University (1926),Yenching University 
(1927), and Fujen University (1929).  Even though most of these newly established 
psychology departments still emphasized education, as Blowers (2006) points out, with 
the returning of more American-trained psychologists, gradually there was more 
emphasis on the American model of empirical research and professional training.  
Psychologists at this time were also actively involved in creating journals and popular 
magazines.  These platforms served several functions.  They were a forum for 
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psychologists to share their thoughts, an educational platform to popularize psychological 
knowledge, and a portal to the new developments of psychology in the United States and 
other nations.  As Blowers (2006) and Kao (2009) point out, Chinese psychology at this 
time was clearly modeling itself on mainstream American psychology and gradually 
shifting away from its early Japanese/European influence. 
Third, the further institutionalization and professionalization of psychology 
resulted in a more rigorous disciplinary boundary.  Gradually, only those who were 
professionally trained in the discipline of psychology had a say about human psychology, 
and those who did not have that training were disqualified from speaking.  As Zhong 
(2008) points out, many eminent Chinese scholars such as Cai Yuanpei (1868-1940), 
Liang Qichao (1873-1929), Wang Guowei (1977-1927), and Zhu Guangqian (1897-1986) 
were originally quite interested in the development of psychology in China and they were 
also active in the early years of psychology in China.  However, as psychology became 
more institutionalized and professionalized, they gradually ceased to speak in psychology.  
It was not that they stopped being interested in psychological affairs; rather, they became 
keenly aware that they no longer had the ―right‖ to talk about psychology.  The 
exclusion of nonprofessional psychologists did help early Chinese psychologists to form 
a consensus group.  However, it became detrimental to the development of the young 
science of Chinese psychology in the long run—Chinese psychology became fixated in 
an essentially historical and cultural disciplinary boundary imposed by or modeled on 
mainstream American psychology.  This disciplinary boundary became the ultimate 
reference of what should be included in or excluded from the disciplinary practice of 
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psychology.  The implied cultural and historical assumptions in this process were never 
critically examined. 
Last but not least, the psychological practice of Chinese psychologists at this time 
had created a Chinese-speaking psychology in ―American terms,‖ so to speak.  As 
Blowers and others (Blowers, 2006; Blowers, Tat Cheung, & Han, 2009) point out, there 
were not many empirical studies done during this time, and Chinese psychologists were 
mostly involved in the introduction of, or commenting on, Western psychologies of 
which mainstream American psychology was a major part.  That is to say, Chinese 
psychologists‘ discursive practice at the time mostly involved the translation of 
psychological categories, theories, methods, and history of mainstream American 
psychology into Chinese.  Consequentially, their collective efforts had created a 
Chinese-speaking psychology which was essentially a system of super-signs utilized to 
guide discursive and non-discursive psychological practices, and it had the authoritative 
power to name local psychological phenomena in a way that corresponded to the 
psychological categories or theories of mainstream American psychology.  Thus, the 
relation between the discipline of Chinese psychology and the psychological life of the 
local community was, and in many ways still is, radically different from the reflexive 
relation between the discipline of psychology and the psychological life of the local 
community in the Euro-American context (Richards, 1987).  The significations of local 
psychological phenomena were not articulated on the basis of the cultural-linguistic 
matrix of the Chinese language (in the sense of metaphor) but metonymically imposed 
from the hetero-cultural signifying chain of super-signs.  Thus the meaning and 
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structure of local psychological life always had to come from elsewhere, from the 
camouflaged traces of super-signs. 
The 1920s and the early 1930s were probably the golden years of Chinese 
psychology.  Starting in 1937, China was drawn into a series of wars, first the war with 
the Japanese Empire and later the Chinese Civil War.  The development of psychology 
in China was serious impeded by continuous wars.  Research activities were mostly 
forced to stop, and teaching and publishing were barely sustained.  The result of the 
Chinese Civil War was the partition of China into two political entities—China and 
Taiwan, respectively—in 1949, and the history of Chinese psychology split into three 
different historical trajectories in China, Taiwan, and Hong-Kong. 
 
From Sinicization to Indigenization 
 
From a cultural-linguistic perspective, the development of psychology in Taiwan 
after 1949 was in many ways a continuation of Chinese psychology.  It basically 
followed the pattern of modeling mainstream American psychology (though with a much 
stronger influence due to geopolitical factors), and Taiwanese psychologists continued to 
create an inauthentic Chinese-speaking psychology based on the metonymic relation with 
mainstream American psychology through the system of super-signs.  Nevertheless, the 
relatively stable academic environment in Taiwan provided Taiwanese psychologists 
with an opportunity to actually practice this psychology to the extent that the 
inauthenticity of psychological practice started to become painfully undeniable for some 
Taiwanese psychologists starting in the 1970s.  Their collective efforts to create a 
psychology which is more relevant to or more ―compatible‖ (qihe 契合), in Kuo-Shu 
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Yang‘s term, with the psychological life of the Taiwanese people was later called the 
indigenous psychology movement (bentu xinlixue yundong 本土心理學運動) or the 
indigenization movement of psychology (xinlixue bentuhua yundong 心理學本土化運動). 
In the past few decades, the indigenous psychology movement has grown to be an 
undeniable phenomenon in Taiwan.  Among Its advocates, Kuo-Shu Yang is often seen 
as the ―father‖ of the movement.  Indeed, Yang has been the father figure of the 
movement in many ways.  He has been the main theoretical architect of the movement; 
he was the first to conceive of the necessity of a ―new psychology‖ and made it a 
personal responsibility to promote it; he was also the mentor of several generations of 
psychologists who later became the advocates of indigenous psychology; and his strong 
will and determination to carry the movement forward had been the indispensible impetus 
behind many crucial moments in the history of the movement.  That is to say, his 
personal involvement and vision have greatly shaped the configuration of the movement 
as we know it.  Yang‘s personal history and his account of the movement provide 
important insights into the development of this approach. 
Yang was born in Shandong Province, China in 1932, a year after the Mukden 
Incident in which the Japanese Empire revealed its ambition to invade China.  His 
childhood and teen years were mostly spent in the turbulence of war—first in the war 
against Imperial Japan‘s invasion, and then in the Chinese Civil War between the 
Kuomintang (KMT) and the Communist Party of China (CPC).  When he was 16, 
Yang‘s family, along with a group of more than a million Chinese people, retreated to 
Taiwan with Chiang Kai-Shek‘s KMT forces.21  KMT, with the advantage of its military 
                                               
21 The Taiwanese population was about six million at the time.  Therefore, the retreat of more than a 
million Chinese people created much tension between the two polulations. 
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forces, soon established an oppressive one-party regime in Taiwan under the leadership 
of Chiang Kai-Shek.  Despite the fact that Mao Tse-Tung proclaimed the victory of 
CPC and the founding of the People‘s Republic of China (PRC) in front of thousands in 
October 1949, Chiang‘s KMT regime in Taiwan refused to admit KMT‘s failure nor 
would they accept the demise of the Republic of China (ROC) that it helped found in 
1912.  Chiang claimed that the retreat to Taiwan was only temporary, and that the KMT 
forces would eventually strike back and reclaim ROC‘s sovereignty over mainland China.  
The administration of the United States—ROC‘s former ally and strongest supporter in 
World War II—was not happy about how the situation had turned out.  On the one hand, 
the Truman administration blamed Chiang and the KMT for losing mainland China and 
therefore refused to offer further support.  On the other hand, however, the Truman 
administration was also hesitant to recognize the legitimacy of China‘s new state because 
of its communist regime.  Nevertheless, with the outbreak of the Korean War in June 
1950 and the continuing unrest in Southeast Asia, the Cold War mentality quickly 
became the dominant structuring force in the geopolitics of Asia.  The Truman 
administration decided, albeit reluctantly, to provide financial assistance and military 
support to Chiang and the KMT regime in Taiwan as part of the United States‘ Cold War 
strategic deployment against the spread of communism in Eastern Asia. 
With support from U.S. government, Chiang‘s KMT regime in Taiwan declared 
that the ROC had not disappeared but was instead in a state of crisis owing to the 
unfinished Chinese Civil War.  Chiang‘s plan to end the civil war was to ―retake China‖ 
through military action.  Nonetheless, he needed time to re-equip his military forces as 
well as to persuade the United States to join the action, without which his ambition would 
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not have a chance to succeed.  Taiwan, in this grand plan, played a crucial role.  It 
could never become a ―normal‖ society.  Instead, it had to remain like a military base, or 
the ―springboard to retake China,‖ as the KMT phrased it.  The KMT government 
therefore declared that the martial law instituted in May 1949 would be indefinitely 
extended for the sake of national security.  However, military coercion was not enough 
for the KMT to claim rightful sovereignty of the ROC over all of China, nor was it 
enough to establish the legitimacy of its regime in Taiwan. 
The ROC on Taiwan needed a reasonably convincing narrative to tell its citizens 
and the international community; in comparison to the PRC, the ROC on Taiwan 
presented itself as a republic worthy of defense. The Cold War ideological rhetoric of the 
―free vs. communist‖ binary was therefore used to draw the line: the ROC on Taiwan was 
the ―Free China,‖ and the PRC was the ―Communist China‖ or ―Red China‖.  And in 
this grand scheme of the battle between the ―freedom camp‖ and the ―communist camp,‖ 
Taiwan was seen as two things at once.  Militarily it was seen as the ―unsinkable aircraft 
carrier‖ with which to retake mainland China, and politically it was portrayed as the ideal 
democratic Chinese society, a ―lighthouse of liberty‖ for all Chinese people.  Just as the 
two inherently conflicting metaphors imply, the self-proclaimed ―democratic‖ state of the 
ROC under Chiang‘s KMT regime was no more than an authoritarian military state in 
which thousands of innocent lives were lost and human rights were greatly violated.  
With critical voices suppressed and political dissidents jailed or killed, Chiang‘s KMT 
regime undoubtedly created a ―stable‖ society in which limited democracy and some 
reforms were implemented.  In any case, it was good enough for many people to live an 
 102 
ordinary life, especially for those retreated ―mainlanders‖ (waishengren 外省人) who had 
drifted for years and thus yearned for a life undisturbed by war. 
The yearning for a peaceful life also seemed to be reflected in Yang‘s original 
choice of an academic major.  According to what he later revealed in a public talk, his 
―romantic imagination‖ of the poetic life in the mountains was one of the main reasons he 
chose to be a forestry major (Center for Teaching and Learning Development at the 
National Taiwan University, 2008).  However, his dream of living quietly in the 
mountains was soon disrupted, not by the eruption of a war but by an illness.  He was 
diagnosed with tuberculosis and was forced to take a leave of absence for a year from 
National Taiwan University (NTU) in his sophomore year.  This sudden period of spare 
time, as Yang (1999a) later recalls, was a life-changing period. Due to the nature of the 
disease, Yang was advised to stay indoors and avoid unnecessary social contact.  He 
took the chance to read voraciously, especially in the humanities.  The readings inspired 
him to reconsider what he wanted to do with his life if he recovered from the disease.  
The secluded life of living and working in the mountains now seemed too escapist and 
too individualistic a dream when his fellow people were still suffering from the unrest 
and disorganization resulting from the weakness of their nation.  Like many people who 
preceded him, Yang was inspired to take up the social responsibility of an intellectual.  
Yang identified with prior intellectuals‘ passion to save Chinese people from their 
miseries by ways of reform.  However, he figured that since, for decades, a variety of 
reforms had already been implemented without much success, a fundamental reform had 
to happen on the human level for the institutional changes to really work.  After a year 
of thinking, Yang returned from his leave of absence determined to change his majors.  
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The choice of a major had become for him the choice of a lifelong career, something not 
only to make a living at but at the same time to take up the social responsibility of an 
intellectual.  Yang decided to change his major to psychology because psychology, as 
Yang figured, was the study of the human heart (renxin 人心), which is at the core of the 
human (ren 人) issues he wanted to tackle.  At the time, the Department of Psychology 
at NTU was the only psychology department in Taiwan, and the general public did not 
really have a good sense of what psychology was about.  In their naive imagination, 
psychology was somehow a discipline more suitable for women than for men.  Yang‘s 
decision to be a psychology major was therefore a peculiar one, unsupported by most 
people around him (Yang, 1997). 
With the clarity of hindsight Yang (1999a) admitted that his decision to become a 
psychology major was also based more or less on a naive belief in what psychology 
should be rather than on a well-informed understanding of what psychology actually is.  
Nonetheless, ―not knowing‖ somehow became the driving force for Yang in his early 
days of learning psychology.  Yang called this period an ―exploratory‖ stage in which 
he explored the territory of psychology by teaching undergraduate courses and doing 
research based on the findings of American mainstream psychologists.  In those years, 
Yang gradually changed his research interests from the formation and cure of 
experimental neurosis in animals, to behavioral learning in rats, monkeys and children, 
and eventually to the study of Chinese personality and social behavior due to the 
awakening of his ―humanistic inclination‖ (Yang, 1997, p. 63).  It was not until after 
more than a decade of learning, teaching, and doing research that Yang finally felt 
confident that he had a good grasp of psychology.  This included receiving three years 
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of what he considered to be ―the best training in scientific psychology available anywhere 
in the whole world‖ from eminent psychologists in the Department of Psychology at the 
University of Illinois (Yang, 1997, p. 63).  He was confident as a psychologist and 
became academically productive in the following years (roughly from 1969 to 1974) 
doing what he thought he was supposed to do—researching Chinese subjects. 
To his own surprise, starting in 1974 , after nearly 15 years of teaching and 
researching as a psychologist, he found himself gradually losing his appetite for doing 
psychological research and felt that his work ―did not have enough relevance or make 
much sense‖ regarding the study of Chinese psychological life (Yang, 1997, p. 64).  To 
his dismay, the profession he had dedicated himself to whole-heartedly had somehow 
betrayed him.  After much soul searching, he realized that the cause of his 
disillusionment was that he, as well as his psychology colleagues, was reproducing a 
―highly Westernized psychology‖ by 
uncritically [accepting] the concepts defined, [adopting] the theories 
developed, and [utilizing] methods (and tools) invented by American 
psychologists, without seriously caring whether or not those concepts, 
theories, and methods were sufficiently compatible with the studied local 
phenomena and their social-cultural contexts. (p. 64) 
 
He therefore concluded that a ―new psychology‖ that would ―make much more sense not 
only to Chinese psychologists but also to Chinese people at large‖ was needed (p. 65). 
Therefore, Yang‘s dream of a genuinely indigenous Chinese (huaren 華人) 
psychology began as an outcome of his temporary disillusionment with practicing 
psychology as a lifelong career.  After realizing the cause of his disillusionment, Yang 
was again impassioned in his profession as a psychologist.  In his own words, 
I convinced myself that it was my responsibility to let my fellow Chinese 
psychologists know that they had been doing research in a rather fruitless 
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way. I considered it my lifelong mission to promote and help create a 
better psychology in Chinese societies, which would make better sense to 
Chinese people and be more applicable in explaining and predicting their 
psychological and behavioral functioning. (Yang, 1997, p. 66) 
 
Yang‘s rationale was that since he and his colleagues were doing ―highly Westernized‖ 
psychological research, the reasonable step to rectify the status quo was to Sinicize 
(zhongguohua 中國化) psychological research. And through collective efforts to Sinicize 
psychological research, a ―new‖ and more ―compatible‖ psychology would be created.  
Nonetheless, he was not confident that his idea to Sinicize psychological research would 
be welcomed by his colleagues in the Department of Psychology at NTU who were still 
strong believers in the American tradition of experimental psychology in which the 
universality of psychology was never challenged.  He therefore decided to push the idea 
in a ―roundabout‖ way by first convincing his anthropology and sociology colleagues in 
the Institute of Ethnology at Academia Sinica of which he was a research fellow.  Two 
of his prestigious colleagues in the Institute, Yih-Yuen Li (anthropologist) and Chung-I 
Wen (sociologist), supported his idea that an academic movement of Sinicization should 
be promoted. 
Yang then moved temporarily to Hong Kong for a year to help establish the 
Department of Psychology at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) in 1978.  
During his time there, he took the opportunity to promote his idea of Sinicization by 
organizing a discussion group with his social sciences colleagues at the CUHK.  The 
notion of Sinicizing research in the social sciences was fervently discussed and the group 
members concurred with Yang on the necessity of an academic movement of Sinicization 
in Chinese societies.  With support from both his colleagues at the CUHK and in the 
Institute of Ethnology at Academia Sinica, Yang finally organized an interdisciplinary 
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conference entitled ―The Sinicization of Social and Behavioral Science Research in 
Chinese Societies,‖ which was held at Academia Sinica at Taipei in 1980.  The success 
of the conference and the ensuing publication of an anthology in 1982 successfully 
publicized the notion of Sinicization in the community of social sciences in Taiwan and 
other Chinese societies.
22
 
In his article written for the conference, Yang (1982) proposes for the first time 
how to Sinicize psychological research.  He summarizes four guiding directions: 
1. empirically retesting the significant research findings obtained by foreign 
psychologists (p. 158); 
2. empirically studying important psychological phenomena that are unique among 
Chinese people (p. 163); 
3. revising foreign-origin theories and constructing new theories that are especially 
compatible with Chinese behavior (p. 169); and 
4. improving foreign-origin research methods (and tools) and developing new 
methods (and tools) that are especially applicable to the study of Chinese people (p. 
176) 
 
These guidelines do not seem to come from any particular theoretical position but rather 
from Yang‘s personal experience in his attempt to Sinicize psychological research.  
Yang suggested that his fellow Taiwan psychologists follow these guidelines so as to 
gradually stop being dependent on, or in Yang‘s words stop ―being breastfed‖ (duannai 
斷奶) by, Western psychology.  These four guidelines became the first set of guiding 
principles (rather than rigorously imposed rules) for Taiwanese psychologists to Sinicize 
their psychological research during the 1980s.   
Taiwanese historian Daiwie Fu (1993) interprets this Sincization discourse as ―a 
local strategy of the dominant academic group in Taiwan‘s social sciences for advancing 
                                               
22 Chinese social scientists were also deeply interested in the notion of Sinicization, but they were unable 
to participate in the 1980 conference because of antagonistic China-Taiwan relations.  As a result, a more 
China-based conference entitled ―Modernization and Chinese Culture‖ was held at the CUHK in 1983  in 
which the notion of Sinicization was discussed in the broader context of Chinese modernization. 
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their own intellectual interests within the local sociohistorical contexts of the early 
eighties‖ and its adaptation of a universal language (for example, ―academic dependence‖ 
or ―center vs. periphery‖) was ―at least partly to take advantage of the popular 
atmosphere of local color movement
23
 [or the Taiwan localization movement]…in order 
to defend their own intellectual position and to upgrade their academic machinery‖ (p. 
257).  He further argues that the ―partial success‖ of the Sinicization discourse was due 
to ―the ‗replacement‘ or ‗transference‘‖ of position and role which used to be occupied by 
the more radical advocates of the Taiwanese localization movement arrested in the 
Meilidao Incident (美麗島事件)
24
 in 1979. 
I can only ―partially‖ agree with Fu‘s interpretation, and believe that the 
Sinicization discourse should be understood within the larger sociohistorical context. 
There were two major events—namely, the United Nations‘ recognition of the PRC as 
the only legitimate representative of China in 1971, and the United States‘ decision to 
diplomatically recognize the PRC in 1978—which significantly threatened the legitimacy 
of the KMT government.  Also called into question were the two indoctrinated but 
dearly held ideological beliefs of the Taiwanese people: first, that the ROC is the 
legitimate representative of China, and second, that the United States is the strongest ally 
                                               
23
 Taiwanese historians often trace back the publicization of the local color movement (or the Taiwan 
localization movement) to a heated public debate concerning xiangtu wenxue (literature of local color or 
indigenous literature) that happened between 1977 and 1978.  It was originally a literary debate among 
writers but it quickly became a public debate about issues related to the critiques of modernization, 
colonization, and American imperialism, which at the time were still taboo topics in the authoritarian 
regime of the KMT. 
24 Formosa Magazine (meilidao zazhi 美麗島雜誌) was a magazine created in 1979 by political dissidents 
which functioned as a platform to voice their political ideas and also as an institutional base to organize 
oppositional forces.  On December 10, 1997, the magazine‘s Kaohsiung service center held a Human 
Rights Day celebration without the permission of the KMT government, and it evolved into a serious 
conflict with the police and the army which was later called the Meilidao Incident (美麗島事件).  The 
incident later became the KMT government‘s excuse to persecute political dissidents.  The massive arrest 
was a serious setback to the democratic movement.  Many local political elites were arrested and jailed.  
However, it was also an awakening experience for many young people, and many of them later became the 
new generation of political dissidents. 
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of the ROC.  These two ideological beliefs were the cornerstones of the KMT 
government‘s propaganda, and they were also essential to the Taiwanese people‘s 
collective identity, both culturally and politically.  On the one hand, the Taiwanese 
people felt deeply betrayed and demanded a continued friendship from the United States, 
which was partially offered by enacting the Taiwan Relations Act passed by the United 
States Congress in 1979.  As a result, the idealized image of the United States was 
temporarily shattered but was soon mended, at least politically.  However, culturally, 
some educated Taiwanese, especially the postwar generation, began to rebel against the 
overwhelming influence of American popular culture in which they grew up.
25
  On the 
other hand, more and more Taiwanese people became disillusioned with the ROC‘s 
rightful representation of China which gradually evolved into a political crisis for the 
KMT government and an identity crisis for the Taiwanese people. 
Culturally, the Taiwanese people became bewildered about who they really were.  
Some decided to seek their roots (xungen 尋根) beyond the KMT‘s propaganda, and 
some became doubtful of their Chinese identity and started to advocate for a Taiwanese 
identity.  ―Searching for one‘s identity‖ was therefore a major theme in the overall 
cultural scene at the time.
26
  Politically, the Taiwanese people also became less tolerant 
of the KMT government‘s ideological propaganda, its civil war mentality, and eventually 
its authoritarian regime to contain the supposed ―crisis‖ that resulted from the Chinese 
                                               
25 For example, in the 1970s, the ―sing our own songs‖ slogan advocated by the Campus Folksong 
Movement (xiaoyuan minge yundong 校園民歌運動) was greatly echoed among the young Taiwanese. 
26 For example, the master piece Legacy (xinchuan 薪傳) of the now world-renown Cloud Gate Dance 
Theatre of Taiwan (yunmen wuji 雲門舞集) was first performed the night when the United States 
government announced that it would diplomatically recognize the PRC in December 1978.  Legacy‘s 
beautiful portrait of Taiwanese ancestors‘ early migration from the coastal area of China to Taiwan and the 
eventual settlement through collaborative hard work greatly reverberated in the Taiwanese society of the 
time. 
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Civil War.  They started to challenge the KMT government and demanded a more 
democratic state.  They also became more actively involved in public affairs, such as 
environmental protection issues or labor issues, which for years were rigorously 
monitored and controlled by the KMT government.  The eruption of all these once 
suppressed social powers was later called the Taiwan localization movement. 
Initially, the KMT government tried to contain these forces by arresting dissidents 
and tightening political control, which resulted in stronger opposing forces.  The KMT 
government eventually decided to legitimate its rightful regime by sharing power with 
local political elites.  The KMT government also realized that the crumbling political 
ideology was no longer sufficient to legitimate its regime and therefore created a new one 
during the 1980s by emphasizing the ―miraculous‖ economic accomplishments 
supposedly resulting from the brilliant leadership of the KMT government.  This new 
ideology of economic growth was later shared by the KMT‘s opposing party, the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).  In July 1987, the martial law instituted in May 
1949 was lifted by Chiang Ching-Kuo, Chiang Kai-Shek‘s son and political heir, and 
Taiwanese society started to go through a series of dramatic changes.  Coming out of the 
political coercion of the KMT government, most Taiwanese people were happy to 
embrace an economic-centered ideology which seemed to guarantee a better life.  With 
the end of the Cold War in 1991, the Taiwanese government quickly embraced the 
post-coldwar ideology of neoliberalism strongly advocated by the United States and thus 
Taiwan became more ingrained in the capitalistic world order dominated by the United 
States.  Taiwanese society as a whole became more Americanized in the past two 
decades rather than the other way around. 
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As Fu (1993) points out, in this sociohistorical context, Sinicization discourse was 
indeed a continuation of the Taiwanese social sciences‘ previous interdisciplinary 
research agenda to construct ―Chinese personality.‖  And there is no doubt that, 
strategically speaking, the ―Sinicization vs. Westernization‖ binary was trying to ―play it 
safe‖ (by making psychological research more Chinese) in a political environment in 
which proclaiming Chinese-ness was still an imposed ideology.  In this sense, 
Sinicization discourse was indeed a defensive strategy, but it was not an attempt by some 
academic elites to ―advance their own intellectual interests.‖  Rather, it was an effort to 
ensure that an academic movement in the social sciences could proceed without risking 
being politically suppressed at a time when the KMT government felt seriously 
threatened by opposing forces.  The massive arrests of the Meilidao Incident occured 
less than a year ago before the Sinicization conference took place, and in the authoritarian 
regime of the KMT government, any micro-politics in the name of ―movement‖ or 
―revolution‖ would be closely examined.  Freedom of speech was not guaranteed at the 
time even in the academic world.  And in terms of its historical effects, Sinicization 
discourse proved to be productive and emancipative rather than oppressive, as Fu‘s (1993) 
interpretation might suggest. 
Different academic communities in Taiwan reacted differently to Sinicization 
discourse.  It evoked the most discussion in the sociology community, especially in the 
community of Taiwanese sociologists living in the United States; it was only slightly 
echoed in the anthropology community, and the psychology community did not respond 
to the notion as strongly as expected (Yang, 1993).  However, during his short visit to 
Harvard University in 1988, Yang was shocked by a question and became keenly aware 
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of how urgent it was that the movement continue to develop.  This is how Yang (1997) 
describes his ―Harvard experience‖:  
In the discussion session after my presentation, the well-known 
developmental psychologist Jerome Kagan asked me the question: What 
kind of psychology would have been developed by Chinese psychologists 
if there had not been any Western psychology?  I was shocked by his 
question and, after a moment of silence, I managed to reply that Chinese 
psychologists would have developed some kind of collectivistic-oriented 
psychology without the hegemonic influence of Western or American 
psychology.  To be honest, I found myself, then and later, dissatisfied 
with my answer.  I must admit that Kagan's question gave me a chance to 
look more closely and squarely at the naked reality that little was left in 
Westernized Chinese psychology after those elements that had been 
borrowed from, or influenced by, Western psychology were taken away.  
Moreover, through my exchange of ideas with the seminar participants, I 
began to realize that North American psychology, the most developed in 
the world, was an endogenous kind of indigenous psychology…in the 
sense that its major concepts, theories, methods, and findings have 
originally and spontaneously evolved partly from the European intellectual 
traditions but mostly from the cultural and social-philosophical matrix of 
the American society. (p. 69) 
 
After coming back from his visit to the United States, Yang became more active 
in mobilizing the movement.  He invited psychologists as well as scholars from other 
disciplines to meet and discuss on a regular basis; he organized a series of conferences 
which took place every 2-3 years, he edited and published anthologies of major 
conference papers; he founded a Chinese Journal in 1993 so as to create a regular 
publication outlet for indigenous psychological research; and he helped to establish a 
foundation in 1997 to provide organizational support for indigenous psychological 
research.  Meanwhile, in the late 1980s, Yang and his colleagues decided to use a 
different term, ―indigenization,‖ to replace ―Sinicization‖ in labeling their efforts.  Yang 
(1997) says that there were two reasons for this change.  First, the term ―Sinicization‖ 
seems to suggest a kind of Sinocentralism; and second, after decades of separation, 
 112 
Taiwan, China, and Hong-Kong had become three uniquely different societies in which 
people displayed different psychological characteristics despite the fact that they, to a 
great extent, shared a common cultural-linguistic matrix.  However, from a discursive 
perspective, the change of labeling was also a reaction to changes in Taiwanese society.  
For most Taiwanese people, the continuous progression of the Taiwan localization 
movement from the 1980s to the 1990s had created a drastic change with regard to 
collective identity.  They were less psychically invested in the old Chinese identity and 
became more psychically invested in the new Taiwanese identity.  It became clearer for 
most people that Taiwan did not represent ―free China.‖  Instead, ―China‖ became the 
Other nation across the Taiwan Strait which represented not only a national threat but at 
the same time a land of economic opportunity.  As a result, ―Sinicization‖ was no longer 
an appealing label for the movement.  In fact, the ―Chinese‖ connotation of the term 
would be a barrier for some interested Taiwanese psychologists to take part in the 
movement. 
More importantly, the change in labeling also reflected a change in discourse.  
As Yang (1997) points out, during the Sinicization phase of the movement, his attempt to 
Sinicize psychological research did not aim to establish a ―Chinese psychology‖ or to 
develop an ―indigenous psychology‖ because at the time he still insisted that there was 
only one scientific psychology and that ―it was not legitimate to talk about indigenous 
psychology within that psychology‖ (p. 68).  Yang‘s ―Harvard experience‖ changed his 
view.  He was shocked by the fact that after nearly a decade of Sinicizing psychological 
research, he could not even imagine a Chinese psychology that was not influenced by the 
ideas of Western psychology.  And he also realized that the ―one scientific psychology‖ 
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he insisted on was actually mainstream American psychology which in essence was an 
indigenous psychology rather than a universal psychology.  Therefore, Yang (1993) 
proposed that the indigenous psychology movement in Taiwan should strive to indigenize 
already Westernized psychology so as to establish an ―indigenous Chinese psychology‖ 
(huaren bentu xinlixue 華人本土心理學) which is ―indigenously compatible‖ with the 
psychological life of the Taiwanese people.  And through the collective efforts of 
establishing indigenous psychologies around the world, a genuine global psychology, 
rather than the pseudo-universal psychology proclaimed by Western psychology, could 
eventually be established. 
In order to discern the changes involved in conceptualizing the movement from 
the Sinicization discourse to the indigenization discourse, Yang‘s indigenization 
discourse has to be carefully unpacked.  First, the universal character of the ―one 
scientific psychology‖ represented by mainstream American psychology in the 
Sinicization phase was given up due to Yang‘s realization of the ―indigenous‖ character 
of mainstream American psychology.  A genuine universal psychology therefore 
became a psychology in the future tense, and it had to be accomplished by the collective 
efforts of indigenous psychologies around the world.  Yang personally never gave up 
the idea that psychology should be a ―science‖ but he decided to prioritize the notion of 
―indigenous compatibility‖ (bentu qihexing  本土契合性) over the ―scientific‖ demand in 
the indigenization discourse.  Consequentially, psychologists interested in more 
―qualitative‖ kinds of psychology such as phenomenological psychology or narrative 
psychology were more willing to identify with or take part in the indigenous psychology 
movement.  Nevertheless, a group of critical-minded psychologists still considered the 
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indigenization discourse too ―conservative‖ and decided to part ways with the movement 
despite their original interest in the movement in the early 1990s.
27
 
Second, Yang‘s conceptual distinction between three psychologies—namely, 
indigenous psychology, Westernized psychology, and indigenized psychology—and the 
relations between them to a great extent reflects his conceptualization of how the 
indigenous psychology movement in non-Western societies should proceed.  In his 2006 
English paper, Yang (2006) further explicates the three psychologies.  He says, 
[I]ndigenous psychology [is] a discipline that applies the scientific method 
to the study of psychological and behavioral phenomena of people in a 
specific ethnic or cultural group, in such a way that the theories, concepts, 
methods, and tools used are highly compatible not only with the studied 
phenomena, but also with their ecological, economic, social, cultural, and 
historical contexts. (p. 299) 
 
Yang emphasizes that for a psychology to be qualified as an ―indigenous psychology,‖ it 
has to be ―spontaneously, naturally, and gradually formed through an endogenous process 
without the intrusion and domination of a powerful alien scientific psychology‖ (p. 299).  
Therefore, only ―psychologies in the Euro-American countries and the former Soviet 
Union are genuinely indigenous‖ (p. 299).  Yang considers psychologies currently 
practiced in most non-Western societies to be ―Westernized psychologies,‖ which in 
essence are a kind of ―artificially transplanted psychology‖ (p. 299) initiated and 
developed under the hegemonic domination of Western indigenous psychologies.  They 
                                               
27 These critical-minded psychologists were mostly from the psychology department at the Fu Jen Catholic 
University (輔仁大學) which was overall not genealogically connected to the Department of Psychology at 
NTU.  They were more radical in theoretical orientation and were more actively involved in social 
movements.  Therefore, in a community dominated by NTU alumni and psychologists trained in the 
tradition of mainstream American psychology, who mostly believed that psychology should be an objective 
and empirical science, their existence was in many ways marginalized in the Taiwanese psychology 
community.  However, their continuous effort in practicing an alternative psychology has gradually been 
recognized in recent years.  And their journal base Research in Applied Psychology has become a platform 
of interesting debates which is radically different from that in Indigenous Psychological Research in 
Chinese Societies, the journal base of the indigenous psychology movement. 
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were formed ―by a process of academic Westernization through which non-Western 
psychologists uncritically adopt Western theories, concepts, methods, and tools in their 
research with local people as participants‖ (p. 299).  Yang acknowledges that 
psychologists in non-Western societies did attempt to modify the concepts, theories, 
methods, and tools of Western indigenous psychologies in local terms.  However, he 
considers the modifications to be ―superficial,‖ which at best created a variation of 
Westernized psychology. 
Yang defines ―indigenized psychology‖ as the aim of the movement which would 
be accomplished by gradually transforming Westernized psychology through a process he 
calls ―quasi-endogenous indigenization‖—that is, non-Western psychologists‘ efforts to 
consciously and purposely indigenize their research in such a way that the 
theories, concepts, methods, and tools created and used are sufficiently 
compatible with the studied local psychological and behavioral 
phenomena as structurally and functionally embedded in their ecological, 
economic, social, cultural and historical contexts. (pp. 299-300) 
 
Yang (1993, 1999b) expands the four guidelines he proposed in the 1982 paper into a list 
of practical guidelines consisting of ten ―Dos‖ and seven ―Don‘ts‖ in indigenizing 
psychological research (or the process of quasi-endogenous indigenization),
28
 and his 
                                               
28 Yang‘s ten ―Dos‖ consists of: (1) do tolerate ambiguous states and suspend decisions as long as possible 
in dealing with conceptual, theoretical, and methodological problems until something indigenous emerges 
in the phenomenological field; (2) do be a typical Chinese person when functioning as a researcher, and let 
Chinese ideas, values, and ways of thinking be fully reflected in the research process; (3) do take the 
studied psychological or behavioral phenomenon and its social, cultural, and historical context into careful 
consideration whenever conceptualizing the phenomenon and designing the study; (4) do consider the 
details of the studied phenomenon and its context before applying a Western concept, theory, method, or 
tool; (5) do give priority to the study of culturally unique psychological and behavioral phenomena or 
characteristics of Chinese people; (6) do begin research with a thorough immersion in the natural concrete 
details of the studied phenomenon and its original context; (7) do study not only the specific content of a 
behavioral phenomenon but also the specific psychological mechanism or process behind or underlying the 
behavior; (8) do base research on the Chinese intellectual tradition rather than the Western intellectual 
tradition; (9) do study not only traditional aspects of Chinese psychological functioning, but also the 
modern ones and the characteristic traditional modern combinations formed under the impact of societal 
modernization; and (10) do investigate the psychological functioning of the ancient Chinese and its 
relationship to the functioning of contemporary Chinese people.  And his seven Don‘ts consists of: (I) 
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notion of ―indigenous compatibility‖ is at the conceptual core of these practical 
guidelines.  In his most recent article, Yang (2012) continues to emphasize that the 
notion of ―indigenous compatibility‖ should be the guiding principle of indigenous 
psychological research so as to facilitate the ―condition of congruity‖ between 
psychological research and the studied phenomenon (p. 15).  In his words, 
indigenous psychological research [should] be conducted in such a way 
that the researcher‘s theory, concepts, methods, tools, and findings 
sufficiently reflect, represent, and reveal the natural structure and process 
of the studied local psychological or behavioral phenomenon as embedded 
in the sociocultural context. (p. 15) 
 
Yang‘s dream of a ―new psychology‖ eventually took shape in the indigenization 
discourse.  It was initially a kind of asceticism in conducting research activities in the 
Sinicization discourse, and in the indigenization discourse it became a positive proposal 
of an agenda to indigenize Westernized psychology through indigenizing psychological 
research.  The ―how‖ of indigenizing psychological research was still in the form of 
practical guidelines expanded from the guidelines to Sinicize psychological research.  
However, these guidelines were now based on a clearly formulated notion of ―indigenous 
compatibility‖ so as to facilitate the condition of congruity between psychological 
research and the studied phenomenon. 
 
Decolonization through Indigenization? 
 
                                                                                                                                            
don't uncritically adopt Western psychological concepts, theories, methods, and tools; (2) don't overlook 
Western psychologists' important relevant experiences in developing their own indigenous psychologies; (3) 
don't reject useful indigenous concepts, theories, methods, and tools developed by other Chinese 
psychologists; (4) don't adopt any cross-cultural research strategy with a Western-dominant imposed etic or 
pseudo-etic approach; (5) don't use concepts, variables, or units of analysis that are too broad or abstract; (6) 
don't 
consider research problems in terms of English or other foreign languages; and (7) don't politicize research. 
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The indigenous psychology movement was echoed by many Taiwanese 
psychologists in the 1990s, especially among NTU alumni since the indigenous 
psychology movement was very much a NTU-based academic movement.  Through the 
collective efforts of the advocates of the movement, such as publishing papers and books, 
holding conferences and seminars, and engaging in dialogues with foreign psychologists 
as well as scholars from other disciplines, the indigenous psychology movement in 
Taiwan was beginning to be recognized as a significant phenomenon in psychology 
starting in the late 1990s, both domestically (for example, Chiu, 2004) and internationally 
(for example, Allwood & Berry, 2006b; Hwang, 1998).  However, despite the seeming 
success of the movement, the indigenous psychology movement also started to show 
some signs of worrisome development started from the 2000s. 
The indigenization discourse gradually lost its charm in inspiring the new 
generation of psychologists.  From a critical historical perspective, the indigenous 
psychology movement was never a purely academic movement; it was also part of the 
various social movements resulting from the collective identity crisis that started in the 
1970s.  As I pointed out above, the Taiwanese localization movement involved 
disillusionment with the political ideology of the KMT government, and it resulted in the 
gradual separation of Taiwanese identity from Chinese identity.  Similarly, the 
indigenous psychology movement involved temporary disillusionment with the idealized 
image of the United States.  However, unlike political relations with the United States 
which soon mended, in the academic context temporary disillusionment became the 
window of opportunity for Taiwanese social scientists to be confronted with the 
dependency of their academic practice, and the Sinicization movement was their reaction 
 118 
to rectify the condition of dependency.  In terms of discourse, the condition of 
dependency was conceptualized as a ―Westernized‖ condition which was to be rectified 
by Sinicizing psychological research—that is, the individual psychologist‘s ascetic effort 
to refrain from uncritically utilizing predigested Western psychological knowledge.  The 
change of discourse from Sinicization to indigenization in the 1990s did not really change 
the conceptualization of how the Westernized condition should be rectified; the 
indigenization discourse continued to rely on the individual psychologist‘s ascetic effort 
to indigenize psychological research.  The major change involved in the indigenization 
discourse was that it proposed a new psychology—that is, an indigenously compatible 
psychology—as the desired object.  However, with the democratic overthrow of the 
authoritarian regime of the KMT government in the 2000 presidential election and the 
following eight years of governance by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), a 
Taiwanese-led opposition party, terms such as ―localization‖ and ―indigenization‖ 
gradually lost their charm in inspiring movements since what these terms refer to were 
seen as accomplished rather than as goals worth fighting for.  For the new generation of 
psychologists, the new ―magic‖ terms in the post-coldwar Taiwan dominated by 
neoliberal ideology became ―globalization‖ and ―internationalization‖ rather than 
―indigenization‖ and ―localization.‖  And as K.-H. Chen and Chien (2004) point out, 
terms such as ―internationalization‖ or ―globalization‖ to a great extent equal 
―Americanization‖ in the Taiwanese context (pp. 185-186). 
As the indigenization discourse gradually lost its charm, its conceptual weakness 
in advancing the indigenous psychology movement started to become clear.  As I tried 
to point out above, the Sinicization discourse was proposed during the time when the 
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idealized image of the United States was temporarily shattered and thus the 
overwhelming influence of mainstream American psychology was revealed to 
psychologists as a problematic dependency on ―Western‖ psychology.  As a result, the 
―Chinese vs. Western‖ binary was used in the Sinicization discourse to deal with the 
―relevancy‖ issue of psychological research.  Psychological research in Taiwan became 
irrelevant to the psychological life of the Taiwanese people because of its dependency on 
Western psychology and therefore it had to be Sinicized.  However, in the indigenization 
discourse, this ―Chinese vs. Western‖ binary was further expanded to a ―Chinese 
psychology vs. Western psychology‖ binary in which Chinese psychology became the 
aim in the agenda of the indigenous psychology movement.  The agenda proposed by 
the indigenization discourse was essentially an anticolonial agenda which attempted to 
break free from dependence on Western psychology (Westernized psychology) by a 
collective effort to instate a Chinese psychology (indigenized psychology). 
In Yang‘s distinction of the three psychologies, the ideal psychology was 
indigenous psychology which was ―spontaneously, naturally, and gradually formed‖ in a 
genuine indigenization process.  And according to Yang (2012), this was psychology in 
its ―pure form‖ (p. 7).  However, this ideal psychology—that is, the one hundred percent 
indigenously compatible psychology—was an opportunity lost for non-Western societies 
since the psychologies in these societies were already a kind of Westernized psychology 
initiated and developed under the domination of a powerful Western psychology.  The 
only choice left for non-Western psychologies was to pseudo-indigenize the already 
Westernized psychology by the ascetic efforts of psychologists so as to facilitate the 
―indigenous compatibility‖—a notion derived from the ideal psychology represented by 
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indigenous Western psychology—of their research.  Therefore, this anticolonial agenda 
did not really break free from the dependence on Western psychology.  On the contrary, 
it was still entangled in its identification with the idealized image of Western psychology 
by instating an inverse ideal image of anOther psychology whose parameters are 
implicitly determined by the idealized image of Western psychology. 
As I have shown in the previous two sections, psychology was introduced to the 
Chinese-speaking world in a colonial situation in which the West as a whole was 
idealized.  This idealized West was represented by Europe before World War II, but in 
the postwar era it became represented by the United States.  In the colonial situation, 
Western knowledge was introduced as a superior form of knowledge, and psychology 
was included even though its superiority was to a great extent presumed rather than 
proven.  The further institutionalization and professionalization of psychology 
suppressed and marginalized traditional psychological practice (the study of xin) and 
created a Chinese-speaking psychology which in essence is a system of super-signs used 
to guide discursive and nondiscursive psychological practices, and whose authority 
comes from the metonymic relation with mainstream American psychology through the 
system of super-signs.  Therefore, the practice of psychology in Chinese-speaking 
societies, Taiwan included, became an inauthentic practice in which the meaning and 
structure of the local psychological life were metonymically imposed rather than locally 
articulated.  Therefore, psychology‘s journey to the East was essentially a colonization 
of psychic space in which the ―soul‖ (xin) grounded in the cultural-linguistic matrix of 
the Chinese language was no longer allowed to give voice to itself in psychology. 
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Furthermore, this inauthentic practice of psychology had an effect on the 
psychologists.  They became problematic subjects in their practice of psychology.  As 
Yang and Wen (1982) describe, 
The subjects whom we studied are Chinese people in Chinese society, but 
the theories and methods we used are mostly imported from the West or of 
the Western style. In our daily life, we are Chinese; when we are doing 
research, we become Western people. We repress our Chinese thoughts or 
philosophy intentionally or unintentionally, and make them unable to be 
expressed in our procedure of research. (as cited in Hwang, 2005a, p. 230, 
italics added) 
 
As long as the authority of the idealized West held sway, this inauthentic practice of 
psychology and the split of subjectivity would not be seen as problematic. However, as I 
pointed out above, the idealized image of the United States was temporarily shattered in 
the 1970s, and as a result the inauthentic practice was seen as problematic.  The 
indigenous psychology movement emerged in this window of opportunity.  Both 
Sinicization discourse and indigenization discourse conceptualized the colonial situation 
of psychology with an anticolonial language which was once inspiring in the 1980s and 
1990s when the language of oppositional politics was also used by other social 
movements in fighting against the authoritarian regime of the KMT government.  
Nevertheless, this anticolonial discourse gradually became less inspiring and started to 
show its conceptual limitation in effectively problematizing the colonial situation of 
psychology in Taiwan. 
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Chapter 5 
Remembering the Dream: Toward a Postcolonial Critique 
 
The indigenous psychology movement in Taiwan started as one man‘s dream and 
eventually emerged as a collective effort of psychologists to find a way out of the 
overwhelming influence of mainstream American psychology so that the ―soul‖ (xin) 
could be restored to the practice of psychology.  However, both the Sinicization and 
indigenization discourses failed to provide an effective strategy for breaking free from 
dependence on Western psychology.  On the contrary, the movement became 
unknowingly entrapped in the problematic imaginary relation with mainstream American 
psychology. 
What most indigenous psychologists did not realize is that the call for an 
indigenous psychology actually emerged out of a traumatic encounter between two 
worlds in a colonial context, and colonial trauma is not something that can be simply 
wished away, ignored, or bypassed.  As Kuan-Hsing Chen (1998), a prominent 
Taiwanese scholar in the field of cultural studies, keenly points out, ―we are still 
operating within the boundary of colonial history, which has generated a whole set of… 
colonial cultural imaginary in which all of us are caught up‖ (p. 2, italics added).  
Therefore, to face colonial trauma involves more than setting indigenous psychological 
research guidelines—the ―Dos‖ and ―Don‘ts‖ suggested by Kuo-Shu Yang in his 
manifesto-like Why Do We Need to Develop an Indigenous Chinese Psychology? (1993).  
It also involves more than enriching the epistemological and methodological complexity 
of indigenous psychology as suggested by Kwang-Kuo Huang (2005b), one of the most 
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assiduous and prolific indigenous psychologists in Taiwan.  It is even more than using 
the hermeneutic phenomenological approach as a ―cultural redemption‖ of the 
already-Westernized psychology, as suggested by Der-Heuy Yee (1997), the pioneer of 
hermeneutic phenomenological psychology in Taiwan.  What they failed to notice is the 
depth (in relation to subjectivity) and pervasiveness (in relation to discourse) of this 
colonial trauma and how, on the imaginary level, it has shaped the historical trajectory of 
the indigenous psychology movement in Taiwan.  At the center of this pathological 
searching for recognition, as I have demonstrated in chapter 3 and chapter 4, is a 
problematic colonial subject whose desire is determined by the inverse idea/ideal of the 
West.  Ashis Nandy describes this inversion in his postcolonial masterpiece The Intimate 
Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism (1983) as ―the second form of 
colonization‖: 
This colonialism colonizes minds in addition to bodies and it releases 
forces within the colonized societies to alter their cultural priorities once 
for all.  In the process, it helps generalize the concept of the modern West 
from a geographical and temporal entity to a psychological category.  
The West is now everywhere, within the West and outside; in structures 
and in minds. (p. xi) 
 
The consequence of this inversion, this colonial trauma, is what I call the problematic 
colonial subject.  It is problematic because, unlike the inversion that helps to shape the 
egoic gestalt as discussed in Lacan‘s conception of the mirror stage (Lacan, 2006), the 
second form of colonialism fragments and transgresses a colonized people‘s egoic gestalt, 
as Fanon (1952/1967), Nandy (1983), and Bhabha (1994) have pointed out.  The desire 
of this subject is, therefore, as problematic as the subject himself or herself; it is 
inevitably a hybrid of desires in which the desire to be Western (or to be non-Western) is 
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at the core of the economy of desire, as Fanon (1965), Memmi (1957/1991), and Nandy 
(1983) have pointed out. 
In an academic environment which is even more Americanized than it was in the 
1970s, is there really a way out of the seemingly totalizing influence of mainstream 
American psychology?  It seems to me that Foucault‘s idea of ―criticism‖ is a strategy 
worth considering, and to a great extent it helped to lay the foundation for the 
postcolonial critique provided by this project.  Foucault‘s (1980b) notion of ―criticism‖ 
refers to a form of local theoretical offensive which is ―an autonomous, non-centralized 
kind of theoretical production, one that is to say whose validity is not dependent on the 
approval of the established regime of thought‖ (p. 81).  In another text, Foucault (1997) 
further explicates the operation of criticism as follows: 
Criticism is no longer going to be practiced in the search for formal 
structures with universal value but, rather, as a historical investigation into 
the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize 
ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying.  In that 
sense, this criticism is not transcendental…it is genealogical in its design 
and archaeological in its method.  Archaeological…in the sense that 
it…will seek to treat the instances of discourse that articulate what we 
think, say, and do as so many historical events.  And this critique will be 
genealogical in the sense that…it will separate out, from the contingency 
that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or 
thinking what we are do, or think.  It is…seeking to give new impetus, as 
far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom. (p. 315) 
 
In other words, criticism is a form of theoretical production that utilizes archaeology to 
historically eventualize ―instances of discourse‖ so that the established regime of 
knowledge can be discerned as a result of historical contingency rather than as ―natural‖ 
or as ―inevitable.‖  And as Foucault points out, this criticism proceeds by means of ―a 
return of knowledge‖ or ―an insurrection of subjugated knowledges‖ (Foucault, 1980b, p. 
81).  By ―subjugated knowledges‖ Foucault means two things.  First, it refers to ―the 
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historical contents that have been buried and disguised in a functionalist coherence or 
formal systemization‖ (p. 81), and as Foucault points out, ―only the historical contents 
allow us to rediscover the ruptural effects of conflict and struggle that the order imposed 
by functionalist or systematizing thought is designed to mask‖ (p. 82); and second, it 
refers to ―a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their 
task or insufficiently elaborated: naïve knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, 
beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity‖ (p. 82).   
Similarly, what I have presented in this dissertation is a postcolonial critique 
which does not instate anOther competing system of knowledge but attempts to provide a 
―way out‖ of the established regime of mainstream American psychology.  The strategy 
of this postcolonial critique is to destabilize the seemingly totalizing power of 
mainstream American psychology by way of re-membering critical historiographies with 
regard to its construction Others, the presumed universality of its history, its metonymic 
practice in the Chinese-speaking world, and Taiwanese psychologists‘ struggle with it on 
the imaginary level so as to reveal the power-knowledge-desire relations therein.  What 
this project offers is a strategy to decolonize psychic space so as to open up the 
possibility for psychology in Taiwan to be practiced in an authentic manner—that is, as a 
reflexive social practice in relation to the psychological life of its local community—and 
so that the ―soul‖ (xin) grounded in the cultural-linguistic matrix of the Chinese language 
can finally be allowed to emerge in the practice of psychology rather than be suppressed 
by the system of super-signs maintained by the problematic relation with idealized 
mainstream American psychology. 
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In sum, I consider this project to be part of the historical struggle of the 
indigenous psychology movement.  What I have tried to do is to turn a critical gaze back 
upon the movement itself in order to decolonize it from the colonial cultural imaginary.  
This is a crucial step in decolonizing the psychic space of the colonized. Without it, even 
the most well-intended indigenous psychologist will keep falling back into the ―vicious 
circle of colonization, decolonization, and recolonization,‖ as Chen (1998, p. 2) has 
warned. 
This project has been a historical project in which the aim is to remember the 
history of the indigenous psychology movement in Taiwan.  The term ―remember‖ is 
used in two senses.  The first sense is quite straightforward. I have written a history of 
the indigenous psychology movement in Taiwan because, in general, the history of 
psychology in Taiwan is rarely told.  To the best of my knowledge, after all these years, 
there is only one book chapter by Hsu (1987) about the history of psychology in Taiwan; 
one journal article by Chiu (2004) about the history of social psychology in Taiwan; and 
one journal article by Hwang (2005a) about the emergence of Chinese indigenous 
psychology in Taiwan.  It is as if there were a consensus among Taiwanese 
psychologists that psychology does not need a history in Taiwan; it is as if the 
magnificent, innovative, and dramatic events all happen at the center—in Europe or in 
the United States of America.  This very fact of lacking a historical consciousness is in 
fact a symptom of colonization which is addressed in Chapter 3. 
This brings me to the second sense of the term ―remember.‖  Writing about the 
indigenous psychology movement in Taiwan has been a way of re-membering the 
historical trajectory of psychology in Taiwan.  Through looking into historical 
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documents, formulating temporary hypotheses, and finding ways to organize the bits and 
pieces into a historical narrative, the historical trajectory of psychology in Taiwan 
eventually becomes clear.  The history I have written is, therefore, not a history about 
progress; it is not about how psychology has helped to improve the lives of the 
Taiwanese people.  Instead, it is a genealogical history in a Foucauldian sense. 
This project has been an archaeological project which involves an analysis of the 
indigenous psychology movement on the discursive level.  Since the analysis of 
discourse involves more than knowledge, it is no longer satisfactory to remain on the 
methodological level with regard to the discussion of indigenous psychology as most 
indigenous psychologists have done.  That is to say, the recognition/misrecognition of 
indigenous psychology involves more than epistemology, more than philosophy, more 
than ontology; in other words, it is not only a knowledge issue but also a power issue.  
As I have argued, the pathology of recognition is characteristic of a colonial and 
oppressive culture; in this case, unfortunately, the pathology has been demonstrated to 
exist within the discipline of psychology.  In order to bring both power and knowledge 
into my analysis, I followed the lineage of discourse analysis originally developed by 
Foucault in the Archaeology of Knowledge (1971/1972) and in Discipline and Punish 
(1975/1977), and by Said in Orientalism (1979), and by Bhabha in The Location of 
Culture (1994).  The analysis of the ―power-knowledge-desire relations‖ in which the 
discipline of psychology is embedded is laid out as part of a theoretical discussion in 
chapter 2, for it constitutes the horizon in which the indigenous psychology movement 
has emerged. 
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This portion of the theoretical work consisted of two parts.  The first involved an 
analysis of the historical development of the discourse of ―Others‖ that takes place at the 
center of psychology—that is, in mainstream American psychology.  My argument has 
been that, in the post-World War II era, psychology has not only become part of the 
―psychosciences and disciplines‖ that help to shape the postwar Euro-American subjects 
(Rose, 1990, 1996); it has also played a constitutive role in shaping the postwar 
non-Euro-American subjects.  I traced the historical formulation of the discourse of 
―Others‖ within psychology from the racial Other to the cultural Other.  In the historical 
process of discursively positioning Others, ―culture‖ is a new signifier of difference in 
place of ―race.‖  The so-called ―culture-related‖ psychologies that have gradually 
developed in the past couple of decades can be seen as the ―surfaces of emergence‖ in 
which the representation of the cultural Other takes shape.  The second part of the 
theoretical work involved an analysis of the historical development of the discourse of 
―the idealized West‖ that takes place at the margins of psychology.  In this project, 
however, I limited myself to analyzing one case that I am most familiar with— 
psychology in the Chinese speaking world, especially in Taiwan. 
Finally, this project has been a psychoanalytic project.
29
  The first sense of it 
being psychoanalytic is on the theoretical level.  Even though psychoanalysis achieved 
its original success in and from the therapy room, it has never been bounded by it.  
Psychoanalysis has always been used as a theoretical resource for social criticism; in fact, 
                                               
29 There is no doubt that psychoanalytic theory can be used either to oppress (for example, to pathologize 
homosexuality) or to provide rationales for oppression (for example, Mannoni (1956) rationalized 
oppression as a necessary dependence of the colonized).  On the other hand, psychoanalytic theory can 
also be a powerful theoretical apparatus against oppression as many post-colonial writers have 
demonstrated.  It seems to me that psychoanalytic theory becomes oppressive when it functions as a 
totalizing theory; when it functions as a criticism—findings holes in a whole, so to speak—it becomes a 
powerful weapon against a totalizing system. 
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Freud himself can be regarded as the founder of psychoanalytic social criticism.  Later 
in his life, Freud wrote two influential essays The Future of an Illusion (1927) and 
Civilization and Its Discontents (1930) critical of the pathologies of religion and 
civilization.  In the context of colonialism, Octave Mannoni‘s Prospero and Caliban: 
The psychology of Colonization (1956) and Frantz Fanon‘s Black Skin, White Masks 
(1952/1967) are two pioneer works concerning how the colonial situation creates its 
subjects—both the colonizer and the colonized.  Other works have since advanced this 
discussion: Albert Memmi‘s The Colonizer and the Colonized (1957/1991), Ashis 
Nandy‘s The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism (1983), 
Homi Bhabha‘s The Location of Culture (1994), and Kelly Oliver‘s The Colonization of 
Psychic Space: A Psychoanalytic Social Theory of Oppression (2004).  Oliver‘s (2004) 
project to transform psychoanalytic concepts into social concepts by ―developing a 
psychoanalytic theory based on a notion of the individual or psyche that is thoroughly 
social‖ (p. xiii) seems especially relevant to the colonial context in which the individual 
developmental schema of subjectivity has been greatly challenged.  As Oliver says, 
If the psyche does not exist apart from social relationships and cultural 
influences, a social psychoanalytic theory is necessary not only to 
diagnose social phenomena but also to explain individual subject 
formation.  We cannot explain the development of individuality or 
subjectivity apart from its social context. (pp. xiii-xiv) 
 
I take Lacan‘s linguistic formulation of Freud‘s psychoanalytic theory as a powerful 
theoretical apparatus for social criticism.  Many postcolonial authors have been using 
Lacanian concepts in their works.  The re-conceptualization of psychoanalytic theory 
into a social theory as suggested by Oliver has been an interesting direction to take after 
the Lacanian reformulation, and I consider this project to be part of this theoretical 
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endeavor.  Many of Lacan‘s concepts (for example, his conceptions of the mirror stage, 
misrecognition, the structure of perversion, the notion of disavowal, the imaginary, the 
symbolic, etc.) have been the building blocks of this project on the psychoanalytic level. 
The second sense of this as a psychoanalytic project is on the level of intervention.  
Psychoanalysis has always been about intervention, about inducing transformation in the 
subject in order to relieve him or her from suffering.  This project of remembering the 
indigenous psychology movement in Taiwan is, to a great extent, analogue to the 
remembering process Lacan mentions in Freud’s Papers on Technique, 1953-1954 
(1991).  There Lacan suggests that ―the restitution of the subject‘s wholeness appears in 
the guise of a restoration of the past‖ (p. 14).  As he says, 
One could say that [what] Freud touches [on] there…[is] the fact that 
[what] the subject relives, comes to remember, in the intuitive sense of the 
words, the formative events of his existence, is not in itself so very 
important.  What matters is what he reconstructs of it….I would 
say—when all is said and done, it is less a matter of remembering than of 
rewriting history. (pp. 13-14) 
 
As I have argued above, modern colonialism transgresses and fragments the egoic gestalt 
of the colonized.  As a result, the colonized does not have a history unless it is related to 
the history of the colonizer; through the inversion of the idealized West, the traditional 
history of the colonized has become a scandal, a necessary negation in order to idealize 
the West.  Writing history is therefore an effort to put the unspeakable—colonial 
trauma—into words. It is by writing about the history of this dream of one man—the 
dream for a genuinely indigenous psychology—that we, Taiwanese psychologists, will 
eventually be relieved from the cultural aphasia resulting from the traumatic encounter 
between two worlds and regain the ability to listen to our own heart (xin), giving voice to 
our own dreams. 
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